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ABSTRACT

A case study approach was used to evaluate
organizational change that occurred between 1986 and 1989 at
General Dynamics Corporation.

The purpose of the study was

to determine how persons in leading positions can
realistically expect to plan and implement significant,
planned organizational changes.

The changes specifically

studied were those which resulted from the planning and
implementation of the Ethics Program.

The Ethics Program at

General Dynamics was examined not only as a case example of
a planned, intended change, but as a vehicle for broad
strategic goals pertaining to human resources management.
Historic data from corporate documents and surveys, and
current data from a resurvey were used to establish changes
in trends in the organization.

Interviews were used to

explore the planning process and general planning-related
change trends.

Two groups of employees, totaling twenty

individuals, were interviewed.

The planning group (five

individuals) provided specific information on planning
processes, and the cultural group (fifteen individuals)
provided general information on the culture of the
organization and culturally related changes.
Results indicated that the Ethics Program was
successful in meeting its specific objectives of making
employees aware of the standards of conduct and enforcing
conformance to those standards.

The broader human resources
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goals intended by the program’s designers did not appear to
have been as successfully implemented.

A conflict between

two distinctively different sets of cultural values appeared
to have offset many of the intended changes.

Findings

further indicated that the Ethics Program was most likely an
inappropriate vehicle for the implementation of general,
strategic human resources goals.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
As organizational competition rises to a global level,
long range planning has become increasingly important.
Organizations in the near future will be required to go
through major strategic reorientations that will involve
technological and sociostructural changes.

These changes

will require technological improvements in products and
manufacturing methods, structural changes in organization,
and reevaluations of services, markets, competition, and
human resources.
In the future, foreign competition will increase,
natural resources will become more scarce and expensive, and
productivity levels in the United States will remain the
same, or even decline (Byars, 1984).

Strategic planning

will be needed in all types and sizes of organizations.
"Strategic management is concerned with making decisions
about an organization’s future direction and implementing
those decisions" (Byars, 1984, p. 6).
Social, political, and economic changes in the
environment have forced organization heads to consider
strategic organizational changes, but managers too often

1
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focus on small components of the overall change problem,
and, further, tend to underestimate the scope of the task.
Tichy (1983) identified some of the common areas of
management focus which he called tactical concerns:
1. Should we change from a functional structure to a
matrix structure?
2.

Should we centralize or decentralize?

3.

Should we launch an expensive companywide "quality

of work" program?
4. Should we individualize or collectivize the
incentive program?
5.

Should we attempt to do a better job of relating

business strategy to organizational design? (p. 4)
These are called "tactical" concerns because they do not fit
into an overall framework for planned change.

Tactical

changes are frequently guided by fad or personal preference,
and are generally not based on a systematic analysis of
organizational needs.

Managers may be able to adapt a trial

and error method of changing to meet the needs of smaller
and simpler organizations.

Trial and error methods are

often invited by the massive and unpredictable changes in
social environment, political posturing, and economic
conditions.

But large organizations with their

ever-increasing complexity cannot tolerate sporadic,
discontinuous change and expect to remain in business.

Few

executives believe that the deep and enduring aspects of an
organization can be easily changed or replaced (Wilkins &.
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Bristow, 1987).

These authors noted "However, the time

frames executives consider when attempting to implement bold
new strategies . . . suggest that many are either not clear
about the difficulties involved or choose to ignore certain,
key principles of change" (p. 221).
Organizations of all types facing an increasingly
turbulent and complex environment must develop strategic
planning capabilities to survive.

Tichy (1983) suggested

that strategic changes involve three sets of problems:

(a)

technical problems, such as selection of markets, product
development, pricing, and organizational design; (b)
political problems, such as regulatory requirements and
shifting power bases; and (c) cultural problems, such as
shifting personal values and inefficient but traditional
rituals.

These three sets of problems have been addressed

at General Dynamics Corporation and the proposed solutions
have been incorporated into the company’s strategic
objectives.

Actions taken on the strategic plan have

resulted in the implementation of a corporatewide Ethics
Program.

Historical Background
General Dynamics Corporation began a program of
strategic organizational change in mid-1985 as the result of
serious charges of fraud, deception, and graft by the United
States Government (Larsen, 1987).

During the previous year,

many examples of mischarging to government contracts by
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defense industry companies were brought to media attention
by various members of Congress.

General Dynamics was

specifically targeted for investigation by then Secretary of
the Navy, John Lehman.

After government auditors found many

unallowable charges to government contracts by members of
the corporation, Secretary Lehman threatened to withhold the
award of new contracts to the company by the Navy and to
withhold progress payments on existing contracts.

General

Dynamics executives negotiated an agreement with the Navy
that committed the company to develop and implement
effective changes in organizational policy and behavior.
In mid-1985, General Dynamics CEO, David Lewis, who had
been one of the key players in the controversy, announced
his retirement effective January, 1986, and appointed
Stanley Pace, formerly of TRW, as Vice Chairman to replace
him upon his retirement.

Pace was commissioned to establish

a corporatewide Ethics Program and to make any other changes
required to improve the company’s image and reputation
(Larsen, 1987).

In addition, Pace was charged with the

responsibility of maintaining the company’s profitability in
the face of massive cuts in defense spending and sweeping
changes in the Defense Department’s procurement process
("General Dynamics," 1988).

Because the Department of

Defense was and is the primary customer of General Dynamics,
any changes in defense procurement can seriously affect the
company’s business posture.

By May, 1989, the company had

become financially sound and was devoid of implication in
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the myriad of investigations, charges, and fines before the
Justice Department in 1988 and early 1989 known to the
public as the 111 Wind scandal.

The corporatewide Ethics

Program, created and implemented as a planned change, and
its effect on operating procedures, employee attitudes,
corporate image, and human resources programs, is the focus
of this research study.

Statement of the Problem
General Dynamics undertook a rare form of strategic
planning by including an element of social responsibility as
a formal strategic objective, and the Ethics Program was
implemented to meet this objective.

The company’s business

posture in 1988 indicated that the specific objectives of
the program to improve the company’s image and to continue
winning government contracts were met (Packard, Laird, Moot,
Bowsher & Conahan, 1988).
The unique nature of the Ethics Program warranted
further investigation.

Even though the strategic objectives

were apparently accomplished, the broader issue of the
successful implementation of a planned organizational change
was not as apparent.

The Ethics Program has become a model

for the industry (Packard et al., 1988), but what actually
happened inside the organization?

The position of the

researcher as a participant observer in the organization and
an internal change agent provided the means to examine the
implied goals of the program further.

The implied goals of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Ethics Program were related to expected organizational
changes that would affect the culture of the organization.
The specific strategic objectives could be evaluated by
economic and organizational performance measures, but the
broader goals of the program would have to be examined as
changes in the fundamental organizational behavior.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research was to determine how
persons in leading positions can realistically expect to
plan and implement a significant, planned organizational
change such as that envisioned by the Ethics Program of
General Dynamics Corporation.

To accomplish this purpose, I

investigated three research questions:
1. What changes actually took place at General Dynamics
between the years 1985 and 1988?
2. Were the changes the result of the strategic plan?
3. Was the Ethics Program successful in meeting its
specific objectives and its broader goals?
Other than hypothesizing that specific changes have
taken place over the target period, this research is
primarily an exploratory case study.

The business aspects

of the corporate mission were not considered except as they
were relevant to specific programs created as a part of the
overall Ethics Program.

Even though the specific changes

under examination were probably placed on the agenda as the
result of economic pressures, the focus of this study is not
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on the specific motivation for change but the planning and
implementation of the change itself and the results of the
program.

Definition of Terms
The following terms used in this study may have
different common meanings than are intended.
Change agent:

Any person involved in creating planned

change in an organization.

The person may or may not be a

member of that organization (Bennis, 1966).
Change program:

A coordinated series of interventions

that are interrelated and build upon each other to produce
certain specific planned changes (Bennis, 1969).
Feedback:

Information sent from one system or

subsystem to another concerning the performance of the
receiver which is intended to affect some change in the
actions of the receiver (Anderson, 1970).
Intervention:

A specific action taken by a change

agent to facilitate the change process, usually an action
that interferes with a common sequence of behaviors (Fordyce
& Weil, 1971).
Latent functions:

Consequences or aspects of an

organization or social group which are unintended, and may
or may not be recognized (Merton, 1957).
Manifest functions:

Consequences or aspects of an

organization or social group which are intended, expected,
and recognized (Merton, 1957).
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Norm:

An idea in the minds of the members of a group

that can be put into the form of a statement, and that
specifies what the members should do, ought to do, and are
expected to do under given circumstances (Homans, 1950).
Organizational climate:

General motivational patterns

among organization members which are supported by formal and
informal reward systems (Litwin & Stringer, 1968).
Organizational culture:

The collection of beliefs,

values, traditions, customs, rituals, and practices that are
prevalent and enduring within a definable group, and are
passed from generation to generation of group members
(Levinson, 1972).
Organizational effectiveness:

A measure of the

adequacy of organizational processes and the degree to which
specified goals are attained economically (Bennis, 1969).
Planned change:

A collaboration of some combination of

external and internal change agents who bring about
specified changes in the organization based on
organizational goals and objectives (Bennis, Benne, Chin, &
Corey, 1976).
Strategic plan:

A decision or series of decisions made

in the present incorporating the organizational mission,
goals, and objectives into a behavioral strategy to position
the organization for long term maximization of opportunity
(Byars, 1984).
Survey feedback:

A specific type of organizational

intervention where a survey is conducted, analyzed, and
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summarized and then fed back to the original respondents for
focused group discussions (Mann, 1957).

Assumptions
The purpose of the study was accomplished through an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Ethics Program at
General Dynamics.

The evaluation included an examination of

the planning process that resulted in the implementation of
the Ethics Program, an evaluation of the program itself, an
evaluation of related program successes and failures, and an
assessment of the impact of the program on the culture of
the organization.
Some basic assumptions were made regarding the nature
of the organization, the nature of change, and the ability
of the researcher to identify and analyze the sources of
organizational change.

The organization was assumed to be

represented by divisions located in San Diego, and the
Electronics Division in particular.

Changes were assumed to

have been detectable and to have had an identifiable source.
Objectives and programmatic means for selecting those
objectives were assumed to have been difficult to specify.
The participant observer was assumed to have sufficient
resources to evaluate programs with respect to the nature
and quality of the actions of program agents and outcomes.
The study was assumed to be able to explain a particular
organizational phenomenon within its organizational context.
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Limitations
An explanation of the process of planning and change at
General Dynamics provides a more holistic and meaningful
theoretical proposition than a carefully controlled
experiment which excludes many of the most important,
contextual relationships.

However, even though I have been

a participant observer in the case, I have had little
control over the significant events.

Causative analysis

cannot be as rigorous in a case study as that found in
experimental designs.

Still, the research questions were

stated in such a way that causative analysis was not as
important as descriptive analysis.

Thus, the results of the

study should be considered a descriptive analysis rather
than a test of hypotheses.
In addition, the results cannot necessarily be
interpreted as an accurate characterization of the real
General Dynamics Corporation.

Whatever the entire

organization is, it is remarkably diverse and constantly
changing.

No study could accurately portray the complex

character of any company of 100,000 employees with several
major divisions producing different sorts of products in
different parts of the world.

The results of this study at

best characterize one part of the company at one point in
time.
General Dynamics is primarily a government contractor.
As such, the company is culturally oriented to the
protection of information, both as a measure of national
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security and as a measure of political self-protection.

The

company has allowed the publication of previous research
conducted in the corporation only if the company was not
identified.

That the present study could be conducted and

published openly is in itself an indication of actual
cultural change within the company.

Still, there was a good

deal of pertinent information that could not be revealed
because it was proprietary or classified.

Although the

results of this study were limited by restrictions on
certain types of information, the conclusions have not been
affected by these restrictions.

The conclusions may be

considered both substantial and meaningful in regard to the
study *s purpose.

Significance of the Study
Despite its limitations, the unique character of the
case and the opportunities for insightful observation by the
researcher give this study its merit.

The opportunities for

methodical, longitudinal analysis of cultural phenomena
within an organization are very rare.

As noted in the next

chapter, most organizational studies are conducted over
relatively short periods of time by outside agents.

Few

long term members of organizations have the skills or
motivation necessary to conduct such a study.
But the key contribution of this research to
organizational literature is the orientation of the
investigation toward whole processes rather than isolated
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elements of processes.

The ultimate goal of this research

is to contribute to the understanding of leadership as a
process of collective, purposeful change.

Burns (1978)

specified planned change as a critical test for leaders:
"The test of their leadership function is their contribution
to change, measured by purpose drawn from collective motives
and values" (p. 427).

Even without characterizing Stanley

Pace as a leader, the kind of change strategy he undertook
at General Dynamics is the kind to which Burns was
referring.

It is not my intention to demonstrate whether or

not Pace was a leader during the time under study.

My

intention is to examine the nature of the change itself to
determine whether or not people can reasonably expect to
plan and implement change of this magnitude while having
some level of control on the manifest outcomes.

Verifying

change that has occurred as the result of the planning
process may help to indicate whether or not intended change
is an integral part of the leadership process.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction
As stated in Chapter I, the focus of this study is on
the process of change and its relationship to leadership.
Because the study is oriented toward an understanding of the
whole process of change rather than isolated elements of it,
a somewhat different theoretical approach was needed to
facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the results.
The process of change is far too complex to be understood by
the usual reductionistic techniques.

Rather than using a

linear rational model to structure the investigation, an
integrated network of models and concepts had to be
accumulated.

This approach is called bootstrapping (Capra,

1982).
The bootstrap approach requires a broad framework of
interlocking models and concepts.

None of the models or

concepts are any more important than the others to the
framework; each model is valid for some aspect of a
phenomenon or range of phenomena.

Models are considered

13
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approximations of reality rather than all-encompassing
theories.

Linear methods of investigation using a priori

models tend to produce linear results; the nature of the
model dictates the nature of the result because reality must
be structured to accomodate the model.

The bootstrap

approach provides a variety of tools to the researcher to
apply to reality as it is encountered (Capra, 1982).
The study of organizational change in real world
situations cannot be facilitated by the simple application
of organizational change theory to defined organizational
situations.

Understanding change and its implications must

be an eclectic use of ideas that, in many cases, overlap
each other but that highlight different aspects of the
change process.

The current study is concerned with how the

plan for change was developed, the impact of the planning
process on the organization, organizational change that
resulted from the implementation of the plan, and the
meaning of the change to the organization and society at
large.
Merton (1957) has suggested that there are two types of
functions of any change or feature of a society:
and latent functions.

manifest

Manifest functions are those

consequences for society or any of its segments that are
intended, expected, and recognized by participants in the
social system.

Latent functions are those consequences that

are neither intended nor recognized.

Although Merton

specified that latent functions are usually not recognizable
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by group members, he also suggested that they become
apparent in time.
In viewing the organization as a social system, the
concept of manifest and latent functions may be used to
explain various outcomes of the organization’s strategic
plan.

Manifest functions are those functions of the plan

and its subsequent activities that are related to the
expected outcomes of the plan.

Latent functions are those

functions that are related to the unexpected outcomes of the
plan.

To restate, latent functions are those developments

that directly result from the implementation of the plan and
were not intended by the planners.

A successfully

implemented plan will maximize the manifest functions of the
plan while minimizing the latent or unforeseen functions of
the plan.

Both types of functions of the strategic plan in

relation to its consequences for organizational change and
organizational culture at General Dynamics have been
investigated in this study.
To investigate manifest and latent functions of a
program such as the Ethics Program, some background in the
planning process, organizational change, and organizational
culture would be useful.

An understanding of the planning

process provides a means to assess the objectives of the
program and, ultimately, evaluate organizational performance
to those objectives.

The organizational change process must

be understood to define the development of the planning
process and the impact of the implementation of the plan.
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definition of the organizational culture will provide a
basis upon which to explain the effects of the program on
the organization and its members.
Society at large is concerned with the legitimacy of
the organization and its operations.

Whether or not an

organization can continue to exist depends a great deal on
the manifest and latent outcomes of its operations and the
impact of those outcomes on the community in which the
organization operates.

Therefore, the aspects of the

community’s and the organization’s understanding of the
organization’s role and responsibility must be examined.

In

this case, the planned change under consideration is
specifically related to the organization’s responsibility to
its customers and to the community.
Finally, the role of planned change and its context in
society is crucial to the process of leadership.

Our

understanding of the leadership process has undergone
significant evolution in the recent past and should be
examined.

The ultimate objective of the current study is to

contribute to the understanding of at least one element of
the leadership process:

intended, collective change.

In light of the previous discussion, Chapter II has
been organized to cover a variety of interrelated concepts
and models for planning processes, organizational change
processes, organizational culture, organizational
legitimacy, and leadership.

In some cases, an examination

of the development of thought in an area is appropriate to
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facilitate an understanding of current thinking.

The

purpose of the chapter is to provide a broad framework for
the discussion and interpretation of the results of the
study.

Strategic Planning
Strategic planning is primarily a management function
that is designed to have specific business applications.
Most published literature distinguishes between strategy
content and the strategy process.

But there have been very

few attempts to explore the relationship between strategy
content and process within an organization (Miller, 1989).
Strategy content typically consists of marketing strategies,
product line strategies, technological strategies, financial
strategies, and growth strategies.

Some strategic planning

literature is devoted to human resource planning (Angle,
Manz & Van De Ven, 1985; Dyer, 1985; Galbraith, 1983; Hall,
1984; Kanter, 1983a; Lorange & Murphy, 1983, 1984; Miles &
Snow, 1984; Schuler, 1989; Schuler & Jackson, 1987; Stumpf &
Hanrahan, 1984), but none specifically addresses social or
community responsibility as an element of strategic planning
content.

The unique feature of the Ethics Program as an

element of the strategic plan at General Dynamics is that
its only potentially measurable objective was to maintain
the company’s legitimacy.

To apply strategic planning

principles to the planning, development, and implementation
processes of this program and their impact on the
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organization, the literature can be grouped to examine three
elements of strategic planning:

the planning process

itself, the business aspects of the planning process which
are primarily related to content, and the cultural aspects
of the planning process.
The Planning Process
Strategic planning is designed to answer four issues
for an organization (Byars, 1984).

The four issues concern

organizational identity, current business posture, future
organizational directions, and desirable strategies for
progressing in future directions.

Strategic planning helps

an organization make decisions in the present to develop a
future position.

Strategic planning is desirable because

organizations that develop plans normally perform better
than ones that do not.

Planning insures that decisions will

be more consistent with the organizational mission, and
planning allows smoother and more efficient change by
indicating milestones and timing.
Normally, the strategic planning process is
characterized as a step by step process (Bennis, 1966;
Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Byars, 1984; Lorange & Vancil,
1976; Normann,

1977; Ohmae, 1982; Wrapp, 1967).

Ohmae

(1982) specified five steps in the planning process.
the business domain must be clearly defined.

First,

Second, the

business environment must be extrapolated into the future.
Third, the choices of strategic options must be listed and
then narrowed according to predictions of the future
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environment.

Fourth, a plan of implementation must be

developed to coincide with best estimates of available
resources, and the plan must be implemented to pace itself
with the distribution of those resources.

And fifth, a

stringent change control procedure must be implemented to
prevent changing basic assumptions and ground rules unless
it becomes absolutely necessary.
Ohmae’s suggestion provides a reasonable outline of the
planning process.

However, a specification of more detailed

activities would be more useful to the functionally oriented
manager.

With this thought in mind, Byars (1984) outlined

eight steps for the planning, implementation, and evaluation
of strategic goals.

The first five steps are considered

planning activities, steps six and seven are considered
implementation activities, and step eight can be considered
a performance evaluation.
The first step is to define the organizational mission
with special attention to the organization’s philosophy of
doing business and purpose for existence.

The

organizational philosophy establishes the values, beliefs,
and guidelines for the manner in which the organization
provides goods and services and conducts itself in relation
to the community.

The organizational purpose defines the

activities that the organization conceptualizes as
characteristic of its role in business and in the community.
The mission statement, then, is a brief and succinct
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statement that communicates the organization’s view of
itself to the world.
The second step is to formulate policies as general
guidelines for action.

These policies specifically outline

the framework within which organizational objectives are
established and strategies are selected.

Once action

decisions are made, strategic policies provide guidelines
for implementation.
The third step is to establish long range and short
range objectives.

Long range objectives specify results

desired from the pursuit of the organizational mission to be
expected one or more years from the present.

Short range

objectives set performance targets to be used to achieve the
organization’s long range objectives.
The fourth step is to identify strategic alternatives
and options available to the organization for achieving its
long and short range objectives.

In the fourth step,

omissions of viable alternatives can result in an incorrect
decision.

Therefore error should be weighted on the side of

inclusion rather than of omission.
The fifth step is to compare alternatives and select a
strategy.

The strategy chosen should be consistent with

previously decided and specified organizational mission and
strategic policies.
The sixth step is to develop an organizational
structure with the appropriate authority relationships and
ional units to implement the strategy.

The
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organizational structure is critical.

An inappropriate

structure can nullify a carefully conceived strategic plan.
The seventh step is to manage organizational activities
and allocate resources to accomplish objectives.

The key

objective in the sixth step is to ensure that the activities
necessary to accomplish the mission and strategy are
performed effectively.
Finally, the eighth step is to monitor the
effectiveness of the strategy in achieving the
organizational mission and objectives.

The eighth step is

designed as a feedback loop to provide top managers with
sufficient visibility to determine whether or not the
strategic objectives have been reached.
The formalized planning process outlined by Byars has
the distinct advantage of face validity.

Byars intended for

the eight steps to provide a comprehensive framework for the
examination and analysis of the planning process in any
organization.

To the uninitiated, the process seems to be

very clear, precise, and rational.

In the world of business

however, a rationally ordered process with distinct,
formalized steps may not be as easy to apply as it would
appear.

After studying corporate executives in strategic

situations, Quinn (1980) concluded that successful managers
do not use formal methods but rather conscious, proactive,
and incremental forward movements to facilitate the planning
process.

Incremental movements are specifically designed to

improve the quality of information, sequencing, and
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organizational awareness, and to decrease resistance and
uncertainty.

In addition, the executives acted

incrementally to improve the strategic decision process by
involving those who have the necessary knowledge, skill, and
decision capability, and to avoid hasty and premature
actions.

Quinn asserted that good strategic management

avoids becoming committed to details and assumptions too
soon, and therefore no single paradigm can hold for all
strategic situations.
Quinn did indicate that his sample of large
organizations making complex decisions revealed broad,
general steps used in the strategic planning process.

The

overall character of the planning process included numerous
loops back to earlier stages to accommodate unexpected or
overlooked issues.

The first general, broad step was to

create awareness of the organization’s new direction, and
marshall commitment through active development of informal
need-sensing systems.

At this point, executives facilitated

the gradual changing of symbols through highly visible
actions and wordless messages, encouraged partial solutions,
stimulated increased flexibility, and systematically waited.
By this method of action, executives gradually legitimized
the new perspectives and tactical shifts, built political
support, and overcame opposition.
The second broad step was to solidify progress
incrementally by creating pockets of strong commitment and
focusing the organization in the new direction.

Pockets of
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formalized commitment were created through champions and
managing coalitions.

Focusing on new organizational

directions required facilitating the continuous process of
change by discouraging stagnation and integrating the change
process with individual and group interests.
Quinn clearly acknowledged the role of political and
cultural factors in the planning process.

Thinking about

strategic planning as a separate, sequential process and
relying on the rationality of formally derived strategies,
according to Quinn, tends to encourage managers to use the
inherent power of their positions to force organizations to
respond and create unsuccessful strategic implementations.
Successful implementations are slow, deliberate, incremental
processes that adapt to the changing environment and
organizational conditions.

By the time the strategic plan

begins to crystallize, portions of the plan have already
been implemented.

Quinn observed that the key to successful

strategic change is to build sufficient organizational
momentum and identity with the strategy.
The departure from the rational step-by-step approach
proposed by Quinn has been expanded by Tichy (1983) who has
suggested that the strategic planning process has been
overly simplified by executives and theorists who focus too
narrowly on internal organizational structures.
Organizational problems, crises, and opportunities arise
from pressures exerted on the organization by the
environment, diversification, advances in technology, and
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changes in people.

Organizational problems, crises, and

opportunities create uncertainties that must be managed and
controlled:

technical uncertainty, political uncertainty,

and cultural uncertainty.

Technical uncertainty can be

about markets, production capability, and technical
innovation.

Political uncertainty can be about who are the

candidates for success, power distributions, and resource
and reward distributions.

Cultural uncertainty is usually

about changing and conflicting values systems.
Each of the three uncertainties (technical, political,
and cultural) and their resulting problems can be specified
for the various phases of the strategic planning process.
During the phases of the planning process, the strategic
activities and influences can be assessed by three
organizational systems.

The technical system assesses

environmental threats, business opportunities,
organizational strengths and weaknesses, and defines the
mission and the resources needed to accomplish it.

The

political system assesses who influences the development of
the mission and strategy, and what coalitions are building
around what strategic alternatives.

The cultural system

assesses the influence of values and philosophy on the
mission, and helps to develop a culture that is aligned with
the mission and strategic direction.
The three organizational systems require three sets of
strategic organizational tasks.

Technical strategic tasks

are environmental scanning and strategic planning.
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Political strategic tasks are lobbying and influencing
external contingencies, internal governance structuring, and
coalition activities to influence decisions.

Cultural

strategic tasks involve the use of symbolic events to
reinforce cultural role modeling by key people as well as
clarifying and defining values.
Each of the strategic tasks is characterized by various
process problems.

Tichy suggested that technical process

problems include role and performance ambiguity, faltering
communication, and resulting resistance to change.

These

problems may be addressed by fitting people into roles and
specifying performance criteria for those roles, and
developing information systems and planning systems to
support strategy implementation.

Political process problems

include ambitious, self-serving power politics, and may be
managed by controlling succession, or getting ahead,
politics and reward systems.

Cultural process problems

generally include symbolic incongruence and cultural
dissonance, and may be managed by controlling symbolic
language, reward systems, and formal communication networks.
Solutions to each of the process problems brings about
characteristic organizational changes.

Technical changes

can be expected in technology, organizational structure,
strategy, and management.

Political changes can be expected

in promotions/successions, reward issues, shifts in power
centers, external control issues, and internal control
issues.

Cultural changes can be expected in performance
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related values, decision making values, human resources
values, and management style.
Tichy recommended that development of human resources
should be oriented with the three aspects of the strategic
process.

Technical aspects require selecting and developing

employees with technical skills.

Effective management

requires a match of management styles with technical tasks.
Political aspects of the strategic process require the
appropriate use of political skills.

Effective management

requires matching political needs with organizational
opportunities.

Cultural aspects require using cultural

leadership skills.

Effective management requires matching

values of individuals with organizational culture.
Business Aspects of Strategic Planning
The process of strategic planning is important in a
study of organizational behavior because the nature of the
process provides a framework within which the behavior may
be defined.

However, an understanding of the cultural

aspects of organizational behavior requires an exploration
of the motives and objectives that created the need for a
planning process.

Strategic planning is primarily a method

used by organizations to maximize profits by gaining a
competitive advantage (Porter, 1980, 1985, 1987).
Therefore, the business aspects of strategic planning
receive the most attention in the literature and from
executive managers.

The current study focuses on a content

element of strategic planning that is not traditionally

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27
considered a fundamental element, ethical behavior.
Generally, business planning focuses on the broad
content areas of growth strategies, harvesting or endgame
strategies, and retrenchment strategies.

Early thinking in

strategic planning specified decision processes and
identified areas of focus for managers to increase their
decision effectiveness.

Lorange and Vancil (1976) concluded

that "an effective planning system requires 'situational
design;’ it must take into account the particular company’s
situation, especially along the dimensions of size and
diversity" (p. 75).

Lorange and Vancil suggested that

strategic planning systems have two major functions:

to

develop an integrated, coordinated, and consistent long-term
plan of action, and to facilitate the adaptation of the
company to environmental change.

They specified six

decision issues to be addressed when designing a strategic
planning system in an organization.
The first issue concerns communicating the corporate
performance goals.

Middle managers in large companies

should be able to assess the potential of their own
division’s business.

Therefore, corporate executives should

not attempt to bias division managers in their assessments.
Division recommendations should then be the basis for
corporate goal setting.
The second issue concerns the goal setting process.
The fundamental question for this issue is who sets the
goals, division managers or corporate executives?

In large

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

companies, initial goal setting should be effected at the
division level because of its closer and more intimate
knowledge of the industry.
The third issue concerns environmental scanning.

The

division management should provide a specific assessment of
business conditions.

Monitoring detailed environmental

changes is too difficult to be performed by top executives.
The fourth issue concerns the focus of subordinate
managers.

Each division in a large company must adopt a

strategic outlook and focus on achieving that outlook.
Division managers should focus on identifying and analyzing
strategic alternatives and their financial implications.
However, the planning activity cannot become simply a
numbers game.
The fifth issue concerns the corporate planner’s role.
In a large company, the corporate planner’s organizational
status can have a significant symbolic value in stressing
the importance of formal strategic planning and its
relationship with conventional budgeting.

The planner

should be a catalyst, encouraging division managers to adopt
a strategic orientation, and should not become involved in
formulating the plans.

The primary function of the

corporate planner is system maintenance and coordination.
The sixth issue concerns the linkage of planning and
budgeting.

The planning system should provide the means to

narrow a broad range of strategic alternatives down to a
specific strategy and budget plan.

The budget plan should
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be designed to accommodate strategic objectives and
reasonable deviations.

The narrowing can be slow or rapid

depending on situation specifics and business conditions.
In a large company, the linkage between the planning system
and budgeting is usually loose and the narrowing of
alternatives can be more gradual because resources do not
normally need to be committed early in the planning process.
Lorange and Vancil suggested that planning systems in a
large company evolve from less explicit to more explicit
goals and objectives.

As the planning systems evolve,

objectives become subject to negotiation, the focus of
middle management becomes more strategic, and the linkage
between budget and planning becomes tighter.

The design of

the planning process is a continuous task that requires
vigilance and insight.
Later strategic thinking began to incorporate
influences from outside the organization into the planning
process.

Content of the strategy came to be thought of less

as an end result of the plan and more as a guideline for
strategic processes.

Porter (1980) developed one of the

most widely used systems for conceptualizing planning
strategies.

Porter divided existing strategies into three

categories:

differentiation, cost leadership, and focus.

The strategy of differentiation is used when a company
captures the market with a unique product or service.
Porter argued that the strategy of differentiation is
effective because it creates customer loyalty, restricts
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price variances, and thereby reduces the opportunity for
other competitors to enter the market.

This strategy

produces higher profit margins because less promotional
outlay is required.

Customers feel compelled to buy because

there are no viable alternatives or substitute products.
The strategy of cost leadership is simple in concept,
but one of the most difficult to implement.

To remain

competitive, companies must simply become the lowest cost
producers in the industry.

The key to this strategy is cost

control so the company may reap higher returns than
competitors, even at low prices.
Focus is a strategy used by companies producing highly
specialized products or services for very narrow and limited
markets.

The markets may be limited by geographic area or

specialized needs or interests of the customers.

The focus

strategy "rests on the promise that the firm is able to
serve its narrow strategic target market more effectively or
efficiently than competitors who are competing more broadly.
As a result, the firm achieves either differentiation from
better meeting the needs of the particular target, lower
costs in serving this target, or both" (Porter, 1980, p.
38).
Miller (1989) expanded Porter’s model to include three
multifaceted process dimensions along which organizations
might be measured:
interaction.

rationality, assertiveness, and

The rationality or information processing

dimension is central and includes intensive analysis, market
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scanning, futuristic thinking, and thoughtful consideration
to strategic issues.

The interaction dimension is the level

of political and social process inherent in strategic
decisions, and includes bargaining, politicking, and
consensus building.

The assertiveness dimension concerns

the level of risk taking and whether decisions are proactive
or reactive.
Based on his expansion of Porter’s model, Miller
hypothesized that (a) the strategy of innovative
differentiation, because of its complexity, will be
positively related to all three dimensions of strategy
making— information processing, interactive, and assertive;
(b) cost leadership strategies, because of their emphasis on
efficiency, will be inversely related to all three
dimensions;

(c) focus strategies, because of their

simplified decision-making requirements, will be negatively
related to information processing and interaction
dimensions, but show no relationship to assertiveness
because a wide range of risk taking behavior can be
expected;

(d) innovative differentiation will show a

stronger relationship with information processing and
interaction in successful firms than in unsuccessful firms;
and (e) successful and unsuccessful firms will show no
significant differences in the relationships between cost
leadership and information processing and focus and
information processing.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
To test his hypotheses, Miller sampled 98 firms in the
greater Montreal and Quebec City areas.

Most of the firms

were small (mean number of employees = 381), and many were
owned by individuals, families, or small groups.

Large

diversified companies were avoided because they tended to
have diversified strategies.

Questionnaires were

distributed to systematically assess strategic content and
processes.

Some interviews were conducted with CEOs and

senior managers.
Using measures he developed, Miller found that
innovative differentiation was positively related to the
three dimensions, that these relationships were especially
strong in successful firms, that these relationships were
not significant in unsuccessful firms, that focus is
inversely related to information processing, and that this
relationship was stronger in successful companies.
above results supported some of Miller’s hypotheses.

The
The

second hypothesis was not supported in that there were no
significant relationships between cost leadership and any of
the strategy dimensions.

The fifth hypothesis was also not

supported in that there was a significant difference between
successful and unsuccessful companies on managerial
interaction.
Miller concluded that strategic content and process can
have many implications for each other, especially if the
company is pursuing a strategy of innovative
differentiation.

Successful, innovative companies pursue
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and use carefully extracted information, interact internally
at high levels, and are fairly risk oriented.

Cost

leadership strategies, because they only make selected use
of information and managerial interaction, do not have any
meaningful implications for strategic processes.

In fact,

the cost control oriented companies who were high on
interaction levels were less successful, probably because
political bargaining and negotiations are expensive
activities and tend to nullify cost efficiency.

And

finally, specializing in limited markets and product lines
eliminates the need for high levels of information
processing because the narrow focus simplifies
administrative tasks and strategic decisions.
Miller suggested that managers be conscious of
consistency between the business strategy and the process by
which it is developed and implemented.

Specifically,

innovative companies must ensure that information gathering
and interaction mechanisms are in place, are appropriate,
and are working.

And cost control efforts must be designed

to eliminate parochial priorities and political squabbling
which detract from cost efficiency objectives.
Miller’s findings are strongly supportive of a broad
section of strategic planning literature which addresses
environmental scanning.

MacMillan (1984) argued that to

remain competitive, companies must adopt certain behaviors
that capture control of their industries.

Strategic policy

is a dynamic problem that incorporates competitive
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countermoves, and the only way to assess countermoves is to
be acutely sensitive to the environment.
Wilson (1984) suggested that the purpose of strategic
planning is to optimize the relationship between the
organization and the environment, to maximize congruence and
minimize friction.

Environmental scanning encompasses the

forecasting of future trends and the monitoring of current
events.

Wilson argued that environmental scanning is an

essential part of strategic planning because it provides the
framework for logical progression of the strategic process.
Environmentally based planning must include not only a
market strategy, but a technological strategy, human
resources strategy, financial strategy, and a public policy
and government relations strategy.
Wilson outlined the requirements of an environmental
scanning system that might be used to feed information to
the strategic process.

The system must operate on the macro

level, that is assess long range trends, and it must operate
on a micro level to focus on and interpret specific events.
The system must be holistic in the sense that it views
trends in social, economic, political, and technological
developments, and should be comprehensive in scope.

The

system cannot be linear or segmented, and it must be
designed to continually revisit the environment instead of
relying on one-shot or even periodic analysis.

The system

must stress contingency planning, and should be integrated
into the strategic planning system.
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Environmental scanning systems are important because
they provide the organization with the ability to predict
turning points.

Without the ability to predict turning

points, organizations are not able to cope with the volatile
environment (Emerson, 1985).

One mistake many organizations

make is to forget that members of the organization live in
and are affected by the environment.

Strategic plans that

do not address human resources, which are supplied by and
affected by the environment, will generally find difficulty
achieving strategic objectives (Schuler, 1989).
Schuler (1989) offered a human resources strategic
management model based on competitive strategies.

The first

strategy offered was cost reduction which strives to
increase productivity, defined as output cost per person.
Cost reduction strategies can mean reductions in workforce
or in wages, or it can be achieved through subcontracting,
work redesign, automation, procedural changes, and job
flexibility.
The role of the employee in a cost reduction strategy
requires a certain behavioral profile:
repetitive and predictable behaviors,
(c) autonomy and initiative,

(a) relatively
(b) short term focus,

(d) modest concern for quality,

(e) high concern for quantity,

(f) strong focus on results,

(g) low risk taking, and (h) stability.

The human resources

management practices prescribed are (a) fixed and stable job
descriptions,
paths,

(b) narrowly defined jobs and narrow career

(c) short term, results oriented performance
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appraisals,

(d) compensation levels consistent with the

market, and (e) minimal employee training.
The second strategy Schuler described was quality
enhancement which strives to produce and deliver the highest
possible quality goods or services.

The employee profile

necessary for quality enhancement contains (a) repetitive
and predictable behaviors,

(b) long-term focus,

level of cooperative behavior,
quality,

(d) a high concern for

(e) a modest concern for quantity,

concern for process,

(c) some

(f) a high

(g) low risk taking, and (h) commitment

to organizational goals.

The human resources management

practices prescribed for quality enhancement are (a) fixed
and explicit job descriptions,

(b) high levels of employee

participation, (c) both individual and group criteria for
performance appraisal,

(d) some guarantees of job security,

and (e) extensive and continuous employee training.
The third strategy discussed was innovation.

For an

innovation strategy to work, employees must have (a) a high
degree of creativity,
of cooperation,

(b) long-term focus,

(c) high levels

(d) moderate concern for quality,

moderate concern for quantity,
process and results,

(e) a

(f) an equal concern for

(g) high risk taking, and (h) a high

tolerance for ambiguity.

The human resources management

practices needed for innovation are (a) jobs structured
around interaction and cooperation,

(b) performance

appraisals that reflect long-term and group performance,
job mobility and flexibility,

(c)

(d) compensation systems based

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
on internal criteria rather than external or environmental
criteria,

(e) compensation from sources other than pay such

as stock and bonuses, and (f ) broad career paths.
Assuming that organizational effectiveness is the goal
of most organizations and that organizational effectiveness
is increased as conflicting cues and reinforcers within the
organization are decreased, Schuler suggested three
propositions:
1.

Organizations pursuing a cost-reduction strategy

should be more effective to the extent they also pursue a
utilization philosophy of human resources management.
2.

Organizations pursuing a quality enhancement

strategy should be more effective to the extent they also
pursue an accumulation philosophy of human resources
management.
3.

Organizations pursuing an innovation strategy

should be more effective to the extent they also pursue a
facilitation philosophy of human resources management (p.
172).
Schuler continued that, although these propositions
might seem straightforward and testable enough, they are
potentially, and most likely, contingent on the relationship
between competitive strategies and business life-cycle
stages.

The contingency is based upon the fit among the

life-cycle stage of the organization, the chosen strategy,
and the changing demands of the environment.
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The complexity of the contingencies proposed by Schuler
suggests that few organizations are able to achieve an
appropriate match of strategy with environment.
Inappropriate matches generally result in partial and
ineffective change plans which serve to frustrate managers
and the people who work for them (Emerson, 1985).
Ineffective changes are dangerous for the organization’s
future.
Emerson (1985) suggested that planned changes in the
organization must be effective at the grass-roots level or
strategic planning is nothing more than a paper and pencil
exercise.

If the desired changes do not take place at the

grass-roots level, Emerson argued, the structure of the
planning process itself will undergo unpredictable and
usually undesirable changes.

Further, and more importantly,

the process of internal communication which ultimately
affects the balance of power and how things get done in the
organization will change in unpredictable ways.

Because of

these possibilities, the corporate planning process is
becoming more directed toward supporting the governance role
of the board of directors and less directed toward the
management process.
The planning process has become overly dependent on
numbers and techniques which have replaced judgement and
experience.

Planning at the executive level has become a

substitute for decision making and responsive action.
Emerson suggested that planning can translate management

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
into a portfolio analysis exercise, but cannot transmit a
feel for the business.

It is not enough to establish a

broad sweeping plan and then hand it down to line managers,
nor is it appropriate to have line managers develop their
own plans in isolation and submit them to corporate.

The

key, argued Emerson, is managing employee attitudes.
Communication, explaining what is going on, must be regular
and consistent in content.

Correcting the company’s

problems through the planning process is doomed to failure.
The only way to maintain the flexibility required to cope
with the changing environment is through internal
relationships and team building.
Despite such discussions in the literature, on those
rare occasions when human relations issues are incorporated
into the strategic plans, they are usually the result of
knee-jerk reactions by managers to some immediate problem or
attempts to incorporate faddish management theory rather
than rational efforts to support organizational goals
(Gehrman, 1979).
Cultural Aspects of Strategic Planning
Lamb and Shrivastava (1986) insisted that two of the
most intractable problems of strategic management are
strategy implementation and strategic performance. "These
topics are intractable because they are new, ill defined,
complex, and not amenable to study through simple
discipline-bound frameworks of analysis" (p. x i ).

This

intractability discourages research on these problems, and
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therefore little research is published.

The problems of

implementation and performance measurement are the most
critical problems facing strategy practitioners.

Brilliant

strategies are quite useless if they cannot be implemented
and their subsequent performance evaluated.
After tracking the strategic planning process at Air
Canada from 1937 to 1976, Mintzberg, Brunet, and Waters
(1986) concluded that the forces that encourage planning and
the planning process can actually impede strategic change.
Operational planning discourages strategic thinking: "The
more an organization relies on planning in the formal sense,
the less likely its people are to think strategically and
the less inclined it will be to undergo strategic change (as
opposed to elaboration or extrapolation of given strategic
direction). . . .

Formal strategic management may prove

incompatible with real strategic thinking" (p. 4).
The conclusion of Mintzberg et al. implies that the
formal planning process becomes an organizational ritual.
The organization’s culture can itself become a major
deterrent to success when the success model, or how the
organization characterizes successful strategy, changes.
Ernest (1985) observed that strategic plans and their
resulting changes and reorganizations that might work very
well on paper frequently do not work as expected.

The

latent outcomes of strategic planning are usually the result
of unseen or misunderstood factors associated with the
organizational culture.

After studying aerospace
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manufacturing firms, retail chains, and electronics
companies, Ernest concluded that the cultural dimension is a
major component of organizational success in implementing
strategic plans.

There must be a fit between planning and

beliefs, and values and practices within the organization.
Ernest defined culture as "a system of shared values
and beliefs that actively shape the company’s management
style and employees’ day-to-day behaviors" (p. 51).

Culture

is generally rooted in the values of the company’s founders
and, to some extent, those of current senior managers.
Cultural feedback loops reinforce successful behaviors which
are continuously repeated.

As levels of consistency

increase, the strength of the culture increases.

Top

managers may not have an adequate handle on corporate
culture if the founders are gone and their own values are
not accurate reflections of the founders’.
Ernest assessed 100 organizations using a 60 item
survey of management practices.

The survey revealed five

orientations critical to defining a company’s culture:
marketing orientation, employee orientation, problem-solving
orientation, innovative orientation, and service/quality
orientation.

Profiles of each company were developed

indicating its level on each of the five orientations.
Relationships between profiles and major problems were
established.

Cultures were categorized on two dimensions:

action and people.

Action involves decision making,

organizing, monitoring, implementing plans, and generating
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ideas.

Companies were categorized as either participative

or nonparticipative relative to their employees.

The two

dimensions, action and people, reflected the balance of
tasks and roles within the organization.
Ernest found that four types of cultures emerged from
the study, and these can be generalized to the emergence of
culture in relation to a company’s position on the action
and people dimensions.

Interactive cultures emerge from

organizations that are both reactive and participative.
Interactive cultures are highly people oriented and service
oriented.

Integrated cultures emerge from organizations

that are both proactive and participative.

Integrated

cultures are also people oriented but tend to be more
effective in identifying and solving problems than
interactive cultures.

Systematized cultures emerge from

organizations that are both reactive and nonparticipative.
Systematized cultures are generally focused on routine work
operating procedures, and external regulations.
Entrepreneurial cultures emerge from organizations that are
both proactive and nonparticipative.

Entrepreneurial

cultures are oriented toward the rapid development of
products and services.
The importance of Ernest’s concept to planning is the
match of strategy to organizational culture.

For example,

service oriented company may not be expected to be good at
developing new products.

In addition, various

implementation strategies might be effective in one culture
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and not effective in another.

The type of culture is

important to understand when planning elements of human
resources, compensation, and performance appraisal.
Ansoff and Baker (1986) agreed with Ernest’s conclusion
that culture is one of the key determinants of an
organization’s success in strategic planning.

Ansoff and

Baker hypothesized that the culture is influenced by
"fashionable" solutions, one of which is the idea of
changing an organization’s culture.
replace one another over time.

These solutions tend to

In the early 1900s, product

orientation and the development of products dominated
corporate culture.

By the 1930s, product orientation had

been replaced by a market orientation and the development of
markets.

By the 1960s, strategy orientation and the

development of strategies had become the dominant cultural
theme.

Ansoff and Baker concluded that as the success model

undergoes continuous change in the corporate environment,
the culture becomes critical as a key deterrent to success
in strategic planning.
Ross and Shetty (1985) suggested that the new strategic
challenge is to change corporate culture from a productivity
orientation to a quality orientation.

Their study of 2,000

business units in 300 manufacturing and service
organizations demonstrated that improving quality in
products and services increases both market share and profit
margins.

New strategies should include quality as a

competitive advantage.

The current systems of quality
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control are ingrained in many corporate cultures and
generally contribute to poor quality by detecting rather
than preventing defects.

Success in the future will not

only be a function of defect-free products but of public
perception of high quality.

To increase public perception

of quality, corporations must reflect public values.
Because perception of quality is difficult to quantify,
measurement of it has to be based on cultural values of the
company.

Therefore, public values must be included in the

company’s value system.
One strategic cultural device that is currently being
used to compensate for high energy and material costs and
incorporate the values of efficiency and accuracy is
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) systems (Melnyk &
Gonzales, 1987).

MRP II systems are of interest because one

was installed at General Dynamics, Electronics Division
during the time of the study.

Melnyk and Gonzales (1987),

in a survey of MRP II firms, found that implementation of
MRP II usually requires corporate cultural changes.

MRP II

is a complex system of material requirements and shop floor
planning and scheduling that requires a strong commitment by
top managers to effect the changes necessary to make its
implementation successful.

The commitment must be in time

and dollars to educate and train employees at every level of
the organization, to enforce the discipline required to do
mundane and repetitive tasks well, and to provide the tools
necessary to maintain high degrees of record accuracy.
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Melnyk and Gonzales characterized the typical
manufacturing culture as shrouding production capacity,
master scheduling, and shop floor planning in mystery.

To

successfully implement MRP II, the mystery must be removed
from scheduling and planning, and they have to be understood
at all levels of the organization so that everyone involved
with production can develop and commit to realistic build
schedules that reconcile customer demands with production
capabilities.

MRP II systems must be integrated into the

strategic plans of the company, and strategic objectives
consistent with MRP II must become integrated with cultural
values.

MRP II systems require and facilitate cooperation

among engineering, manufacturing, procurement, and marketing
functions.

MRP II systems reduce interdepartment conflict,

alter the nature of institutionalized strategic planning
processes, link functional areas where barriers existed
previously, provide smoother transitions to new changes than
previous change systems did, formalize and standardize
information, and provide linkages between strategic
objectives, operating plans, and production goals.
MRP II systems have achieved the status of panacea for
a multitude of organizational problems and inefficiencies.
One of their attractive features is the ability to play
"what if" games.

The ability to predict the future using

systems such as MRP II has become more and more important to
business.

"The more unpredictable the world becomes, the

more we seek out and rely upon forecasts and predictions to
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determine what we should do" (Gimpl & Dakin, 1987, p. 57).
Gimpl and Dakin (1987) examined the available research
on planning practices and concluded that managers’ obsession
with the magical rites of long range planning and other
future oriented techniques is a manifestation of
anxiety-relieving, superstitious behavior.

Forecasting and

planning have the same cultural function as magical rites;
they make the world seem more deterministic and increase
confidence in coping mechanisms.

In addition to uniting

managers as a group and inducing them to take action, these
rites preserve the status quo.
Methods of prediction or telling the future, such as
tarot cards, reading entrails, and astrology, have been
created and used during times of great uncertainty,
particularly when the various possible outcomes potentially
have a significant impact on the existing way of life.
Uncertainty in the business environment brings out the
consultants, organizational development specialists, and
other cultural soothsayers who direct the proceedings and
interpret omens.

Gimpl and Dakin suggested that long range

planning is ideal to calm the discomfort that managers feel
facing a random world.

When managers look into the future,

they choose a view that requires little change and then look
for supporting data.

Strategic plans that recommend radical

changes in allocation of resources, corporate behavior,
fundamental missions, and corporate goals are likely to be
met with no action.
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Managers rarely try to justify the success of planning
processes by comparing the plan to actual practice.

Long

range planning is justified, according to Gimpl and Dakin,
by secondary benefits like increased communication or
commitment and not on the basis that the plan was followed
and the predicted results were realized.
has symbolic value.

Strategic planning

Planners can never be proved wrong:

They simply did not take all the complex contingencies into
account.
A low tolerance for ambiguity induces managers to
develop the illusions of control.

Gimpl and Dakin defined

ambiguous situations as those situations that cannot be
classified because they are new, those situations that are
too complex to be analyzed, and those situations that
contain contradictory elements or structures.

Japanese

managers tend to feel more comfortable with ambiguity and
will use it to their advantage.

Western managers feel

strongly that they must make decisions as opposed to make
choices.

Decision making implies a level of control.

If

enough facts and data are gathered, the ambiguity is thought
to be removed and an optimum decision can be made.

This

type of thinking creates the illusion of control.
Gimpl and Dakin concluded that superstitious behavior
in management has two functions.

Under conditions of

extreme ambiguity, superstitious behavior will stave off the
tendency to do nothing by reducing anxiety.

Secondly,

superstitious behavior will promote random action which is
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better suited to a random world.

Regular patterns of

behavior are less likely to meet with success in a random
situation than random patterns because random patterns tend
to cover unfamiliar ground and generate new responses.
Magical planning generates confidence in ambiguous
situations, generates cohesiveness in the management group,
increases faith in the future, and minimizes bias created by
regular patterns of behavior.
S um m ary

Strategic planning is a process within which
organizations can determine their identity, their position
in the environment, their direction, and how to get to where
they want to be.

The planning process allows organizations

the opportunity for introspection and internal assessment.
In addition, strategic planning assures that organizational
decisions will be consistent with the organizational
mission, and helps to smooth out the process of change.

The

process of planning is at least as important as the plan
itself, and should be understood as a thought process and
not simply a set of procedures or exercises.

The planning

process provides the framework for organizational learning.
Strategic planning requires the involvement and support
of all levels of management, particularly top management.
Strategic planning is not a panacea nor will it effect
miraculous recoveries.

Strategic planning cannot be used to

solve immediate problems in the organization.

The planning

system must be tailored to the situation and the
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organization, and cannot be utilized without a thorough
understanding of the organization’s power structure and
political climate.

Planners cannot simply rely on

rationality and quantification, but must incorporate
political, social, and environmental aspects into the
planning process.
Strategic planning also allows organizations to examine
their place in the environment.

For an organization to

compete for and retain legitimacy, it must be clear on its
own value to society and its intention to serve its own
employees as well as the community.

The planning process

must optimize the relationship of the organization with its
environment.

The strategic plan must contain an element of

human relations and an element of public policy.
Companies may vary in culture not only as a result of
their collective beliefs, values, and behaviors, but as a
result of the content of their strategic plans and planning
processes.

The nature of the role, product, or market

orientation a company chooses in relation to society can
affect how members see themselves in relation to each other
and in relation to the community.

Conversely, the

organizational culture can influence the choice of role,
product, and market orientation.

Organizational Change
Once a strategic plan is adopted in an organization,
the next step is implementation.

The implementation of a
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plan almost always requires some directed changes in the
organization.

Of course, not all organizational changes are

the result of the implementation of a plan, some may occur
as a result of pressure from the environment and seme may
occur as the informal structure of the organization changes.
Organizational changes can be viewed from three essential
perspectives:

the structural perspective or the traditional

management approach, the psychological perspective or the
individual’s involvement in the change process, and the
cultural perspective or the group reaction to and creation
of change.
Structural Aspects of Change
An understanding of organizational change must
necessarily begin with a discussion of what is changed.
Organizations are merely human constructs that represent
defined human activities.

Mintzberg (1979) suggested that

organized human activity requires two fundamental and
opposing elements:

the division of labor into tasks to be

performed, and the coordination of tasks into activities.
"The structure of an organization can be defined simply as
the sum total of the ways in which it divides its labor into
distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them"
(p. 2).
Mintzberg specified five major divisions of labor that
every organization has even if more than one division is
performed by one person.
operating core.

The first division of labor is the

The operating core performs the basic work
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that is generally characterized as the organization’s reason
for existence.

The operating core directly produces the

organization’s products and services by procuring the
production inputs, processing the inputs into outputs,
distributing the outputs, and providing direct support to
the input-process-output cycle.

The second division

Mintzberg called the strategic apex.

The strategic apex

ensures that the organization serves its mission in an
effective way, and also serves the needs of those who have
power or control over the organization.
has three sets of duties:

The strategic apex

direct supervision, managing the

organization’s boundary conditions and its relationship with
the environment, and developing the organization’s strategy.
The third division is the middle line, those middle level
managers that join the strategic apex with the operating
core.

The fourth division is the technostructure.

The

technostructure is comprised of analysts who design the
work, plan the work, change processes and procedures, and
train operators, but do not do the work themselves.

The

technostructure effects standardization in the organization.
The fifth division is the support staff.

The support staff

provides support activities that are not directly related to
the work flow such as building maintenance and switchboard
operation.
Mintzberg outlined five basic mechanisms used by
organizations to coordinate work:
(b) direct supervision,

(a) mutual adjustment,

(c) standardization of work
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processes,

(d) standardization of work outputs, and (e)

standardization of work skills.

These five elements should

be considered the glue that holds the organization together.
Mutual adjustment, according to Mintzberg, is pure and
simple direct communication between workers.

Mutual

adjustment places control of the work in the hands of the
workers.

It is the simplest coordinating mechanism, but it

is also the only mechanism that works under extremely
complex and difficult conditions.
Direct supervision uses one individual to coordinate
the work of others by giving instructions and monitoring
actions.

The mechanism of direct supervision is generally

the most favored coordination mechanism because of the
concept that control passes to a single mind which in turn
controls others.
Mintzberg specified three different standardization
mechanisms to distinguish a hierarchy of preference.
Standardization of work process is the preferable
coordinating mechanism because it is least affected by
individual differences.

Standardization of the work process

requires specification of procedures and design of the
environment to control the content of the work.

Under these

standardized conditions, the worker needs little if any
supervision and very little mutual adjustment communication.
Standardized output is the second most preferable
mechanism.

Standardized output specifies the exact

dimensions of the output.

Here, the process is of no
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consequence, and little direction or communication is
required.

The worker is free to arrive at the output by any

means available.
Standardization of skills depends entirely upon the
training and skill of the worker.

This is the kind of

coordinating mechanism one might find in an operating room,
where every person involved must rely upon personal training
and experience rather than communication, direction,
procedure, or output specifications even though these
mechanisms may be used to some extent.
Mintzberg hypothesized that as the organization becomes
more complex, the coordinating mechanisms form into an
evolutionary cycle from mutual adjustment to direct
supervision to standardization back to mutual adjustment.
Direct supervision and mutual adjustment can also be used as
informal mechanisms to gain power.

Often the formal and

informal coordinating mechanisms within an organization are
indistinguishable.
Because of the real-life melding of formal and informal
structures observed by Mintzberg, there are relatively few
models of organizational change that focus on practical
application.

Mintzberg (1979) complained that

organizational research generally fails to relate structure
with the functioning of the organization; in other words,
research literature on organizational theory lacks context.
Bedeian (1980) asserted that careful assessments of
organizational change efforts are extremely rare, and even
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careful assessments are misleading.

The criteria for

success for the planned changes are typically multiple and
generally vague, and a given investigator is equally likely
to focus on the successes or the failures of the change
instead of a proportional representation.

In addition,

assessments of change are expensive and time consuming, and
specifying, let alone explaining, the results of whatever
has been produced is difficult and may be beyond the
available expertise in the organization.
Beckhard (1979) presented a model of change which he
claimed has had a history of high utility.
change planning has four major steps:
change problem,
change,

The model for

(a) defining the

(b) determining readiness and capacity for

(c) identifying resources and motive for change, and

(d) determining the intermediate change strategy and goals.
When the planned change affects a large system, the proposed
change must be evaluated in relation to the environment, to
changes in management strategy and organizational
structures, to changes in the ways work is done, and to
changes in the reward systems.

In addition, Beckhard

suggested, the change must be maintained once it has been
implemented.
A fair amount of organizational literature has been
devoted to distinguishing the characteristics of successful
versus unsuccessful change in organizations (Robbins, 1987).
When examining change in an organization, there are
basically two points of view:

mechanistic and humanistic.
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Both points of view consider manipulation of the
organization not only appropriate, but necessary for its
survival.

Both points of view are concerned almost

exclusively with the outcomes of the change.
The mechanistic view holds that people are basically
components in the organizational machinery and concentrates
on measures of performance.

Organizational performance, if

properly planned and ordered, will be increased.

For

example, Robbins (1987) suggested that organizational
effectiveness has been measured by overall ratings,
productivity, efficiency, profit, quality, accidents,
growth, absenteeism, turnover, job satisfaction, motivation,
morale, control, conflict/cohesion, flexibility, adaptation,
planning and setting goals, goal concensus, internalization
of organizational goals, role conformance, managerial
interpersonal skills, management task skills, information
management and communication, readiness, utilization of
environment, evaluation by external entities, stability,
value of human resources, participation and shared
influence, training and development emphasis, and individual
achievement emphasis.
Robbins proposed four models of effectiveness that may
be used to evaluate change:

(a) goal attainment,

(b)

systems,

(c) strategic constituencies, and (d) competing

values.

Under the goal attainment model, the organization

is effective when it accomplishes its stated goals.

Under

the systems model, the organization is effective when it
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acquires needed resources.

Under the strategic

constituencies model, the organization is effective when all
strategic constituencies are at least minimally satisfied.
Under the competing values model, the organization is
effective when the organization matches its emphasis on
return on investment, market share, new product innovation,
and job security with constituent preferences.
The humanistic model still considers people to be
elements of the organizational mechanism.

But because

people are the primary element, and people are less than
perfect mechanisms, a theraputic approach applied by
internal agents, external agents, managers, or CEOs can make
them more productive.

Hopclul in the 1970s that therapeutic

psychology could be applied to the business world, the
emphasis of organizational theorists was on organizational
development as a tool for management to affect humane
manipulation of the organization.

Franklin (1976) studied

change processes in 25 different organizations (11
successful and 14 unsuccessful) to determine any consistent
factors that might contribute to successful change efforts.
Franklin identified eight specific factors that seemed to
contribute to successful change:
reputation for innovation,

(a) an organizational

(b) contact with external change

agents prior to implementation,

(c) a focus on specific

problems rather than general problems,

(d) a commitment to

survey feedback method of organizational development,
commitment to the change efforts by top management,

(e)

(f) the
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change program was presented as part of a total development
effort rather than as an add-on,

(g) there was a commitment

to no more than a four year time frame for a single project,
and (h) internal change agents were carefully selected.
From the eight factors, Franklin proposed three general
factors that distinguish successful from unsuccessful change
plans.

The first factor is that successful changes are

normally the result of environmental pressure.

The

environmental factor was supported by Alderfer (1977) who
stipulated that change techniques must include environmental
issues.

The second factor proposed by Franklin stresses the

importance of commitment by the top managers.

Senior

executives must have priorities that are consistent with the
change plan.

The third factor is that internal change

agents must be chosen to champion the cause and effectively
communicate the desired message.
Dunn and Swierczek (1977), in a comprehensive review of
organizational change literature, insisted that
organizational practicioners do understand the relationship
of theory and practice.

Dunn and Swierczek analyzed 67 case

studies conducted from 1945 to 1975 and found that (a)
change efforts that are collaborative are more successful
than those that are unilaterally directed, delegated, or
subordinate directed,

(b) participative change agent

orientation is associated with effectiveness as compared to
nonparticipative orientations, and (c) participative change
efforts are more effective than nonparticipative ones.
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Clearly, the findings of Dunn and Swierczek (1977)
stress the importance of participation among top managers,
change agents, and all other organizational members in a
theraputic relationship.

This conclusion is consistent with

the conclusion of Friedlander and 3rown (1974) that change
efforts must be supported by collaborative involvement of
all participants.

But the issue of environment as an

important factor in outcome has not been settled in
humanistic change models.

Unlike Franklin (1976) and

Alderfer (1977), Dunn and Swierczek (1977) concluded that
the environment does not affect the outcome.

Dunn and

Swierczek also concluded that the type of organization does
not show any relationship to change outcomes.

The

assumption seems to be that the members of an organization,
under the appropiate internal conditions, will always behave
in the organization’s best interest.
More characteristic of organizational literature in the
1980s is a focus on theraputic managerial behavior and its
effect on organizational change.

Hersey and Blanchard

(1982) identified two sets of skills and knowledge needed by
change agents in organizations:
implementation skills.

diagnosis skills and

The diagnostic process used by these

change agents includes three steps:
the point of view,

(a) determination of

(b) identification of the problem, and

(c) analysis of the situation.
After the diagnostic process is complete, change agents
must plan and implement a change program.

The
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implementation of a change program involves identifying
alternative solutions to the problem and developing a change
strategy.

Hershey and Blanchard suggested that there are

three broad theories used to develop change strategies:
force field analysis, change cycles, and patterns of
communication.

Force field analysis, a technique developed

by Lewin (1947), used an assessment of driving forces and
restraining forces to determine change strategy.

Change

cycles can be implemented through a participative change or
a directed change according to the level of change:
knowledge changes, attitude changes, individual behavior
changes, or group changes.

Patterns of communication in the

organization along with patterns of intergroup conflict must
be analyzed, defined, and considered in the change strategy.
Phillips (1986) attempted to identify Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) behavior in a typical corporate change
pattern.

Phillips suggested that once the CEO decides to

commit to a new strategy, he or she then proceeds to change
the organization in a manner consistent with the new
strategy.

After a series of announcements, organizational

shakeups, and personal talks around the company, the CEO
usually withdraws to let the line managers take over.

At

this point, according to Phillips, the big change usually
tapers off.

It declines because the conventional approach

to change is not well suited for dealing with habitual
behavior, parochial priorities, and the current distribution
of power and influence.
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After studying a successful change in a chemical
company, Phillips concluded that successful change
strategies include elements that are substantially different
from conventional strategies.

To launch the change program,

the CEO of the chemical company announced the change and
reinforced the objective by running a contest for the best
slogan to describe the change objective.

Next, the CEO

modified the organizational structure by bringing lower
level managers up to key positions where interest and
backgrounds were aligned with the new objectives, and moving
staff level executives to new positions where they could
broaden their experience.

Following the organizational

restructuring, the CEO used a series of dramatic and
symbolic ceremonies and techniques to highlight
organizational role changes in management and the managers’
new responsibilities.

In addition, the CEO communicated the

changes with customers and the community.
A follow-up survey of customers one year after the
announcements indicated that 47% had noticed a significant
improvement in service.

Phillips concluded that the

approach used clarified exactly what the new objectives were
and how the organization was changed to achieve them,
explicitly and unmistakably contrasted the old with the new,
dramatized the change to increase both emotional and
intellectual understanding, and decisively shifted the power
structure.
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Summarizing his studies of successful changes in
various companies, Phillips suggested six distinctive
differences that successful strategies have from
conventional strategies.

First, communication of what

needed to be done differently was directed at all levels of
the organization through a concerted communication program.
Second, efforts were made early on to demonstrate new
methods of operation.

Third, aggressive changes were made

to standardize operating procedures.

Fourth, top managers

played remarkably visible roles in the change process for
extended periods of time.

Fifth, top management stressed

the positive aspects of the changes through rewards and
incentives.

And sixth, managing the change program became

the agenda of senior managers.
Psychological Aspects of Change
During the 1970s, a movement toward concern for the
welfare of the individual prompted a great deal of
literature devoted to managing change by understanding the
psychological profile of organizational members.

This

literature differs from that previously sited in that it
focuses on the adjustment process of the individual rather
than on the intended outcomes.

The assumptions of this area

of the literature center on the notion that change itself
cannot be controlled but that the perspectives of the people
involved can.

If the theraputic manager handles the

transition properly, resistence to change will be minimal
and probabilities for success will increase.

The amount of
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such literature is vast, but highly repetitive.

Therefore,

a small, selected sample of the writing on this topic should
produce sufficient background in relation to the present
study.
There are generally two different perspectives of the
psychological aspects of change:

the perspective of the

change agent (the changer) and the perspective of the group
member (the changee).

As mentioned above, many authors

suggested that these two roles be combined through
participative change efforts.

Yet, there is no literature

that suggests that anyone remains apathetic to change; a
given member of an organization is either in favor of the
change or resistant to the change.

Possibly organizational

members who might be apathetic to change are not worthy of
attention by organizational theorists because they do not
help nor do they hinder change efforts.

Regardless, the

"for" and "against" attitudes are the primary elements of
focus.

The literature, then, falls into two categories:

the psychological profile of the successful change agent,
and methods for overcoming resistance to change.
Outside consultants who operate as organizational
change agents have expended some effort to evaluate their
own effectiveness in a highly competitive environment.
Hamilton (1985) concluded that 20% of the consultants
perform 80% of the effective work in organizational change.
But the primary focus of change agent effectiveness
literature is on traits or skills needed by agents to do
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their work (Argyris, 1970; Bennis, 1969; Burke,

1982;

Steele, 1982).
Hamilton (1988) conducted an extensive review of the
literature to compile a list of factors that are supposed to
predict a change agent’s effectiveness.

Hamilton organized

the factors into three general categories of effectiveness
characteristics:

(a) openness and responsiveness to others’

needs and concerns,

(b) comfort with ambiguity and the

ability to make sense of it, and (c) comfort with oneself in
relation to others (p. 40).
Hypothesizing that personality characteristics and
behavioral tendencies of effective organizational
development consultants differ significantly from those of
less effective consultants, Hamilton tested the validity of
predictive factors on a sample of 105 organizational
development consultants employed by the United States Navy.
A comparison of psychological profiles measured by three
personality inventories and effectiveness ratings measured
by supervisor and peers rating scales indicated the
following results:
1.

Mental agility (a large capacity for making sense

of ambiguous situations) and a friendly cooperative
disposition were both positively related to consultant
effectiveness.
2.

Detail orientation, concern about facts and

figures, procedural orientation, and high need for tangible
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results and specific direction were negatively related to
consultant effectiveness.
3.

The need to work within defined boundaries was

negatively related to consultant effectiveness.
4.

The ability to look for new patterns and see

meanings, relationships, and possibilities beyond the
immediate senses was positively related to consultant
effectiveness.
5.

Individuals who were venturesome, trusting,

relaxed, or imaginative were more likely to be effective
consultants than individuals who were shy, suspicious,
tense, or practical.
In light of her findings, Hamilton concluded that certain
personality characteristics found in effective consultants
differ significantly from those found in less effective
consultants.
While there is no apparent research linking the
psychological profiles of the changer with the changee,
there is considerable speculation on the reactions of
individuals to change.

Hampton, Summer, and Webber (1982)

identified some psychological aspects of resistance to
change including rejection of the change agent, satisfaction
with the current situation, unwillingness to admit
ignorance, the influence of past history, the protection of
parochial authorities, and methods of blocking undesired
change.

The above aspects of resistance should be

considered when developing a change implementation plan, or
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the most obviously beneficial changes may not be successful.
One of the critical elements of the potential probability of
resistance to change and the effects of that resistance is
the character of the innovation and how that character
manifests itself in the implementation activities.
Hampton et a l . specified three categories of technical
innovation:

routine, distress, and opportunity.

Routine

innovation is a small-step technological advancement
programmed by management, and is characterized by
well-defined procedures for development, measurement, and
implementation.

Distress innovation is the result of

economic and/or environmental pressure, and is characterized
by insufficient resources and planning.

Opportunity

innovation is used to supplement or replace existing
products of services, and is characterized by sufficient
funding and planning.
Hall, Goodale, Rabinowitz, and Morgan (1978) studied
routine innovation in departmental and job characteristics
over a ten month period in the transportation ministry of a
large Canadian province.

They found more favorable

attitudes in departments that did not change than in
departments with either "positive" or "negative" changes.
Hall et a l . concluded that people tend to not like changes.
Following this conclusion, Kanter (1985) proposed ten
reasons why people tend to resist changes.
Ranter’s first proposed element of resistance concerns
the perceived control of the change.

Change can be exciting
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when an individual chooses the nature and parameters of the
change.

However, when the change decision and process is in

someone else’s control, change can be threatening.

This

element of resistance, according to Kanter, can best be
managed through the participative management technique.
The second element concerns too much uncertainty.
Kanter suggested that not knowing the next step leads to
anxiety about the change process.

This element of

resistance can be overcome with consistent, effective
communication at every step of the process.
The third element concerns what Kanter called the
surprise factor.

The surprise factor is created by

decisions and actions that are released without sufficient
preparation or groundwork.

The response by individuals to

something totally unexpected is shock and defensive
posturing.

The most common area for the surprise factor,

according to Kanter, is in organizational changes.
Management typically waits for all organizational decisions
to be made before releasing any information about them.
This element of resistance can be minimalized by properly
timed communication.
The fourth element Kanter called the difference effect.
The difference effect is the experience an individual has
when forced to reevaluate familiar routines and habits,
which used to constitute the correct way of doing things,
under the assumption that there is something wrong with
them.

The necessity of thinking through new ways of doing
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things requires more energy and effort than old habits and
can result in excessive fatigue and burnout.

The remedy for

the difference effect is to minimalize the new ways of doing
things, and to leave old routines and habits in place as
much as possible.
The fifth element is related to the fourth.

The

difference effect, in addition to requiring new habits,
brings into question the individual’s judgement in the
former adherence to a way of doing things that has now been
labeled incorrect or inefficient and the individual loses
face.

People will sometimes commit to a course of action

that is contrary to their long-term best interests to avoid
losing face.

To minimize the effects of losing face, past

action can be brought into perspective as a step in an
evolutionary process.
The sixth element involves individuals’ concerns about
remaining competent in the changing environment.

Competence

anxiety can be minimized by education and training in the
new methods and procedures required by the proposed change.
The seventh element Kanter called the ripple effect.
Resistance to change can be caused by the disruption of
work-related or personal plans and projects to which people
had committed before the change began.

Kanter did not

specify remedial action except to suggest that change agents
must be sensitive to the potential for the ripple effect.
The eighth element of resistance is that the change
will result in more work, more energy, and more time.
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Kanter argued that anxiety related to the idea that more
work will be required causes less anxiety and is based in
reality.

It is rare, if ever, that change can be

successfully implemented without diligent and sometimes
painful efforts.

But the successful change agent will have

prepared all members of the organization to understand and
accept their roles in the change, and motivate them to put
forth the required effort.
The ninth element is the history of antagonism and
resentment that exists between certain members of every
group.

Unresolved grievances from the past almost certainly

will arise to interfere with the change efforts.

The only

possibility for the change agent to overcome these
hindrances, according to Kanter, is to identify and resolve
them.
The tenth element of resistance proposed by Kanter is
the most reasonable:

The change may really be threatening.

Real personal danger usually creates a defensive response,
and there is little a change agent can do about it except to
avoid pretense and false promises and deal with the
resistance as well as possible.

Kanter suggested that

resistance to change is not irrational, and change agents
can only be successful by developing an understanding of and
strategies for the inevitable psychological resistance to
any change program.
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Cultural Aspects of Change
The psychological perspective of organizational change
has become less prevalent as organizational theorists have
discovered that anthropological explanations of culture
better explain the behavior of individuals within the
context of the group or organization.

Kanter (1985)

suggested that the change agent can effectively deal with
resistance to change by developing rituals of parting or
ceremonies that move symbolically from the past to the
future, stressing future opportunities.

Robbins (1987)

determined that an organizational perspective of change
differs among cultures on certain key characteristics:

the

importance of individual initiative, risk tolerance, the
clarity of organizational direction, organizational
structural integration, the levels of management contact,
the levels of procedural and behavioral control, member
identity, reward systems, conflict tolerance, and
communication patterns.
Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985) used a psychological
framework to show how individual characteristics and
resulting actions form into a cultural format that guides
the manner in which organizations learn things and thus
affect the manner in which the organization changes.
Certain cultural governing variables in the organization
create action strategies which, in turn, have certain
consequences.

The utilization of the consequences in the

development of the governing variables and the action
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strategies constitutes the organization’s theories-in-use.
When consequences are used to modify action strategies, this
is known as single-loop learning.

When consequences are

used to modify governing variables, the organization is
using double-loop learning.

The learning pattern of the

organization determines to some extent the manner in which
the organization will effect change.
One recent cultural change in some organizations has
been the movement away from control oriented management to
participative management (Lawler, 1988 ). ~Lawler (1988)
found three distinct strategies for involving employees in
decision making:

(a) parallel suggestion involvement,

job involvement, and (c) high involvement.

Each of these

three strategies vary on four elements or features:
information about organizational performance,
based on organizational performance,

(b)

(a)

(b) rewards

(c) knowledge that

enables employees to understand and contribute to
organizational performance, and (d) power to influence
organizational direction.

Each strategy moves control of

information, rewards, knowledge, and power down into the
organization to different degrees.
The parallel suggestion involvement strategy moves the
four elements down into the organization the least of the
three strategies, and is the oldest approach to employee
involvement.

Employees are asked to produce ideas,

suggestions, and problem solutions that will influence how
the organization operates.

This can be accomplished through
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suggestion programs, quality circles, and methods
improvement programs.

Rewards in a parallel suggestion

strategy are typically based on cost savings or gainsharing.
Based on a review of related research, Lawler concluded that
parallel structure can lead to increased organizational
performance and cost savings, and that employees can be more
satisfied with their work than in noninvolvement
organizations.

The limitations of a parallel structure

focus around the character of the strategy as a program or
temporary system in the organization.

Cost savings

suggestion programs are expensive to run and difficult to
maintain, they run out of suggestions and knowledge to solve
complex problems, they are generally resisted by middle
managers because of the threat to their power base and the
extra work created by the need for responses to the
suggestions, they usually create some sort of conflict
between participants and nonparticipants, and the suggestion
programs are rarely supported consistently by the reward
systems.

Lawler observed that parallel structure systems

may go on for a period of time, but they tend to disappear
after awhile and they do not change the organization’s way
of doing business.
Job involvement focuses on enrichment of work to
motivate employees to better levels of performance.

Job

enrichment creates jobs that give feedback, increases
individual influence in work methods, requires a variety of
skills, and provides a comprehensive task to perform as
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opposed to a task component.
form of job involvement, are
involvement.

Autonomous task groups, as a
the primary unit of

All group members are equally responsible for

group objectives and performance.

Group approaches require

interpersonal skills that may not be required in basic job
enrichment strategies.

Reward structures are different in

group approaches, and groups can have more decision power
than individuals.

For example, teams may make personnel

decisions and select supervisors.
Lawler found that job involvement technology can result
in improvements in productivity, quality, absenteeism, and
turnover.

The effective use

of this approach depends on the

technology of the workplace.Teams are appropriate when

the

task is too complex for one individual, such as in chemical
plants, oil refineries, banks, and airlines.

The individual

approach to job involvement is appropriate for organizations
where the technology allows an individual to do the whole
task or service.

Job involvement approaches limit the

contributions that individuals might ordinarily make to
strategic decisions because the individuals are limited to
immediate work decisions.

To be effective, job involvement

approaches must be part of the strategic objectives and
incorporated into the business plans to receive the
sustained commitment of management and supervision.
High involvement strategies require the organization to
be structured so that people at the lowest levels have a
sense of involvement in the performance of the total
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organization.

According to Lawler, high involvement

strategies contain the elements of job involvement,
suggestion involvement, and team approach, but they differ
in the kind of information shared and decision, power, and
reward systems.

In high involvement, employees are not only

asked to make decisions about their work activities, but to
play a role in the organization’s strategic decisions.
Rewards are generally based on organizational performance
rather than individual performance.
Lawler reported that there are relatively few data on
high involvement organizations because there are so few
examples to study.

Most examples are self-contained

manufacturing units in isolated locations or new startups.
Existing research (Lawler, 1986) indicated that high
involvement organizations tend to be low-cost, flexible, and
adaptive organizations, and they tend to be quality and
customer oriented.

High involvement approaches require a

high initial investment in employee selection, training, and
system development, and are not appropriate for every
business.

The primary determinants of which involvement

strategy should be used in a given organization are the
nature of the work it does, organizational technology,
organizational values, and the characteristic management
approach used by the organization.

The organization’s work

and technology are centered around two critical aspects:
the extent to which individuals need to coordinate their
activities, and the relative complexity of the work
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involved.

High interdependence favors a team approach,

while low interdependence indicates an individual approach.
High complexity indicates a need for high involvement.
Lawler concluded that high involvement strategies
require managers to believe that employees are a key
organizational resource and will behave responsibly,
consistent with the democratic principle.

High involvement

is not universally good for all organizations, but strategic
analysis of where the organization is and where it wants to
be can indicate the appropriate level of involvement.
The process of organizational change, from a cultural
perspective, must necessarily be a process of socialization
or resocialization. "As goal-oriented entities,
organizations seek to influence, determine, and/or control
the behavior of their members in directions consistent with
their particular objectives.

At the same time, members are

attempting to define mutually acceptable and satisfying
roles for themselves in the organization" (Fisher, 1986, p.
1 0 1 ).

Many authors have suggested that organizational
socialization can be understood as a serial or stage process
(Feldman, 1981; Graen, 1976; Schein, 1978; Van Maanen,
1976).

But research tends only to support stage models when

they are related to specific occupations or job content
areas (Fisher, 1986).
An extensive review of the literature on organizational
socialization was conducted by Fisher (1986).

Fisher
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critiqued the methodology of previous research in
organizational socialization.

Previous research has

neglected to account for how individuals change during
socialization and the potential outcomes of socialization.
Socialization occurs when individuals cross a boundary in
organizational role or status.

There is relatively little

systematic research on organizational socialization, and
those few studies available do not include responses from
the worst failures of socialization.
Most existing studies have focused on only a few
occupational groups:

police, nurse, military recruit,

engineer, and graduate student.

Very few studies examine

more than one occupation within an organization.

Fisher

distinguished between occupational socialization, the
socialization process found in professions that require
lengthy training and complex skills, and organizational
socialization, the socialization process that occurs when
one enters an organization or during an organizational
change, but conceded that the two may occur simultaneously.
Fisher defined socialization as primarily a learning
and change process involving psychological categories of
content.

These categories of content might be (a)

organizational values, goals, and culture,
values, norms and friendships,

(b) work group

(c) job skills, knowledge,

and procedures, and (d) personal change relating to
identity, self-image, and motive structure.

The

socialization process can lead to destructive, rebellious
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outcomes and cause disillusionment and turnover.

On the

other hand, socialization can lead to creative change for
the organization and satisfaction and commitment in the
organization’s members.

Fisher suggested that socialization

research should include an examination of anticipatory
socialization:

all learning and experience that prepares an

individual for a change.
Before learning can take place, the change agent must
convince organizational members that the change is
necessary.

This may be accomplished through a process of

unfreezing or unlearning old or outside cultural values and
substituting new organizational values (Schein, 1986).
There seems to be some evidence to suggest that individuals
with low self-esteem are more likely to copy others, and are
therefore more easily socialized (Weiss, 1978; Weiss &
Nowicki, 1981).

But Dalton (1979) disagreed, suggesting

that increased self-esteem facilitates the change process.
Motivation to become socialized probably changes during
the socialization process, people do not simply discard old
values and adopt new values (Van Maanen, 1976).

First,

behavioral compliance is shaped through rewards and anxiety
reduction, then organizational members learn to identify
with the primary work group, and finally they internalize
the new value structure.

The effect of socialization on any

group member depends on whether the change is affected on
individuals or groups of individuals, whether the process is
formal or informal, whether the process is structured and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77

sequential or random, whether or not there is a fixed time
table, and whether the socialization is affected by peers or
with a designated agent (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979).

Weiss

and Nowicki (1981) concluded that using peers as change
agents may have the best chance of influencing behavior.

Organizational Culture
The Anthropological Perspective of Culture
"People go to work to find meaning in their lives"
(Graves, 1986, p. 143).

Meaning, and what people make of

meaning, is the essential motivating factor in the
socialization process.

Cultural anthropology, which is the

study of human custom and cultural behavior, explores
certain questions about people in groups (Keesing, 1958):
Why do humans behave the way they do?
of a particular group develop?

How did the customs

How do the customs of one

group differ from those of another?

What things do all

people have in common, the universals and constants?
is the nature of a cultural system?

What

Can cultural processes

be predicted and controlled?
The study of organizational culture derives from two
fields of cultural anthropology:

ethnology, the analysis of

likenesses and differences among cultures, and social
anthropology, which is concerned with developing
generalizations about culture, society, and personality.
Keesing (1958) defined culture as "the totality of learned,
socially transmitted behavior, or 'custom’" (p. 16).
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Keesing distinguished culture from society and from
personality, defining society as "the aggregation of
individuals in organized populations or groups" who share
the same cultural beliefs (p. 16).

Personality, from the

perspective of social anthropology, is the collection of
"characteristics of the individual particularly as a
consequence of learning and training in a particular
sociocultural milieu" (p. 16).
Cultural anthropology literature is rich in technique
and perspective on the investigation of culture.

From the

above definitions, the conceptualization of organizations as
societies within which characteristic cultures can be
identified is both reasonable and justifiable.

And the

available organizational literature is generally sufficient
to address the various questions of organizational culture.
However, there is one area of anthropological literature
which warrants some attention in light of the present study:
the question of cultural determinism.

The question of

determinism is particularly important to the study of
organizational culture because organizations are best
characterized as part time cultures for their members.
Organizational members bring one or more cultures from the
larger society into the organization.

Organizational

members are socialized in a more pervasive culture before
they even become aware of the organizational culture.
One of the best arguments in favor of cultural
determinism was presented by White (1948).

White argued
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that even though some people believe strongly that culture
can be controlled, evidence for this conclusion is scarce if
not nonexistent.

Faith that advances in science,

technology, and philosophy give people the power to shape
their own destiny is a weakly supported belief in light of
the two world wars in the 20th century, and the
ever-increasing and unnecessary complexities in life such as
fashion trends and entertainment media.

All complex social

entities can be traced back to earlier approximations.

The

United Nations can be traced back to tribal councils, modern
warfare and weapons systems can be traced back to
prehistoric people throwing rocks at each other, and complex
national and international economic systems have grown out
of all the barter and

distribution processes used

since

before the Stone Age.
Culture, asserted White, cannot be explained in terms
of humans.
culture.

Humans have remained a constant element of
Culture cannot be explained in terms of

environment.

Environments have remained consistent while

the cultures they have contained have changed dramatically.
Culture must be explained in terms of culture; culture is a
continuum.

All cultural traits grow out of previous

cultural traits or situations.

Culture of the present was

determined by culture of the past, and culture of
will be determined by the past and the present.
makes itself.

the future
Culture

Although people cannot control the course of

culture, they can learn to predict it, and even to make some
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adjustments.

But understanding culture gives people no more

control over it than understanding the ocean gives them
control over the tides.
One of the best arguments in favor of cultural control
was presented by Opler (1964).

Opler argued that culture is

not a deterministic entity that uniformly creates its
members.

People are not helpless, hapless recipients of

culture.

Rather, they are active shapers of the nature and

boundaries of their social processes.

"Culture is to be

thought of less as a rigid cast than as a plastic border
against which men strain" (p. 526).

Culture is the work of

humanity, it seems to be autonomous only because of our
efforts to define and categorize it.
Whether or not culture can be controlled by people is
central to the study of organizational culture.

If

organizational culture cannot be controlled, then there is
no point in its examination except as idle scientific
curiosity.

If culture is determined by previous activities

and events, then the researcher has nothing to offer the
business practitioner except an explanation of how the
current culture evolved.

The present study must necessarily

operate under the assumption that culture in organizations
can be shaped and controlled to some extent.
The Organizational Perspective of Culture
"People who have experienced past success in
organizations that are now in trouble usually greet grand
announcements for significant change with significant
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resistance" (Wilkens & Bristow, 1987, p. 221).

According to

Wilkens and Bristow (1987), a change agent cannot hope to
identify all the cultural conventions that may interfere
with change.

Most of these latent functions of

organizational culture come into awareness when they simply
appear during the process of implementation.

Change agents

must then plan to modify change plans as they uncover new
insights about the organization’s culture.

Any strategic

plan that changes the direction of the organization must
still begin from where the organization is at the time, and
must use the current organizational cultural knowledge and
skills.
Rather than attempt to change the roots of the culture,
Wilkens and Bristow recommended using the existing culture
to achieve the change by considering what motivates and
focuses the group.

Return to the organization’s past to

find inspiration and instruction, to identify themes that
form the basis of the existing culture, to identify
principles that will remain constant no matter what change
is implemented, to find examples of current successes, to
identify and label eras that indicate directional shifts,
and to mourn the loss of the cherished past.
As Tichy (1983) suggested, cultural uncertainties in
planning are related to the changes and conflicts in
people’s value systems, and addressing cultural
uncertainties requires determining the influence of beliefs
and philosophies on the organizational mission.

Allcorn
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(1985)

suggested that certain elements of culture have

work-facilitating or work-inhibiting effects on the work
force.

Organizational atmosphere can facilitate work if it

is relaxed and informal and inhibit work if it is formal and
restrictive.

Intragroup communication that is spontaneous

and flexible will facilitate work while restricted or
cliquish communication patterns will not.

A clear

understanding of the task facilitates work while task
ambiguity does not.

Constructive conflict and frank,

constructive criticism that encourages revision and
compromise will facilitate work while ignoring or
suppressing conflict or making personal attacks leads to
polarized camps that inhibit the work process.

When

leadership shifts among organizational members and all feel
a part of the decision process, the work process is
enhanced.
In agreement with Allcorn’s conclusions, Moch and Huff
(1987) explored the destructive effects of the "blaming
ritual" in a large food processing plant in the southern
United States.

The plant was primarily an assembly line

type production pattern with functional division of labor,
most of which was unskilled.

Moch and Huff observed that

the centralized power structure at corporate headquarters
left few discretionary resources for the plant manager to
use in exchange transactions.

In order to meet rigid

production schedules under heavy restrictions of hiring and
firing, his major asset was his position and use of language
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and ritual.
ritual:

The primary ritual observed was the blaming

In ambiguous situations, individuals or groups of

individuals were identified as the problem or source of the
problem.

The blame was usually tied to personal attributes

such as laziness or incompetence.
By studying locution, the actual words spoken, Moch and
Huff concluded that the plant manager’s use of language was
specifically designed to emphasize separateness from
subordinates and to highlight their inferiority.

Many

aipeoific rituals were clearly pointless except to define and
assert power.

Blaming rituals contained an unanswerable

logic (a question or situation for which there can be no
explanation), surprise (an unpredictable topic and content
focus), superficial content, and repetition.

The blaming

rituals were met with little or no response from the blamee.
Moch and Huff concluded that the blaming ritual
provided a number of cultural functions:

stability provided

by a familiar pattern where the established behavior is the
path of least resistance, reinforcement of the bos s ’ intent
to maintain power and control, and a restriction of the
boss’ control from the recipient’s point of view.

In

addition, Moch and Huff concluded that the use of sexual and
scatological language had the effect of conveying personal
abuse and identifying the individual as the problem rather
than the individual’s behavior.

But the sexual and

scatological language also has the effect of keeping things
informal and shelters the group from more explicit and
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formal control efforts.

When a worker is contracted for

time rather than product, he or she is open to hierarchical
surveillance.

Productivity was assumed to be increased

through coercive control mechanisms.

Language and ritual

are specifically designed to maintain control of
productivity in the factory.
"There is not much point in attempting to study or
change a thing called culture if it does not affect what
goes on in organizations" (Kilmann, Saxton & Serpa, 1986, p.
88).

Therefore, those authors concluded that one must

assume that culture does affect organizational behavior and
performance, and the direction of the organization.

The

nature of the impact depends on the strength or
pervasiveness of the culture:

Is the culture seen the same

way by all members of the organization, or differently by
different members?

Regardless of direction, the culture

exerts some level of pressure on its members.

According to

Kilmann et a l . , the strength can range from very weak to
very strong.

A culture has a positive impact on an

organization when it moves behavior in the right direction
in relation to the plan, when it is widely shared throughout
the organization, and when it places a high level of
pressure on its members to follow specified guidelines.

A

culture has a negative impact if it points in the wrong
direction, when it is widely shared, and when it places a
high pressure on members to conform.

When the culture

conflicts with the organizational mission, Kilmann et a l .
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suggest it is better to have a weak culture than a strong
counterculture.
Kilmann et a l . defined culture as shared philosophies,
ideologies, values, assumptions, beliefs, expectations,
attitudes, and norms that knit a community together.
Culture manifests itself in behavioral norms, assumptions
and human nature.

Norms are readily measurable and

observable; assumptions can only be determined by
examination of decisions and decision processes; and human
nature is the collection of needs, wants, motives, and
desires that define the group.

Organizations may have

multiple cultures moving in multiple directions with
multiple strengths.

Kilmann et. al. concluded that managing

culture is essential and possible, and that more research is
needed to improve understanding and develop methods that
increase control of corporate culture.
Echoing the theme that corporate culture can be
controlled, Bettinger (1989) advocated a thorough assessment
of the organizational culture by senior management.

"Without

a thorough understanding of the existing culture, the
compatibility of strategy cannot be effectively evaluated by
management" (p. 38).

Bettinger identified certain key

cultural components which can be assessed such as the
general attitude toward change, the current focus, standards
and values, the rituals supporting these values, reward
systems, methods of conflict resolution, and levels of
commitment to organizational goals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Most models of organizational culture seem to be the
result of observations by consultants and what might be
called clinical experience, and are not systematically
supported by research.

In light of the complexities of

organizational behavior and the infancy of this area of
conceptual thought, the dearth of research is
understandable.

But one exception to this generalization is

the research conducted by Hofstede (1980).

Hofstede studied

the values and beliefs of 116,000 IBM employees in 40
different countries and, as a result, developed a model to
order societies on four cultural dimensions:
distance, uncertainty avoidance,

power

individualism-collectivism,

and masculinity-femininity.
Power distance is the extent to which a culture
encourages unequal distribution of power among its members.
Cultures can be rated high or low on this continuum.

In low

power distance cultures, interaction among classes and
socioeconomic levels is higher.

In high power distance

cultures, interaction is lower and tends to be autocratic.
Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of the
society feel threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity and
take steps to avoid uncertainty.

In a low uncertainty

avoidance culture one would find fewer written rules and
procedures, less structure to activities, and higher risk
taking.

A society low on individualism-collectivism would

tend to be loosely structured and self-sustaining
(individualistic), while a society high on this variable
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would tend to be more cohesive and would place a high value
on loyalty and dependance on others (collective).

The

masculinity-femininity dimension categorizes societies on
the extent to which they value masculine traits such as
assertiveness, competition, and acquisition of tangible
things, or feminine traits such as passivity, cooperation,
and emphasis on feelings.

In masculine organizations,

people believe that the job should offer challenge,
opportunity for gain, and advancement.

In feminine

organizations, people feel that the job should offer good
working conditions, security, and the opportunity for open
expression and personal growth.

Masculine organizations use

rational or political methods to solve problems, while
feminine organizations use intuitive methods.
Hofstede determined that certain countries tended to
produce organizational members with similar cultural
orientations that may be assumed to be the result of the
nesting culture rather than the organizational culture.

For

example, IBM employees from France tended to express high
power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, medium to high
individualism, and medium masculinity, while IBM employees
from Switzerland tended to express low power distance,
medium to high uncertainty avoidance, medium individualism,
and medium to high masculinity.

Hofstede developed eight

clusters into which most of the countries in the study fit.
The only single country in a cluster was Japan, which was
medium power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, medium
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individualism, and high masculinity.

As a result of his

research, Hofstede cautioned that an organizational culture
can only be a subculture of the larger society, and should
be examined in that context.
Using Hofstede*s paradigm, Jackofsky, Slocum, and
McQuaid (1988) analyzed the relationships between cultural
values and selected CEO roles in five different countries:
Sweden, West Germany, Taiwan, France, and Japan.
Characterizing their conclusions as tentative because of the
difficulty of separating the behavior of the CEO from the
behavior of the organization, Jackofsky et al. found that
each culture embodies distinctive attributes and that these
attributes are manifested in the C E O ’s behavior.

Intangible

factors such as personality, presence, ability to
communicate, and physical appearance all contribute to the
difficulty of the analysis.

The role of the CEO is critical

to the interpretation of national and international values
within the corporate culture, and the complexity of the
C E O ’s role only serves to discourage direct research.
The findings of Jackofsky et a l . bring to the fore the
question of the role of leadership as an element of
organizational culture.

Several authors (Bass, 1985;

Bennis, 1969; Bettinger,

1989; Dalton, 1979; Deal & Kennedy,

1982; E n z , 1986; Graves, 1986; Hauserman, 1987; Linton,
1936; Opler,

1964; Schein, 1986; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984;

Wilkens & Bristow, 1987) have stressed the importance of
heroism in culture.

The cultural component of heroism, for
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Deal and Kennedy (1982), was a pivotal and necessary
component of leadership.

Heroes are central to any

corporate culture because they are symbolic figures who
demonstrate that ideal behavior and success are attainable.
Heroes defy order in the pursuit of a vision.

Although Deal

and Kennedy felt that some heroes are "born" into the role,
they suggested that organizations with strong cultures
create their own situational heroes.

Companies that promote

people who embody fad management practices instead of those
who embody key organizational values wind up with weak
cultures.

Strong cultures, according to Deal and Kennedy,

create heroic positions and develop certain types of
individuals for those heroic roles.

Heroes make success a

human possibility, provide inspiring role models, symbolize
the values of the company to the outside world, preserve
what makes the company special, set a standard of
performance, and motivate employees.
similar idea:

Bass (1985) proposed a

Transformational leaders are quality of life

managers in that they create and maintain the culture of the
organization.

If leaders are concerned with the quality of

life, and if they plan and implement change, then the change
must promote quality of life in terms of the organizational
culture.
Most philosophies of administration are founded in
rationalistic positivism and tend to avoid quality of life
or value issues that are central to management functions
(Hodgkinson, 1983).

The very foundation of administration
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is decision making, and decision making is based on beliefs
about good vs. bad, right vs. wrong, cost vs. benefit, and
so on.

Meanings that people create are inherent in their

philosophy:

"Philosophy involves a set of beliefs about how

the world is structured, and administrators, knowingly or
not, put those beliefs into practice" (Foster, 1986a, p.
19) .
Even though there seems to be a consensus of opinion on
the importance of philosophy, values, and beliefs to an
understanding of organizational culture, there is some
disagreement on the definition of culture, and, as noted
above, definitions that presume to provide practical
guidance tend to be inadequate for research.

Smircich

(1983) has suggested that there are at least five different
perspectives of organizational culture:
1. Classical management theory perceives culture as an
instrument serving biological and psychological needs.
2. Contingency theory views culture as an adaptive,
regulatory mechanism which unites individuals into social
structures.
3. Cognitive organizational theory sees culture as a
system of shared cognitions, a product of the mind which
defines rules.
4. Symbolic organizational theory perceives culture as
a system of shared symbols and meanings.
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5.

Transformational organizational theory understands

culture as a projection of the mind’s universal unconscious
infrastructure (pp. 339-358).
Graves (1986) has pointed out that the various
perspectives can be characterized as falling into two
categories:

(a) the anthropological approach which treats

culture as a phenomenon in itself, and (b) the psychosocial
approach which treats culture as a variable which is capable
of manipulation by managers to improve productivity and
performance.

The psychosocial approach is sometimes

referred to as organizational climate.
Graves argued that the phenomenological culture changes
slowly and unpredictably over time, while climate can
reflect day to day changes.

Graves also suggested that the

culture of an organization can be used as a bench mark for
organizational change.

In fact, change is usually justified

by an inappropriate culture.

Organizational culture can be

theoretically seen as a means of providing stable behavior
through a system of causal relationships.

These

relationships apply an incentive for people to commit to the
organizational goals, reduce anxiety, and act as an operant
conditioner.

Graves stated that although there is general

agreement that the concept of organizational culture is
meaningful, there are no clear definitions of culture or
climate.
Tagiuri (1968) defined organizational climate as "a
relatively enduring quality of the internal environment of
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an organization that (a) is experienced by its members, (b)
influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms
of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or
attributes) of the organization" (p. 27).

Payne and Pugh

(1976) defined climate as "the characteristic behavioral
process in a social system at one particular point in time"
(p. 1,126).

This behavioral process is the result of and is

influenced by members’ attitudes, values, and beliefs, with
the context and structure of the system being more stable
than the people.
Graves and the other organizational climate theorists
are interested in a definition of culture that is precisely
definable and readily measurable.

Graves (1986), for

example, used the Ghiselli Self-Description Inventory to
investigate the culture of four types of companies in
England.

The inventory was given to managers in training

seminars because, Graves reasoned, the personality of the
upper management set and manipulated the climate of the
organization.

But if the organization itself is nothing

more than an "accounting practice" used to make meaning from
socially constructed reality, as suggested by Burrell and
Morgan (1979), then a survey of the personality
characteristics of senior managers is likely to fall
drastically short of a meaningful representation of the
culture.

In addition, the distinction between culture and

climate may be useful when considering the manifest
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functions of management, but does not make sense when
considering the latent functions of management.
After conducting his survey, Graves (1986) concluded
that organizational culture is something an that
organization is as opposed to something that it has, that it
is possible to distinguish managers in one company from
those in another using character traits and needs, and that
the notion of organizational culture is linked to the
perceptions of managers and may not exist in any objective,
measurable form.

Changing an organizational culture can

take place at three levels: behavior, attitudes, and values.
Changing behavior can be accomplished through rearrangement
of the physical environment, facilities, and meeting times.
Changing attitudes can be accomplished by restructuring
broad levels of management to adjust mental set and
perceptions of employees.

Changing values requires a change

of senior managers, and can only be accomplished by new
people at the top.
If culture can be considered a benchmark by which
managers can assess change, then a concept of culture which
provides a suitable framework for the entire organization is
needed.

Porter, Lawler, and Hackman (1975) defined culture

as a set of customs and typical patterns of ways of doing
things.

"The force, pervasiveness, and nature of such modal

beliefs and values vary considerably from organization to
organization" (p. 489).

Organizational cultural change
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attempts fail if the prevailing and dominant norms and
values are not taken into account.
Enz (1986) suggested that research based on definitions
of culture that stress symbols, stories, and rituals is too
fixated on examining cultural artifacts and ignores common
values.

"Organizations do not operate under simple rules of

reasonableness, but often operate as a function of the
enduring values shared by organizational participants" (p.
108).

Foster (1986a) agreed:

"The ability to label coffee

breaks as rituals hardly results in a cultural analysis of
the organization" (p. 136).
Foster (1986a) defined culture as "the lived and
experienced collection of beliefs that are not really
amenable to rationalistic intervention by managers" (p.
136).

Leaders do not change culture through programs,

Foster argued, but through a personification of values and
beliefs that facilitate development of the culture that they
favor.

The notion of manipulating the culture is overly

simplified, and cultural understanding of the organization
will never be adequate until it begins to include political
and structural aspects of the organization and their
relation to the larger society.
The operational definition of organizational culture
which was used for this study is that offered by Schein
(1986), that culture is "a pattern of basic
assumptions— invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external
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adaptation and internal integration— that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and
feel in relation to these problems" (p. 9).

Schein agreed

with Bass (1985) by stating that "the only thing of real
importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture"
(p. 2).
The creation and management of culture requires
knowledge of the process of learning and unlearning complex
beliefs and assumptions.

Typical behavior patterns in an

organization, according to Schein, could be as much a result
of the environment as the culture, and should not be used as
the primary basis for defining the culture.

Instead, Schein

recommended examining the culture on three different levels:
(a) artifacts, the visible level of culture;

(b) values, the

sense of what ought to be as opposed to what is; and (c)
basic assumptions, people’s relationship to their
environment, and the nature of reality, time, space, human
activity, and human relationships.
Clearly, the culture of the organization is the
keystone to organizational planning and organizational
change.

An appropriate culture can facilitate successful

planning and change while an inappropriate culture can deter
both.

The culture of the organization specifies how

problems are perceived, how strategies are developed to cope
with the problems, and how the organization itself responds
to its own plans.

Yet culture is difficult to define, and
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even more difficult to measure.

The evaluation of the

success of any strategic change must be conducted with
respect to cultural context.
An organization’s culture is not a clearly defined
entity because it is constantly influenced by the nesting
social culture.

Members of the organization are also

members of the society within which the organization
operates and, therefore, will reflect social values which
may or may not be consistent with organizational values.
The relative merit of an employee’s behavior within the
organization and his or her response to change must be
understood not only by the standards of the organization,
but within the broader context of social responsibility.

Social Responsibility of Organizations
American society is becoming increasingly less tolerant
of corporate crime (Cullen, Maakestad & Cavender, 1987).
The current trend in American organizations is to define and
manage the normative systems that channel the behavior of
organizational members (Weiss, 1986).

The organizational

culture is the entity that provides the guidelines for
ethical behavior at work by standardizing general and
pervasive characteristics of the organization which affect a
broad range of decisions (Victor & Cullen, 1988).
Schein (1986) suggested that in order to understand
behavior within an organization, the underlying assumptions
that have developed within the organization must be
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considered.

Schein also suggested that three levels of

culture interact to produce behavior:

(a) operational basic

assumptions including the nature of the organization’s
relationship to the environment,

(b) the organization’s

perception of the nature of time and space, and (c) the
organization’s perception of the nature of human activity
and human relationships.

These levels are generally

invisible and taken for granted.

But they lead to values

that are tested in the physical environment and by social
consensus at some level of awareness, and, in turn, produce
the visible artifacts and creations such as technology, art,
and the visible and audible behavior patterns of
organizations.
Ethics
The study of ethics is concerned with two basic
questions:

What is the nature of life’s greatest good

(summum bonum), and what sort of right and good action is
required to bring about the good life (Sahakian & Sahakian,
1966)?

O n e ’s theory of summum bonum is said to be o n e ’s

ethical philosophy, and o n e ’s application of behavior in
practice of ethics is said to be o n e ’s moral standard.

The

ethical theory of an individual or group is a fundamental
basic assumption upon which all other operational
assumptions are based.

Normally when discussing

organizational ethics, the actual focus is on the behavioral
or moral standards.

Writers in the field of organizational

ethics rarely address the ethical theory behind the
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behavioral prescriptions they are discussing because their
primary question concerns whose rules organizations should
follow.

The ethics or theory behind the prescribed

behaviors should be examined in order to make sense of the
prescriptions.

Often the behavioral prescriptions create

conflicts because there is more than one ethical theory
involved.
For example, Elkins and Callaghan (1981) outlined a
social responsibility doctrine within which business forms a
social contract with society.

Business functions by public

consent, and its basic purpose is to serve the needs of
society.

If business fails in this contract, society is

obligated to seek out some other institution to serve its
needs.

Business is responsible equally to shareholders

(owners), customers, labor and employees, all levels of
government, suppliers, financiers, special interest groups,
and local communities.
The social responsibility model outlined by Elkins and
Callaghan is in direct conflict with Friedman’s concept of
the social responsibility of business.

Friedman (1983)

suggested that business serves society best by serving its
owners and by making profits.

Contributing to society may

be in direct conflict with conducting business; only people
can have responsibilities, an organization is an artificial
person and can only have artificial responsibilities.

The

employee, as a person, has a responsibility to society.

But

as an employee, responsibility is owed to the owners of the
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organization to conduct business according to their wishes.
If the organization is owned by the public (i.e. nonprofit),
then the responsibility is to society.
Elkins and Callaghan (1981) pointed out that neither
the normative economic model nor the social responsibility
model are adequate for use by a manager.

The economic model

is descriptive and prescriptive for structured conditions
within markets and organizations that don’t exist.

The

social responsibility doctrine is too vague and presents
some serious philosophical questions.

In addition to the

above criticisms, it should be pointed out that neither
model examines or defines a consistent picture of summum
bonum, or what the objective is for the organization and
society in general.

Friedman (1983) suggested that there

are two different objectives for organizational behavior,
and they conflict.

If Friedman’s conclusion is valid, then

organizations and the society that nests them are in heated
conflict with no hope of resolution.

Since the conflict has

not resulted in the defeat of either side, there must be
some rules involved that prevent this from happening.
Ladd (1983) insisted that there are rules involved.
Ladd stated that certain facets of the organization ideal
are incompatible with the ordinary principles of morality
and the resulting dilemma is one source of alienation.

Ladd

also noted similarities between the language-game of formal
organizations and the language-game of other types of games,
such as chess and baseball.

Challenging the rules of these
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established games is inappropriate as is challenging the
rules in the organization language-game.
Ladd also argued that decisions or actions of the
organization are attributed to the organization and not to
the individuals or even the collections of individuals that
make up the organizations.

The phenomenon of attribution

allows people to have two sets of ethical principles:

one

when they act in behalf of the organization, and one when
they act as a member of society.

An employee is acting in

behalf of the organization when actions are consistent with
organizational goals.
officer:

Ladd gave the example of a naval

the officer is not personally responsible for

bombarding a village and killing all the people because that
is what the navy does, but that same officer is held
personally responsible if the ship runs aground.

In other

words, decisions that are consistent with organizational
goals are attributed to the organization, and decisions that
are inconsistent with organizational goals are attributed to
the individual.

Following this reasoning, if an

organization’s behavior is unethical from society’s
perspective, the behavior must necessarily be considered
consistent with organizational goals if no responsibile
individual has been identified as the wrongdoer.
What, then, happens to the individual who must
assimilate and follow two sets of ethical principles?
According to Ladd, the organization cannot assume a genuine
moral posture because the organizational repertoire does not
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contain concepts like moral obligation, responsibility, and
integrity.

Rationality in an organization is determined by

means and ends, not by ethical principle.

An individual

must go along with the organization because there is no
evidence that individual action can change the system.

One

has the same feeling about changing organizational behavior
as one would have about changing the nature of the army
during a war.
Lachs (1978) suggested that psychological distance from
deeds renders us ignorant of the conditions of our existence
and the outcome of our actions.

Lachs used the example of

General Yamashita, Commander of Japanese forces in the
Philippines during World War II.

At the war crimes trial,

General Yamashita claimed that he simply ordered his troops
to do whatever was necessary to stop the guerrilla activity
not realizing his orders would result in legal atrocities.
He was not in effective control; without knowing the mental
condition of his troops, he could never understand how a
professional and innocent order could have been interpreted
as a license for murder and torture.

Assuming that a person

acts as an individual based on what he or she knows, and
considering the expected organizational repertoire of
soldiers during a war, Yamashita is blameless.

After all,

managers may not necessarily question the wisdom of
organizational direction.

Managers are only doing what they

have to do because their responsibility is to the
organization.

If managers did not perform as expected, they
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would be removed from their jobs and replaced by someone who
would.
The Relationship of Culture and Ethics
LaCroix (1978) listed three cultural myths, paradoxes
really, in business that illustrate the cultural crossover
and how it manifests itself in the organization’s sense of
social responsibility:

success, work, and self-interest.

Success means that the hero succeeds.

Yet any consistent

winner is detested by everyone else and must be humbled.
Even though everyone in an organization may be working
toward the same ideal, achieving that ideal can result in
ostracism by one’s peers.
people from mischief.

Work builds character and keeps

Work is valuable in itself and a

person’s time is best spent working to produce something of
value.

If work really is intrinsically valuable, LaCroix

asked, then why do so many people complain about work and
spend so much effort getting out of it?

If producing is

satisfying, then why do so many organizations have to
implement programs to increase productivity?

Self-interest

and utility maximization express a person’s prime
motivation.

If utility maximization is so important for the

individual, argued LaCroix, then why do we have
organizations at all?

Do organizations exist for the

maximization of an individual’s objectives?

If the answer

is yes, then all individuals in the organization must have
the same objectives.

Otherwise, it would mean that some
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individuals are not working to maximize their own
objectives, but rather the objectives of others.
The three cultural myths listed by LaCroix— success,
work, and self-interest— are clearly carryovers from the
culture that nests the organization.

They illustrate how

individuals in the organization attempt to explain their
ethical posture when there is no organizational posture.
The problem of considering organizational culture and its
relationship to the organization’s sense of social
responsibility is confounded by three issues:

(a) the

organization cannot be held accountable in the same way an
individual can be held accountable,

(b) the organization is

made up of a collection of individuals with differing
ethical philosophies, and (c) the organization will present
any image necessary to the nesting society to maintain its
existence.
To examine the relationship of culture and ethics, the
culture must be adequately described to include a concept of
underlying foundation, or basic assumptions, and the ethical
philosophy of the organization must be determined.

The

ethical philosophy of an organization consists of the unique
manifestation of the philosophies of the individuals that
give the organization a behavioral direction regarding its
treatment of the nesting society.

In order to discuss

organizational culture or social responsibility, the
organization must be conceived of as an individual with all
the accountability of the individual.

The problem with this
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concept is that the organization may remain the same, but
the individuals in the organization change.

Incoming

individuals, particularly at top management levels, bring in
new ethical philosophies.

Fortunately, there is some

consistency within organizations after individuals have
shifted because of the pervasive organizational culture.
The complexity of the problem is not limited to the
description of the organization, but must also include the
way in which the nesting society, which is also a collection
of individuals, views the organization, and the relationship
between the two.

For example, business ethics conflicts

listed by LaCroix (1978) illustrate the complex relationship
between the individual as a member of the organization and
the individual as a member of society:
1.

Complying with superior’s requirements when they

conflict with on e ’s code of ethics,
2.

Job demands infringing on home obligations,

3.

Methods employed in competition for advancement,

4.

Avoiding or hedging responsibility,

5.

Maintaining integrity when it conflicts with being

well-liked,
6.

Impartial treatment of subordinates because of

race, religion, or personal bias,
7.

Moral concern that o n e ’s job does not fully utilize

one’s capacities;
8.

Condoning poor quality,

9.

Knowingly giving less than best performance, and
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10.

Misrepresentation of the facts to protect

organizational interests.
Each of these conflicts exemplifies the dissonance felt by
the individual when weighing the moral standards of society
and the moral standards of the organization.

Understanding

this conflict is the key to understanding the relationship
of culture and ethics in an organization.
The ethical elements of organizational culture do not
include methods of gathering information, conventions or
rules that have arbitrary consequences, or organizational
decision making that does not have a differential effect on
others (Victor & Cullen, 1988).

Victor and Cullen (1988)

defined the ethical elements of organizational culture as
the ethical climate based on the interaction of the type of
ethical criterion with the locus of analysis.

The ethical

criterion could be based in principle, benevolence, or
egoism.

The locus of analysis could be the individual, the

local community, or the cosmopolitan society.

The ethical

climate refers to how people in the organization decide,

for

example, whether it is right or wrong to pay kickbacks, but
not to information gathering such as determining whether or
not kickbacks are expected, or conventional decisions such
as whether the kickbacks should be paid in cash or goods.
Victor and Cullen (1988) surveyed 872 employees in four
different companies to determine whether or not ethical work
climates have organizational bases separate from individual
perspectives and evaluations.

Victor and Cullen assumed
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that (a) organizations and subgroups within organizations
develop different institutionalized normative systems,

(b)

these normative systems are well known to group members and
are perceived as a type of work climate, and (c) perceptions
of ethical work climate differ from effective evaluations of
ethical work climate.
Victor and Cullen tested two hypotheses:

First, the

variation in perceptions of ethical work climate between
groups is greater than the variation for the individuals
within groups.

And second, perceptions that describe the

ethical work climate are not correlated with attitudes that
evaluate work climate.

Victor and Cullen concluded that

there are at least three distinct sources of ethical
climate:

sociocultural, bureaucratic or structural, and

organization specific sources.

There are many types of

ethical work climates, and the wide range of relationships
between the climate types and evaluations of organizational
ethics indicates that climate differs from affective
responses to organizations.

It is possible, argued Victor

and Cullen, that ethical climates might affect
organizational performance factors, and that ethical climate
prescriptions may influence what ethical issues are
considered at work and what criteria are used to resolve
these issues.

The ethical climates identify the decision

processes which generate the systematic responses of
organizations to ethical dilemmas.
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Ackerman (1973) concluded that there are two major
deterrents which inhibit integration of social policy into
corporate planning:

the perception of daily business

activities as separate from and unaffected by the corporate
social role, and the notion that socially responsible action
goals are not cost effective, that is they provide no
business return for the cost.

Carroll and Hoy (1984) agreed

with Ackerman that social policy must be integrated into
strategic planning and operationalized into organizational
practice.
Carroll and Hoy suggested that corporate social policy
must be addressed at two levels in the organization:
macroview and the microview.

the

The macroview is characterized

by organizational goals, high level decision making, concept
formulation, high risk taking, and long range planning, and
concerned with organizational goals, strategic goals,
corporate decisions, and the business environment.

The

microview is characterized by functional goals, day-to-day
decision making, operational implementation, lower risk
taking, and short range planning, and concerned with
functional operation, operating plans, and coordination.

Of

the four factors of strategic planning specified by Carroll
and Hoy (corporate competencies and resources, market
opportunities, the personal values and aspirations of the
management group, and acknowledged social obligations) only
the fourth element is concerned with what managers ought to
do as opposed to what they want to do.
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Conflicts between social trends and corporate
stakeholders are inevitable.

Social responsibility,

according to Carroll and Hoy, is generally treated as an
environmental factor, and social policy is usually one of
adaptation.

The public good should be a factor in corporate

strategy because corporate legitimacy depends on its
responsiveness to social responsibility, the potential for
government intervention is high in some cases, and
developing a responsive policy is good business practice
from the standpoint of business success and continued
existence.

As society changes, social forces influence

marketplace decisions, self-protection decisions, and
anticipatory decisions at the macrolevel.
Nielsen (1985) classified several types of strategic
responses that can emerge when managers are faced with a
conflict between personal morality and organizational
strategic thrust.

The first, and most common, type of

response is to avoid thinking about the problem.

But the

avoidance response is rarely effective because it does
nothing to make the problem go away.

Other than avoidance,

managers can either obey, leave the company, conscientiously
object, secretly go outside the organization to the press or
government, or negotiate and build a consensus for a change
in strategic objectives.

All the responses have their

advantages and disadvantages, but the response with the
greatest potential for success is negotiation and consensus
building, which also is the most difficult to implement.
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Nielsen suggested that when negotiation and consensus
building is implausible, many managers find the most
expedient method of affecting change is to go to outside
authorities, sometimes called whistleblowing.

Hauserman

(1987) defended whistleblowing as an appropriate response to
affect change because whistleblowers are asserting a basic
individual value or sense of value that approaches ideals
beyond the value structure of the corporate America.
"Whistleblowers need to be protected against employer
retaliation" (Hauserman, 1987, p. 75).

If we wish the

society of the future to be better off, we need to encourage
those who would stand for these ideals.
Whistleblowing, according to Hauserman, reestablishes
individual conscience and community standards.

Community

citizenship has been replaced by feelings of corporate
citizenship.

This change in allegiance fosters

unwillingness in individuals to feel responsible for the
victimizing or criminal actions of others.

The failure to

protect a person who does report misconduct is a sanctioning
of moral turpitude.

Allowing employees to be fired for

reporting illegal actions of corporations supports the
notion that loyalty to the corporation is more important
than loyalty to society and personal moral values.
However, action taken by an individual does not
necessarily promote a sense of community.

Nielson (1989)

speculated that the state of being as an individual can mean
the necessity for intervention to end unethical practices by
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working against other individuals and groups.

Neilson

listed twelve different types of intervention strategies
that an individual might take, such as whistleblowing,
noting that all of them can be effective.

However,

intervention can have important limitations.

According to

Nielson, the individual intervening could be wrong about the
organization’s actions, the individual could damage
relationships within the organization to the extent that no
action will correct the problem, the organization could be
hurt unnecessarily, or the individual could be encouraged to
exercise power inappropriately.
Magnet (1986) concluded from interviewing several high
status individuals in the financial world that oral
transactions can

no longer be made because people do not

keep their word,

that written contracts cannot be trusted

because no matter what language is used it is open to
interpretation, and that one cannot simply refuse to deal
with unethical individuals because one cannot see this
element of character.

Part of the problem uncovered by

Magnet seems to be that employees hop consistently from one
company to the next and begin to see themselves as free
agents and their role as self-serving. Employees become
devoted to their own objectives instead of the company’s

and

therefore feel no obligation to protect the company.
Magnet suggested that not only has loyalty between the
employees and the company been weakened, but also between
the company and its customers.

Customers make no secret of
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the fact that they select vendors on an economic basis and
not on the basis of long-term relationships.

Misconduct on

the part of a supplier no longer results in a permanent
exclusion of the supplier from business if economic
agreements can be reached.

The ethic of the past, according

to Magnet, was more of a class value belonging to a genteel
oligarchy.

But today’s managers belong to no class or time

honored ethical code.
of money.

The new ethic is based on the making

An individual is admired for the amount of money

he or she has, and not how that money was obtained.

There

is no place for people to acquire mainstream values:

The

schools strive to be inoffensively value-neutral, colleges
teach that everything is relative, and television advocates
instant gratification.

People in our society have been

taught that the cause of wrongdoing is the economic or
psychological environment of the wrongdoer, and it is right
to hire and promote people not because of merit but because
of their membership in a group.
Magnet lamented that business ethic is currently a
perversion of the free market economic theory:

By pursuing

their own interest in their own way, people will augment the
wealth of the nation and the well-being of society.

The

strong are presumed to prevail over the weak; the strong can
do whatever they want and their success proves they were
right in doing it.

If one works long hours, one has the

right to any amount of money because compensation can never
be adequate for losses in terms of social and family life.
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This sense of entitlement weakens the conscience and serves
to identify the sense of self as a function of possessions.
The quest for increased profits and reduced budgets has the
effect of lowering behavioral standards and increasing fear
and resentment among corporate survivors, and shredding the
corporate cultures in which these standards are embedded.
Even though business schools teach that managers must
prevent the creation of corrupt cultures that encourage
misreporting of revenues and expenses and cheating on
contracts, the message ends with the tacit assumption that
individual employees cannot be held responsible for their
actions.

The result is pious corporate ethics that do not

require any person to be ethical.
Contradicting Magnet’s observations to some extent are
the findings of Greenberg (1988) that managers are concerned
with fairness to their employees.

After conducting a survey

of 815 managers across the United States, Greenberg
concluded not only that looking fair at work was considered
to be different than being fair at work, but that managers
expressed a significantly greater concern about looking fair
than about actually being fair.

A followup survey indicated

that looking fair did not necessarily mean that unfairness
should be hidden.

The followup sample identified four

methods managers felt would promote the image of fairness:
(a) announcing all pay raises and promotions,
how pay raises are determined,

(b) explaining

(c) allowing workers to

participate in decisions, and (d) explaining why work

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
assignments are made.

These four methods would indicate

that the managers sampled placed a high value on openness
and honesty.

Greenberg concluded that this tactic increased

the managers’ power base and influence, and reinforced the
managers’ identity and self-esteem.

Decisions may tend to

be designed to indicate fairness to oneself and others.
An appropriate conclusion to this section on social
responsibility in business would be a summary of the
observations former Defense Secretary David Packard, former
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, and former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Robert Moot made during a roundtable
discussion on ethics in the defense industry (Packard,
Laird, Moot, Bowsher & Conahan, 1988).

Packard argued that

ethical problems in the defense industry were caused in part
by bad practices on the part of the government.

Moot agreed

with Packard adding that -the government changes the ground
rules too often, defining formerly acceptable behavior as
unacceptable.

Packard also suggested that corporate

executives frequently failed to give their lower level
managers a clear understanding that integrity is more
important than financial performance, and Laird agreed that
performance incentives have a tendency to corrupt ethical
standards.
Packard proposed that there are several possible
solutions to the problem.

One might be adoption of the

Defense Industry Initiative, which identifies six critical
elements for effective self-governance by industry:

codes
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of conduct, employee training, reporting of violations by
employees, procedures for voluntary disclosure by
contractors, responsibility to the industry, and public
accountability.

Packard argued that senior managers must

become committed to ethical principles not only by
acceptance but through enforcement of the intent of the
rules throughout the organization.

Packard also advocated

the encouragement of whistleblowers not only within the
contractors, but within government as well.

Leadership and Organizational Change
Historically,

interest in leadership has led

philosophers and researchers to speculate on what sorts of
personality traits distinguish great leaders from others
(Stogdill,

1948).

Stogdill (1948) considered this approach

inadequate because it did not take other important variables
into account like interpersonal relationships and
environmental variables.
Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) were among the first
to recognize that leadership could not be defined out of
context.

Lewin et a l . concluded that leadership style

created social climates of three different types:
authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire.

But the first

significant departures from focus on leader traits were not
made until almost ten years later.

Hemphill (1949) studied

leaders in different settings and concluded that leadership
must be defined by group tasks and group structure, and that
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personality characteristics of the leader must be
deemphasized.
In the early 1960s, interest in leadership tended to
focus more on power and authority relationships as well as
on other processes (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Janda, 1960;
Raven, 1965).

But in the latter 1960s, the focus on the

interrelationships between leaders, followers, and
situations led to a revisiting of the psychological aspects
of leadership (Fiedler, 1967; Hollander, 1964; Steiner,
1964).

Fiedler’s (1967) assertion that the Least Preferred

Coworker (LPC) scale could identify the leader’s style again
brought the focus of attention to the characteristics of the
leader, this time in relation to the situation.
By the end of the decade, enthusiasm for Fiedler’s
model began to wane.

Hollander and Julian (1969) cited

limitations of the trends in leadership research to this
point.

Earlier studies had failed to distinguish the

process of leadership from the leader as a person.

The

relationship between leader and followers was thought by
Hollander and Julian to be built over time and to involve
exchanges or transactions in which both leaders and
followers give things and get things.

The personality

characteristics of the leader are determined by followers’
expectations of the leader’s role as well their own levels
of satisfaction.

It is the perception of the followers,

asserted Hollander and Julian, that determine the value of
the leader’s traits, not the measurable personality
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characteristics of the leader.

In addition, Hollander and

Julian concluded that leadership traits do not generalize
over situations and that leadership effectiveness must be
evaluated in relation to the group’s achievement of desired
outputs.
In the early 1970s, House (1971) attempted to
incorporate situational variables, aspects of personality,
and subordinate perception into a theory of leadership he
called the path-goal theory.

The path-goal theory states

that effective leaders (a) recognize and/or arouse
subordinates’ needs for outcomes over which the leader has
some control,

(b) increase personal payoffs to subordinates

for work goal attainment,

(c) make the path to these payoffs

easier by directing the subordinates’ work, (d) help
subordinates clarify expectations,

(e) reduce barriers to

subordinates’ goals, and (f) increase opportunities for
personal satisfaction contingent on effective performance.
The path-goal theory was later revised to include
environmental variables and individual difference variables
(House & Dessler, 1974).

House considered these six

functions of a leader, which he referred to as strategic
functions, to be complimentary to the subordinates.

The six

functions were supposed to increase subordinate motivation
necessary for effective performance by providing coaching,
guidance, support, and rewards not normally available in the
environment.

The original path-goal theory states that

subordinate motivation is increased to the extent that the
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leader fulfills these strategic functions.

The revised

theory suggests that the required behavior of the leader is
determined by the situation in which the leader operates,
which is determined by environmental variables and
personality characteristics of the subordinates.
Environmental variables,

in context of the theory, are

determined by the subordinates through attribution of
control and level of value.
Although House and Dessler found support for the
path-goal theory, other researchers indicated that the model
did not account for all the relevant variables necessary for
an adequate explanation of the leadership process (Barker,
1976; Downey, Sheridan & Slocum,
Stinson & Johnson, 1975).

1975; Sims & Szilagy,

1975;

The primary criticisms were that

the model focused on supervisory positions where leadership
is defined as position power, and the model did not
generalize to different types of supervisory positions.
The first major departure from the management trends in
leadership studies was a lengthy musing on a general theory
of political leadership by Burns (1978).
there was a crisis of leadership:
irresponsibility of those in power.

Burns suggested

the mediocrity and
Regardless of the

research on leadership and the detailed investigations of
the lives and personalities of political and business
leaders, little if anything is known about leadership.
failure of leadership study, according to Burns, was the
failure to combine leadership and followership roles
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conceptually.

Processes of leadership are part of conflict

and power dynamics.

Leadership is nothing without

collective purpose, and the effectiveness of leaders must be
judged by actual social change measured by intent and by
satisfaction of wants, needs, and expectations of followers.
But the characteristic that set the Burnsian notion of
leadership apart from the previous definitions was the
emphasis on moral leadership:
mere powerholders.

Leaders are different from

Leadership elevates both leaders and

followers to higher levels of morality by their taking
responsibility for commitments.
Burns specified two different types of leadership:
transactional leadership, and transformational leadership.
Transactional leadership is the brokerage of power and
resources.

Transactional leadership differs from management

in that the transactional leader "takes the initiative in
making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of
valued things" (p. 19).

Burns’s concept of transactional

leadership is akin to the path-goal theory of leadership
where the leader is understood to arouse and satisfy
followers’ needs for payoffs.
Transformational leadership is a concept inspired to
some extent by the historic emphasis on charismatic traits
of the leader, but differs from traditional notions of
leadership in its involvement of the followers in the
leadership process.

Transforming leadership occurs "when

one or more persons engage with others in such a way that
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leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of
motivation and morality.

Their purposes . . . become fused.

Power bases are linked . . .
purpose" (p. 20).

as mutual support for common

Burns saw transformational leadership as

collective, dissentual, causative, morally purposeful, and
elevating.

Transformational leadership is concerned with

end values such as liberty, justice, and equality.
Leadership must be understood as based in ethics, otherwise
it is "reduced to management" (p. 389).
The movement that Burns started took two basic
directions.

The first direction is essentially the same old

direction with a new language.

Management oriented

leadership theorists borrowed Burns’s conceptual
descriptions but retained the same old assumptions about
leadership:

(a) that leadership can be expressed as

criteria for effective management (Levinson, 1980);

(b) that

strategic change is wholly dependent on the CE O ’s behavior
(Hosmer, 1984; Levinson & Rosenthal, 1984; Paulson, 1984);
(c) that leaders are responsible for choosing the "right"
kind of leadership and corporate lifestyle (Tichy & Ulrich,
1984);

(d) that the essence of leadership is the creation of

incremental change in the organization (Nielson, 1989); and
(e) that leadership is excellent management, the excellence
of which is determined by outcome (Kanter, 1983b; Kotter,
1988; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Tichy & Devanna, 1988).

But

the inadequacy of this direction is expressed even by some
of its proponents (Bass, 1981; Bennis & Nanus, 1985).
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The second direction started by Burns is more
philosophical and integral than the management performance
approach.

Certainly decision making is central to

administration, but decisions are based on values:

good and

bad, right and wrong, benefit and cost, efficiency and
effectiveness (Hodgkinson, 1983). "Values do not exist in
the world.

They are utterly phenomenological, subjective,

facts of inner and personal experience" (Hodgkinson,
p. 31).

1983,

Hodgkinson (1983) argued that since values act as

determinants of behavior, and motivation is a key to
organizational performance, leadership cannot be understood
except as a function of value issues.

And the rationalistic

positivism that pervades traditional leadership studies is
inadequate because it avoids value issues.
Foster (1986b) argued that the management approach to
understanding leadership has failed to produce consistent
evidence or minimal clarity of the concept.

The current

paradigm of leadership operates under several false
assumptions listed by Foster:

(a) that leaders and

followers operate within an uncontested and real social
structure,

(b) that a major function of hierarchical

leadership is the improvement of productivity within that
structure,

(c) that continual refinement of instruments will

facilitate more complete understanding of leadership, and
(d) that an empirically justified model of leadership can
ultimately be developed.

Foster suggested that "leadership

is a construct which must be dismantled and rebuilt" (p. 3).
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"The theories of leadership which have dominated social
science can be dismissed largely on the basis of their
non-reflective quality and their inclination to be
substitutes for theories of management" (Foster, 1986b, p.
1 0 ).

Rost (1988) agreed, suggesting that "traditional
leadership scholars and the theories they have developed
have been concerned with the peripheries of leadership:
traits, personality characteristics, born or made issues,
greatness, group facilitation, goal attainment,
effectiveness, contingencies, situations, goodness, style,
and above all the management of organizations— public and
private" (p. 1).

Rost continued, arguing that emphasizing

the peripheral elements of leadership allows practitioners
to grasp something tangible:

Followers see leaders taking

charge and feel good about following, society experiences a
collective sense of greatness and accomplishment, and
civilization is given the means to perpetuate its cultural
values.

The pursuit of leadership within a logical

positivist framework provides scholars with scientific
comfort even if it provides nothing meaningful toward the
understanding of leadership.
Rost contended that scholars have focused on the
content of leadership:
leading.

Leadership scholars should be addressing the

process of leadership:
followers.

what leaders need to know about

the relationship between leaders and

Rost criticized Burns for failing "to develop a
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consistent conceptual framework that clearly (1)
distinguishes leadership from management,

(2) develops a

case for transactional leadership being leadership, and (3)
defines the noncoercive nature of leadership" (p. 8).
What, then, are the implications of this second,
radical movement in leadership study?

Adams (1986)

suggested that transforming leadership is a state of
consciousness rather than a personality trait or set of
skills.

Foster (1986b) argued that leadership is a symbolic

force; it identifies action which yields social change and
improvement.

Even though the psychological approach

normally identifies leadership as a property of personality
or position, Foster contended that leadership is a temporal
property of the actor in the process of acting and resides
neither in the personality nor the situation.

Foster

(1986b) argued that leadership is a transient phenomenon
that may reside equally well in different players at
different times, and later (Foster, 1989) added that
leadership is a real phenomenon because it does make a
difference and the world would be different without it.
After reviewing the leadership definitions of Bennis
(1983), Burns (1978), Selznick (1957), and Tucker (1981),
Foster (1986b) identified several commonalties:

(1)

Leadership is an interactive process that is not possessed
by the individual identified as the leader,

(2) the

leadership process is largely political in nature because it
justifies the mores of a community and the allocation of its
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resources,

(3) the political aspects of leadership include

negotiations, conflict management, interest groups, and
coalitions,
tension,

(4) leaders and followers exist in political

(5) symbolism is important in leadership, and (6)

leadership assesses and reforms social and organizational
structures.

Foster noted that even though these four

theories are an advance over traditional functional
approaches because they attempt to account for political and
social action, their definitions of leadership are
implicitly hierarchical and characterize leadership as a
property possessed by some individual.

Leadership is

treated as a volunteeristic trait, where one can choose to
exert leadership.
Foster (1989) characterized leadership as a process of
tapping into mainstream consciousness and changing it
through dialectic relationships, that is the exchanging of
roles between leaders and followers; leadership is a
communal relationship.

Foster offered four criteria for

distinguishing leadership:

(1) Leaders must be critical in

the sense that they reflect critically on existing social
structures and common understandings,

(2) leaders must be

transformative in the sense that they must be oriented
toward social change without necessarily having to change
the social structure,

(3) leaders must be educative in the

sense that they must have a vision of the intended
alterations, and (4) leaders must be ethical in that they
must be self-critical and self-clarifying.

Rost (1988) also
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offered four criteria that he considered to be the essential
elements of leadership:
based on influence,
relationship,

(1) Leadership is "a relationship

(2) leaders and followers develop that

(3) they intend real changes, and (4) they

have mutual purposes" (p. 51).
Of interest to the present study is Rost’s discussion
of the role of change as an essential element of leadership.
Rost contended that actual change is not necessary for
leadership to have occurred; the intention of change is
sufficient.

Once changes have been completed, there is no

longer any leadership process.

But the impact of change in

the leadership process cannot be measured by outcomes.
Successful outcomes do not mean that leadership has
occurred, and unsuccessful outcomes do not mean that
leadership has not occurred.
of the leadership process.

Failed changes can be a part
The pursuit of goals and the

attainment of objectives are management functions, not
leadership.

Leadership, according to Rost, is based on

influencing relationships,

intended changes, and mutual

purposes.

Summary
Organizational planning and change is a complex
process.

Strategic planning objectives and the resulting

implementations are directly related to the organization’s
perception of its mission and its manifestation in
organizational policy, strategy, and activities.

Planning

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125
cannot be assumed to be a rational process despite all the
rational tools used in the planning process.

Rather,

planning is an incremental and constantly readjusted process
that includes technological, political, and social
implications.
Organizations create strategies within the context of
the environment, and then match the process to the content.
Of critical importance to the planning process is the human
element, both in terms of organizational culture and human
resources.

The human element affects both the process of

planning and the outcome.

No plan will work if the human

resources are unavailable or inappropriate.

And once the

humans who will carry out the plan are in place, the nature
of their interaction will determine the nature and
interpretation of the outcome.
Organizational culture is a key determinant of planning
success and is rooted in the values and beliefs of top
managers.

The selection and placement of individuals within

the organization, the tasks they are assigned, and the way
in which activities are rewarded are all linked to the value
system of those at the top.

Culturally, planning relieves

anxiety about the future and about control over the present,
and the planning process provides a cultural framework for
organizational learning and change.
Essentially, the present study is concerned with the
process of change on two different levels.

To evaluate the

organization within its own context, the traditional linear
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management theories must be used.

Examining the

effectiveness of the organization and the changes as they
were planned and implemented in the board room makes no
sense if it does not relate performance to rational
organizational structures.

However, understanding the

change process is another matter.

As suggested by Rost

(1988), the change does not have to be successful in the
traditional linear sense to be meaningful within a
leadership context.

The management perspective of change

must necessarily provide positive evidence of change toward
goals and objectives; the leadership perspective of change
is not concerned with outcomes.
Asking the question "has change occurred in the
organization?" is superfluous in the literal sense.
course change has occurred.

Of

If nothing else, there has been

turnover in the organization.

The question from a

traditional perspective is concerned with the outcomes of
the changes and whether or not they are consistent with the
plan.

The question from a leadership perspective is

concerned with whether or not leadership was involved in the
changes, regardless of outcome.

In the present study, the

question was addressed from both the traditional perspective
and the leadership perspective.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The purpose of this study is to determine how persons
in leading positions can realistically expect to plan and
implement a significant, planned organizational change such
as that envisioned by the Ethics Program of General
Dynamics.

The purpose was accomplished through an

evaluation of the effectiveness of the Ethics Program as a
case example of intended, significant organizational change.
Normal scientific methodology would require the
researcher to isolate the Ethics Program for evaluation.
This positivistic approach would eliminate the most
important contextual relationships that govern both the
senior managers’ intentions and the employees’ expectations
of the program.

It would be a grave mistake, in this case,

to separate the Ethics Program conceptually from other human
resources elements of the strategic plan.

Within the

company, the Ethics Program had come to symbolize all human
resources programs as the central vehicle for strategic
human resources objectives.
127
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The evaluation included an examination of the planning
process that resulted in the implementation of the Ethics
Program as a vehicle for strategic change, an evaluation of
the program itself, related programs, their successes and
their failures, and an assessment of the impact of the
program on the culture of the organization.

Three different

but related approaches were used to formulate conclusions in
this study:

(a) the case study approach,

(b) the survey

approach, and (c) the program evaluation approach.
The Case Study Approach
Yin (1984) defined a case study as "an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within
its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple
sources of evidences are used" (p. 23).

Yin felt that, in

general, case studies are preferred when "how" or "why"
research questions are asked, when the researcher has little
or no control over the situation or events, and when the
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life
context.
The current study can be characterized as a case study
even though other approaches were incorporated into the
methodology.

The case example is the Electronics Division

of General Dynamics Corporation and the case study is
concerned with how the Ethics Program and related programs
were implemented in the division and what the effects of the
program were.
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The greatest value of a case study over an experimental
design is its flexibility for evaluating possible
alternative configurations of factors in prediction
(Labovitz & Hagedorn, 1971; Leedy, 1980; Ronan & Prien,
1971; Tripodi, Fellin, & Epstein,

1978).

Case studies

generally use field research techniques, common in everyday
life, which try to make sense out of an on-going process
that cannot be predicted in advance (Babbie, 1979; Tripodi
et al., 1978).

Case studies are useful where it is

difficult to specify objectives and programmatic means for
selecting those objectives (Tripodi et a l ., 1978).
Information from a case study may also be used for
evaluating programs with respect to the nature and quality
of the actions of program agents,

internal and external.

The present study required extensive use of field
techniques to examine and interpret on-going processes.
Because organizational processes are continuous, there is no
clear definition of what constitutes a change, when that
change can be said to have occurred, and what were the
probable causes of the change.
Case studies fall into three categories and can be used
in a variety of settings.

The three categories are

explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive case studies, and
they can be used in policy and political science research,
social science research, administrative planning research,
or organizational and management research (Labovitz &
Hagedorn, 1971; Yin, 1984).

The present study was designed
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to describe the process of change and support speculation on
probable causes and potential controls.

The case study

method was used to evaluate not merely static combinations,
but dynamic processes involved in shifting structural
configurations.
The purpose of a case study is to describe a unit of
measure rather than to test a hypothesis (Labovitz &
Hagedorn,

1971).

The case study method lies midway between

the descriptive survey method and the experimental method
(Leedy, 1980).

The case study is low on control compared to

the experimental method and low on representation compared
to the survey method, but the advantage of using the case
study method is the richness of its descriptive elements.
In the present case, the study was designed to explain a
particular organizational phenomenon within its
organizational context:

how a specific organizational

change was planned and implemented at General Dynamics,
Electronics Division.
Even though I have been a participant/observer in the
case, I have had little control over the significant events.
Still, an explanation of the process of planning and change
at Electronics Division can provide a more holistic and
meaningful theoretical proposition than a carefully
controlled experiment that excludes many of the most
important contextual relationships.
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The Survey Approach
There are three devices for direct questioning of
respondents that are versatile and useful in almost any
social topic, and which can be used to extract useful
information in one session (Labovitz &. Hagedorn, 1971).
three devices are (a) questionnaires,

The

(b) schedules, and (c)

guided interviews.
Questionnaires can be used over large geographic areas
and for large populations.

The major disadvantages are (a)

respondents must be able to read and write,
high degree of self-selection,

(b) there is a

(c) questions must be

restricted in length and scope, and (d) there is a lack of
depth or ability to probe for meaning.
Both schedules and interview guides are comprised of a
set of items or questions that are asked verbally.

The

disadvantage is that an interviewer must be present to give
questions and receive responses.

A schedule is a

questionnaire that is read to the respondent.

More meaning

may be extracted from the interview, but the sample must be
smaller.
An interview guide is a loosely structured schedule.
It lists topics to cover in the interview, but does not list
specific questions.

The interview guide provides maximum

flexibility in extracting meaning, particularly in those
areas where little is known.
These three techniques have six potential problems:
(a) sensitive subjects who respond differently because of
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the presence of the interviewer or simply because they are
being questioned, which means that results cannot be
inferred to a population,

(b) faulty memory of subjects,

(c)

the response rate is always less than 100% leading to an
overall biased response,

(d) the tendency of the questions

to tap opinions, attitudes, or perceived behavior and not
the actual behavior in a situation,

(e) some respondents are

unqualified to provide certain data, and (f) invalid
responses as a result of lying or misrepresentation.

These

problems can be overcome to some extent by using other types
of observations and restricting the use of survey methods to
appropriate techniques.
The survey method is applicable to many types of
problems in many fields.

Surveys depend on direct contact

with people, but they are inexpensive and relatively easy to
administer.

The adequacy of a survey depends on the

adequacy of the sample, and the geographic area and the
population must be well defined.

Gender, socioeconomic

class, occupation, ethnic background, and common experience
can be used to define the sample.

Festinger and Katz (1953)

specified the various types of data that may be extracted
using the survey method:

demographic, environmental,

behavioral, and data which show the level of information,
attitudes, opinions, motives, and expectations of
respondents.

The forms of analysis for these data can

include the comparison of different parts of the sample,
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linking behavior and attitude, analyzing motivational
forces, and prediction.
The present study relied to a large extent on survey
data.

There was a comprehensive survey of employees

conducted by the company in 1986 (hereafter referred to as
the 1986 Survey of Employees).

This survey was used as a

baseline to compare with the results of smaller surveys
conducted in 1983, 1988, and 1989 by the researcher.
Hendrick and Jones (1972) suggested there are a number
of attitude factors that influence the outcome of a survey,
some of which may be controlled and some of which may not.
For example, surveys are developed under the assumption that
people do not work for years to become unhappy.

Yet some

behavioral patterns indicate that people do not make the
choices that would logically lead to what they specify as
happiness.

Respondents answer items that attack their

beliefs in different ways depending on the level of
forewarning.

For this reason, survey data were compared

with other sorts of data in the present study.
Using data from the 1986 Survey of Employees in the
study necessarily required a secondary analysis of the
results.

Babbie (1979) suggested there are advantages and

disadvantages for secondary analysis of survey data
collected by another individual.

Secondary analysis

primarily saves time and costs in data collection, but the
disadvantages to secondary analysis have to do with
validity.

The researcher must determine the extent to which
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the purposes of the original survey meet his or her own
needs.

Original items may come close to asking what the

researcher wants to know, but may not provide the
appropriate scope or context to meet specified objectives.
This situation usually leaves some question unanswered or
with incomplete answers.

Secondary analysis should be

restricted to special purposes such as those used in
connection with case studies.

The present study, as much as

possible, used followup surveys designed to be similar to
the initial survey.

The emphasis was more on the potential

changes reflected by the surveys than on the specific
information gathered, although the nature of the information
was considered important.
Leedy (1980) distinguished between descriptive survey
techniques and analytical survey techniques.

Descriptive

surveys are primarily qualitative and verbal and deal with a
situation which demands that observations be the principle
means of collecting data.

Populations must be carefully

defined, carefully chosen, and delimited.

Data obtained by

the descriptive methods are particularly susceptible to
distortion through the introduction of bias into the design.
Data collected by descriptive methods must be organized and
presented systematically so that valid and accurate
conclusions may be reached.

Leedy suggested various methods

for developing descriptive surveys and limiting design bias.
Analytical survey methods generate quantitative data
that can be analyzed by the appropriate statistical tools.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135
The purpose of using analytical surveys is to probe those
data so that certain meanings may be inferred, and the
presence of dynamic forces and potential forces may be
discerned.

These forces may provide clues for further

investigation.
Surveys used in the present study were designed to
generate qualitative observations of the company’s
operations and employees’ attitudes toward those operations.
The initial survey was used to pinpoint organizational
problems that required intervention by management.

The

followup surveys were designed to compare similar sample
responses with the initial survey data to determine if the
interventions were effective.
Program Evaluation
Most evaluation research is conducted on social,
political, and educational programs (Madaus, Scriven, &
Stufflebeam, 1983).

Therefore some adjustments had to be

made to the language and application frequently used in
evaluation research models to accommodate a study of a
program for organizational change.

However, these

adjustments should not have changed the basic conceptual
framework of the models under consideration.
Rossi and Freeman (1985) defined evaluation research as
"the systematic application of social research procedures in
assessing the conceptualization and design, implementation,
and utility of social intervention programs" (p. 19).

The

present study is concerned with the evaluation of a program
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designed to change the attitudes, behaviors, and values of
the employees of General Dynamics.

In a sense, the Ethics

Program was attempting to change the culture of the
organization and, therefore, could be considered very much
akin to a social intervention program.
The naturalistic inquiry model of evaluation (Guba &
Lincoln, 1985) focuses on the issues and concerns inherent
in any social context.

Guba and Lincoln (1985) defined a

concern as a matter of interest to one or more parties in
the society.

Concerns are rarely defined and specified

although they contribute significantly to actions taken by
those who hold the concerns.

An issue, on the other hand,

is a statement that provides a basis for the presentation of
different points of view, or a proposition about which
reasonable people might disagree.

Issues and concerns are

the basic organizers of the evaluation because they provide
a pluralistic context for considering merit and worth.
Guba and Lincoln considered evaluation as a process for
describing an evaluand and judging its merit and worth.

The

merit of an evaluand can be considered against a stable and
relatively unaffected standard, while worth is determined by
comparison of a snapshot of the evaluand with a variable
standard.

In a pluralistic society, merit is a relatively

stable notion of value that is widely understood and
accepted even in situations of conflict.

Worth is a

fluctuating value associated primarily with economic
parameters.

The importance of merit and worth in evaluation
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is fundamentally linked with the communication of
information to the audience of interested stakeholders:
those who share interests and concerns that are related to
the evaluand.

Merit and worth are pluralistic phenomena

that provide the context for the process of evaluation.
The present case presented a perplexing evaluation
problem.

Normally, the worth of a company’s business plans

can be judged by comparing the plan outcomes with the
economic standards established by the company’s objectives
and by the environment.

The Ethics Program was an element

of the business plan at General Dynamics, but it was more
appropriately judged on its merit to society.
Guba and Lincoln suggested there are four steps to a
case study:

(a) to chronicle, or to develop a register of

facts and events;
characterize;

(b) to render, or to depict and

(c) to teach, or to provide with knowledge;

and (d) to test, or to prove.

The fourth step is, according

to Guba and Lincoln, an evaluation and is an integral part
of an evaluative case study.

In contrast with the other

three steps, the final and ultimate product of an evaluation
is a judgement.

The judgement is based on examination,

clarification, and synthesis of the facts, and leads to a
naturalistic generalization in contrast with the scientific
generalization of the experimental method.

To make the

judgement effective, the evaluator must constantly interact
with the stakeholders in a process of negotiation.

It is
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this process that provides the proper checks and balances
for the evaluation.
Guba and Lincoln specified that the rigor of an
evaluation can be demonstrated through credibility,
applicability and external validity, and consistency and
internal validity.

Credibility can be enhanced by

collecting data on short notice, addressing experimenter and
subject biases, and describing the data gathering
techniques.

Applicability and external validity can be

enhanced by checking facts with sources, exploring
self-interest conflicts, and investigating institutional
myths.

Consistency and internal validity can be enhanced by

clarifying information, documenting audit trails,
triangulation, and following up on divergent leads.

Research Design
The research questions were answered using corporate
documents and surveys, participant observations, surveys
conducted by the researcher, media observations, and
corroborative observation and analysis by selected members
of the organization as triangulated sources of information.
A

comparative analysis of these data was conducted to

develop and support answers to the research questions.

The

corporate documentation equaled three years worth of data
collected from the Ethics Program.

These data represented

the nature of the complaints registered with the Ethics
Program directors within the corporation, and actions taken
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as a result of those complaints.

An analysis of these data,

combined with corroborative analysis, provided sufficient
basis for an evaluative judgement of the effect of the
program.
In addition to the data gathered by instrumentation,
the experiential perspective and the intimate familiarity
with the organization that I have as a result of my tenure
there have proved to be significant factors in the
formulation, analysis, and interpretation of the results.
My continuous participation in the organization and its
processes has given me the capability of understanding and
interpreting motives and values behind statements made by
interviewees that may have been missed or interpreted
differently by a researcher unfamiliar with the
organizational culture and history.
There were some opportunities to compare the
implementation of the Ethics Program at Electronics Division
with that of other divisions.

But the case example had to

be limited to Electronics Division because of time and
logistic limitations, and because initial examination
revealed that the differences between divisions were great
enough to potentially confound the results.

Methodology
The study was conducted in three basic phases:

(a) the

planning process used to develop the Ethics Program was
researched and defined,

(b) the effects of the program were
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examined using surveys and interviews, and (c) a judgement
of the effectiveness of the program in achieving its goals
was developed.

The development of these three phases

required examination of the antecedents to the program,
program goals, implementation activities, manifest or
intended outcomes, actual outcomes, and latent actual
outcomes.
The primary unit of analysis was the Electronics
Division of General Dynamics.

The corporation as a whole

could not be examined because it was too large and complex
to be represented in one study.
The analysis was carried out in four steps:

(a) the

planning process and the nature of the intended change were
defined,

(b) the nature of the program and its objectives

were defined,

(c) the organizational culture and its changes

over the past two years were examined, and (d) the success
of the plan and the program was evaluated.

The plan was

defined by gathering data about the environmental and
political pressures affecting the organization and how these
pressures resulted in a new management philosophy and
revised strategic position.

These data came from

unclassified company documents, media sources, and
interviews.

The nature of the ethics program, its

implementation, its objectives, its broader goals, and
subsequent programs was defined using company documents and
interviews.

The organizational culture was examined using

guidelines and recommendations suggested by Schein (1986)
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for the three levels of understanding.

Plan and program

success was assessed using data gathered in the previous
three steps.
Participant and Site Selection
Participants were located in the four sites of General
Dynamics, Electronics Division located in the San Diego
area.

Electronics Division employs an average of about

3,500 people during the time of the study.

This accounts

for approximately three percent of the company’s employees.
Participants included myself, the investigator, who has
worked for the company for more than ten years, key
individuals within the division who had direct knowledge of
the planning process and its effects at top levels of the
division and in the corporation, and division employees at
various levels of the organization.
I was involved in the implementation of the Ethics
Program and I conducted training classes for other employees
to introduce them to the program and its requirements.

For

the previous eight years, I had been involved in developing
and implementing business plans for production and material
control, and I have had access to the key procedural
mechanisms that produce action from policy.

At the time of

the study, I occupied a policy making position for
developing and implementing procedures and systems to
control United States Government owned property located at
the division.

I was a member of the Vice President of

Material’s staff.
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Five key individuals, three males and two females, were
interviewed to determine the specifics of the planning
process and implementation.

This group of key individuals

will hereafter be referred to as the planning group.

By

agreement with them, I cannot reveal their names or
positions because of possible repercussions.

These five

individuals, whose longevity with the company ranged from 8
to 3 7 years, were selected because they were known to the
researcher to be cooperative, insightful, straightforward,
and they were involved as a result of their positions in the
major administrative processes of the division.

None of the

key participants were aware of the identity of the others.
The impact of the implementation and potential cultural
changes was examined by interviewing ten professional
employees, five females and five males, and five hourly
employees, two females

and three males, each with more than

three years of service

(range = 3-14 years).

This group of

15 employees will hereafter be referred to as the cultural
group.

By agreement with them, I cannot reveal their names

or any other information that might result in their possible
identification.

With the exception of two individuals, the

subjects did not know the identity of the other participants
(two subjects were interviewed together).

The subjects were

selected because they were known to me to be insightful,
credible, and straightforward.

Because an element of risk

was involved as a result of their participation,
trust— particularly their trust in me— was an essential
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criterion of selection.

The subjects represented

Engineering, Material, Operations, Quality, Finance, Human
Resources, and Information Resources departments.
Participation in the 1986 Survey of Employees was
voluntary and on-site participants were determined through
stratified random sampling localized in each division.

All

employees not selected to fill out the survey during working
hours were mailed a copy to be completed and returned.

All

General Dynamics employees were given the opportunity to
participate.

About 70% (61,974) of all General Dynamics

employees completed and returned the survey and were
included in the analysis.

About 70% (1,273) of all

Electronics Division employees participated:

952 completed

the survey on site, and 321 completed the survey at home and
mailed it to the consulting firm.

A categorical breakdown

of corporate and division respondents is represented in
Table 1.
The corporatewide survey was wholly developed,
conducted, and analyzed by Sirota and Alpert Associates,
Inc., a consulting firm hired by the company specifically
for that task (Sirota, 1986).

To protect anonymity, no

General Dynamics employees were allowed to see the completed
questionnaires.
The researcher conducted three surveys that provided
comparison data.

The first survey was conducted in April,

1983 (hereafter referred to as the April 1983 Survey) within
the Manufacturing and Material Control Department of
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Table 1
General Dynamics 1986 Survey Respondents
Sample
Employee Classification

Corporate

Management
Professional
Management Support
Labor
Unidentified
Total
Electronics Division.

Division

7,193

224

20,447

565

6,563

126

22,397

322

5,374

36

61,974

1,273

All department employees were given

the opportunity to respond anonymously and 60% (253) did
respond.

The second survey was conducted in March, 1988

(hereafter referred to as the March 1988 Survey) within the
Material Department of Electronic Division.

All department

employees were given the opportunity to respond anonymously
and 16% (50) did respond.

The third survey was conducted in

June, 1989 (hereafter referred to as the June 1989 Survey)
within the Material Department of Electronics Division.

All

department employees were given the opportunity to respond
anonymously and 76% (205) did respond.
A fourth survey used for comparison was conducted in
the Engineering Department by Engineering personnel in
February, 1989 (hereafter referred to as the February 1989

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145
Engineering Survey).

All department personnel were given

the opportunity to respond anonymously and 8% of the
approximately 900 Engineering employees responded.

The

exact number of respondents is unknown.
Instrumentation
The 1986 Survey of Employees was designed by the
consulting firm of Sirota and Alper Associates hired by the
company for that purpose (Sirota, 1986).

The consulting

firm began by conducting interviews with small groups of
employees selected at random in the different divisions
about specific employee concerns.

Fifty interview sessions

were held with a total of 500 employees.

The consulting

firm also interviewed various union leaders, customers, and
other outside consultants.

The final survey included 125

basic questions asked of all General Dynamics employees, and
40-50 additional questions designed to address issues
specifically related to the employee’s division.

The

Electronics Division version of the survey contained an
additional 36 items for a total of 161 items (Appendix A).
All questions were multiple choice design with most items
containing a space for write-in responses.

The purpose of

the survey was to gather information about employee issues
and concerns so that management and supervisory personnel
could take structured action to resolve problems (Sirota,
1989).

There was no validity or reliability information

reported.
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The April 1983 Survey was designed by the researcher
for purposes of exploring the issues and concerns regarding
the existence and function of the Program Control Department
of the Manufacturing and Material Control Department of
Electronics Division.

The survey was commissioned by the

Director of Manufacturing and Material Control to determine
the possible need for reorganization.

The survey consisted

of nine open-ended items (Appendix B) addressing topics that
were suggested by the Director.

Reliability and validity

data were not determined.
The March 1988 Survey was designed by the researcher to
determine the issues and concerns employees had about the
Material Department of Electronics Division.

The survey

contained one open-ended item: "What are the top ten
problems in GDE in general and in the Material Department
specifically?" Reliability and validity data were not
determined.

Because the March 1988 Survey contained only

one item, it does not appear in the Appendices.
The June 1989 Survey was designed by the researcher to
compare responses within the Material Department to
identical items in the 1986 corporate wide survey.

The

survey consisted of 14 items, thirteen of which were
identical to the original survey (Appendix C).

Item number

two was a modified version of item number one and did not
appear on the original survey.

The items to be addressed

were selected by collective agreement of the Vice President
of Material and his staff because they had indicated
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employee concerns on the original survey and were singled
out for corrective action.

Reliability and validity data

were not determined.
The February 1989 Engineering Survey was designed by
Engineering Administration personnel to address an action
item selected by department management to address concerns
identified by the 1989 Survey of Employees.

The purpose of

the February 1989 Engineering Survey was to examine changes
in communication patterns within the Research and
Engineering Department of the Electronics Division that may
have occurred between 1986 and February, 1989.

The survey

consisted of 11 multiple choice items (Appendix D).

No

reliability or validity data were available.
All interviews were conducted from interview guides
prepared by the researcher.
conducted:

Two types of interviews were

(a) interviews designed to extract information

about specific programs and program results conducted with
the key individuals (Appendix E), and (b) general interviews
of employees designed to uncover values, beliefs, and basic
assumptions under the guidelines recommended by Schein
(1986) for assessing organizational cultures (Appendix F).
Data Collection And Analysis
Some existing data were reanalyzed for this study.
These data included the results of the corporatewide 1986
Survey of Employees, the results of surveys conducted by the
researcher (the April 1983 Survey and the March 1988
Survey), the results of the survey conducted by the
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Engineering Department (the February 1989 Engineering
Survey), the actions planned and reported upon as a result
of the 1986 Survey of Employees, the tabulation of
complaints received by the Ethics Program directors, and
changes to existing standard practices and departmental
procedures.
Original data were gathered from the June 1989 Survey,
from interviews with a sample of employees regarding their
perceptions of changes in the company and other observations
related to the organization’s culture, and from interviews
with key individuals regarding their analysis of the
planning process and the effects of the Ethics Program and
its success in achieving its specific objectives and its
broader goals.
Interview participants were asked to agree to be
interviewed multiple times, depending upon their position in
the company and their relative contribution to study
objectives.

Second interviews were conducted with all

respondents regarding cultural assessments but not with any
of the key individuals.

The second interview explored the

validity of summaries, observations, and speculations
derived from the first interview and interviews with other
respondents.
The specific data gathering steps were as follows:
Phase I - Defined the planning process.
Step 1 - Reviewed corporate documentation.
Step 2 - Structured program interview guides.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149
Step 3 - Conducted interviews with key personnel.
Phase II - Examined program effects.
Step 1 - Reviewed initial survey data.
Step 2 - Conducted resurvey.
Step 3 - Structured cultural interview guides.
Step 4 - Conducted interviews with selected employees.
Step 5 - Analyzed data.
Step 6 - Reinterviewed.
Phase III - Judged program effectiveness.
Step 1 - Organized and analyzed all data.
Step 2 - Interpreted data.
The nature of the data required comparative and
descriptive analysis.

Inferential techniques were not

necessary, and would not have contributed to any meaningful
interpretation of the data.

Human Subjects - Ethical Considerations
Employees were subjected to two types of observation:
paper and pencil survey, and interview.
participated in both types.
distributed and received.
information:

Some subjects

All surveys were anonymously
Interviews revealed two types of

program information and cultural information.

All subjects signed an agreement (Appendix G) which stated
the purpose of the research and informed them that their
identity would not be revealed.

Therefore, the identity of

subjects interviewed will be known only to the researcher,
and their responses will be grouped to eliminate the
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possibility of identification.

Subjects at no time were

placed in a potentially harmful situation by the process of
research.

Conclusion
The design allowed for the accumulation of a large
volume of data, and also provided the flexibility for latent
insights to emerge.

The rigor in the design was supported

by the triangulation of a variety of sources of information.
The methodology did not impose rigid controls on gathering,
analyzing, and, ultimately,

interpreting the data.

However,

my obvious biases, which would ordinarily result from
prolonged immersion in the organization’s culture, were
offset by my ability to comprehend and sort out the
understatements, overstatements, parochial attitudes, and
symbolic language that may have passed unnoticed by an
outsider.

Whatever was lost in terms of control was

replaced by cultural insight and conceptual flexibility.
Insight and flexibility are essential when attempting to
extract meaning from complex social processes.
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RESULTS

The Planning Process at General Dynamics
The official division policies for developing and
reporting division strategic and operating plans are
specified in Division Standard Policy SP.07.05.01.

This

policy states that the Division Planning Department of the
Marketing Department is responsible for developing the plans
with the assistance of the General Manager’s staff and
submitting them to corporate headquarters, and that division
plans must be reviewed and approved by the General Manager.
The plan’s contents are considered company private
information and are to be handled using standard security
procedures.

The policy also states that the division

strategic plan, which contains the division’s long-term
objectives, associated risks, and their impact on the
division, and the division operating plan, which contains
the division’s commitment to a level of performance and
performance forecast, both should be prepared annually.
Division strategic plans and operating plans should be
prepared in accordance with Corporate Policies 4-103 and
151
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4-104 respectively which give specific details for
preparing and submitting the plans.
Division business plans are distinguished from
strategic and operating plans in SP.07.10.07.

Business

plans are developed for new business opportunities as the
need arises.

Business plans contain detailed analyses of

the new opportunities and are used in the decision-making
process.

SP.07.10.07 specifies the required sections and

suggested subsection topics for the business plan outline.
The required sections are a program or product line
overview, an assessment of the customer, an assessment of
the competition, an assessment of the market, a recommended
strategy, a proposed support organization and schedule,
investment requirements, technology requirements, key
issues, and a plan of action.
According to an internal corporate memo from Herb
Rogers, President of General Dynamics, to all division
general managers and key corporate and division planning
personnel dated 20 March 1989, corporate executives
considered the strategic planning process to be an
opportunity to identify strategic objectives, to develop
long-term alternative actions, and to articulate appropriate
strategic responses to the business environment.

The memo

also stated that the strategic plan consists of a mission
statement, a strategic approach, five strategic goals, and
operating guidance.

In addition, the memo firmly

communicated the suggestion to disseminate the corporate
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strategic guidance throughout the management structure so
that everyone can understand their roles in implementing the
intended business direction.
The above mentioned memo was the cover memo for the
corporate strategic plan.

The memo specified that the

purpose of the plan was to initiate discussions and
negotiations between division and corporate executives that
would culminate in the development of division-specific
strategic objectives, and that these objectives would be
achievable only when actions were defined and completed.
The plan itself is a company private document and
cannot be quoted directly.

However, the corporate mission

statement as it appeared in the strategic plan was quoted in
the division newspaper (Riccitelli, 1989a).

The following

mission statement was attributed to company president, Herb
Rogers in the article:
General Dynamics is dedicated to achieving and
maintaining the highest integrity of our products, our
people, and our corporation.

The foundation of General

Dynamics’ business will be based on developing and
delivering superior world-class, high-technology
systems.

We will give priority and focus to continuous

improvements in the quality of every aspect of
operation correspondent to reductions in cost.
objective is two fold:

Our end

first, to meet the needs of our

customers; second, to ensure that all our actions are
in the best interests of our shareholders,

(p. 1)
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Another version of the corporate mission statement is
available in both editions of the unclassified handbook
General Dynamics Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct
(Appendix H), the pamphlet used to communicate the specifics
of the company’s Ethics Program to all employees.

The

mission statements are identical in both editions, but where
the statement appeared on the back cover of the first
edition, it was moved to page four of the second edition
following the table of contents and the message from the
Chairman.

The change in position of the mission statement

in the second edition appears to reflect the corporate
executives’ desire to communicate the corporate mission to
all employees.
Following the mission statement in the second edition
of the ethics handbook (Appendix H) is a statement of key
commitments, values, and responsibilities.

The five key

commitments are to the customers of General Dynamics to
bring them the highest quality products for the lowest cost,
to the suppliers to be a good customer, to each other as
employees to treat one another fairly and with dignity and
respect, to shareholders to pursue growth and earnings
objectives while keeping ethical standards in mind, and to
the communities in which the company operates to act as
responsible and responsive corporate citizens.

The key

values specified in the handbook urge employees to be
dedicated and loyal to company and country, law-abiding,
honest and trustworthy, responsible and reliable, truthful
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and accurate, fair and cooperative, and economical in using
company and customer resources.

These key commitments and

key values communicated the intentions of the corporate
executives to utilize the Ethics Program as a central
element of strategic human resources planning.

By providing

this conceptual framework as an introduction to the
standards, executives appeared to have intended to
communicate to employees that ethical behavior begins with
treating each other with dignity and respect.

Thus,

employees rightly expected the Ethics Program to alter
unfair treatment by supervisors and peers, and to be the
foundations of good business practices.
Having specified the key commitments and key values,
the pamphlet stipulates the responsibilities of the company,
supervisors, and individual employees.

The company’s

responsibilities focus on creating and maintaining the
Ethics Program, communicating the ethical standards,
enforcing those standards, and ensuring that working
conditions at all locations are supportive of those
standards.

Supervisors are responsible for assuring that

all new employees are properly trained in the meaning and
application of the standards, demonstrating their own
commitment to the standards by exemplary behavior, and
maintaining an environment that encourages frank and open
communication and concern for the standards of conduct.

All

employees regardless of rank or station are responsible for
knowing and understanding the standards of conduct,
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upholding associated policies and procedures, seeking help
when necessary, being sensitive to potentially unethical or
illegal situations, counseling fellow employees, and
reporting violations of the standards.

Following the

definitions of responsibilities, the handbook defines the
standards.
The 1989 strategic plan predicted trends in shifting
demographics of the workforce, increased involvement of
employees in improving productivity, increasing quality and
reducing cost, and increased social responsibility of
industry.

Based on predicted trends, the assessment of the

environmental conditions concluded that new approaches to
human resources management and work force training were
needed.

In a section entitled "Operating Guidance,"

suggestions were made for managers to involve employees and
their ideas for improvements, to be sensitive and responsive
to the diverse needs of the workforce, to plan and implement
flexible human resource programs emphasizing training, to
plan good corporate citizenship and conduct business to the
highest ethical standards, to maintain a work environment
that respects the rights and dignity of employees, to accept
the increasing social responsibility expected of
corporations operating in communities, and to communicate
with employees, shareholders, citizens, and political
leaders.

Combining these elements into a single section

indicated that all of them were aimed at the same general
goal.

Business practices at General Dynamics have been
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characterized as dependent upon a work environment that
maintains the basic moral treatment of human beings as
members of the community so that they might actively
participate in the business process.
The basic elements of the strategic plan had been
communicated to employees through company newspapers.

An

article on corporate level strategic plans (Riccitelli,
1989a), in addition to stating the organization’s mission,
outlined the major points of the business charter, the
company’s assessment of the business and market environment,
and the company’s strategic goals.

This article focused on

corporate business plans for economic growth, technological
growth, and increased productivity but did not cover any of
the elements regarding corporate responsibilities,
communication, or ethical standards.
Division level strategic objectives were covered in a
different article (Riccitelli, 1989b) which also stressed
specific economic, sales, technological development,
quality, and productivity goals.

However, this article

devoted one section, entitled "Provide a Fulfilling
Workplace for Electronics Division Employees," to a specific
division goal to provide resources and training and
development opportunities to employees to increase their
productivity.

Communication of senior executives’ desires

to increase human resources awareness seemed to be
intertwined with their desires to increase ethical
awareness.
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A similar article (Riccitelli, 1988) outlined the
process of developing operating plans and specified the
division’s approach to implementing certain economic, sales,
and performance goals.

Performance to goals has been

consistently reported in the division newspaper as a summary
of the General Manager’s annual State-of-the-Division
address to the management club in January, and in occasional
articles covering quarterly performance.

The Ethics Program

has been subjected to the same type of management controls
as other human resources programs.

For example, performance

to Ethics Program goals was outlined in an article (Andrews,
1988) and in a specific report (General Dynamics, 1988).
Other strategic plans were communicated to employees.
An explanation of a strategic organizational restructuring
in the division (to focused business units) was offered in
an article by Dong (1989).

This particular planned

organizational change was cited as a source of concern by 11
of the 15 employees interviewed by the researcher.

The Ethics Program at General Dynamics
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics was created in
June, 1985 by Stanley Pace, then Vice Chairman of the Board,
as one of five elements in the corporation’s Zero Defect
Administration Program.

The specific objective of the

Ethics Program was to "put the Standards of Business Ethics
and Conduct into practice" (General Dynamics Corporation,
1988, p. 6).

A broader goal was implied by Kent
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Druyvesteyn, Staff Vice President-Ethics Program:

"The

purpose of the General Dynamics Ethics Program is to help
employees in their everyday business activity, not to catch
them in wrongdoing" (Andrews,

1988, p. 3).

Pace developed a four phase plan to increase employee
awareness of the rules, to increase commitment to standards
of behavior, and to increase knowledge regarding the
resolution of ethical dilemmas in the workplace ("Ethics
Training," 1986).
Phase one of the plan was to have the division general
managers meet in early 1986 at corporate headquarters to
discuss the strategies for developing and implementing the
program.

When the general managers had been briefed,

one-day awareness workshops were conducted for the general
managers’ staff members.
Phase two involved hiring or appointing division ethics
directors and setting up lines of communication for
employees to use when seeking advice or reporting
wrongdoing.

A program director was hired at the corporate

office, Ethics Program Directors were appointed at each
division, and an advisory group was convened at corporate
headquarters in August, 1986 to review the proposed
standards and to create long-term plans for implementing and
maintaining the Ethics Program ("Five Ethics," 1986).

There

were a total of 34 ethics directors, nine of whom were
devoted to the task full time in the nine major divisions
(General Dynamics Corporation,

1988).

Primary modes of
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communication were telephone calls and personal visits.

A

toll free "hotline" was established for the entire
corporation to use, and each division set up a special local
number that was answered directly by the Division Ethics
Director or was answered by a recording device if the
director were unavailable.

The Division Ethics Directors

maintained an open-door policy so that they would devote
immediate and confidential attention to anyone who visited
their private offices.
Phase three required each division staff to select an
adequate number of internal trainers for the division based
on division population (there were 17 trainers in
Electronics Division).

The division trainers attended a

two-day offsite session to prepare themselves to train all
other division employees.
In phase four, all other employees in the corporation
(approximately 103,000) participated in a training course in
which they were introduced to the Standards of Business
Ethics and Conduct (hereafter referred to as Standards).
The training sessions were four hours long for salaried,
professional employees, and two hours long for all other
employees.

In addition to covering the rules, the training

session was designed to heighten employees’ awareness of
common ethical dilemmas and how to deal with them.

The

training sessions were discussion type seminars which were
facilitated by the in house trainers.

All new employees
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receive a review of the Standards as a part of their
orientation.
The first edition of the Standards was published and
distributed in August 1985 (General Dynamics Corporation,
1988).

In that same year, the Board of Directors

established the Committee on Corporate Responsibility to
review the effectiveness of the Ethics Program and to
receive reports on its progress.

In addition to the

Committee, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer created
the Corporate Ethics Steering Group to provide advice on the
implementation of the program.

The Steering Group reviewed

policies, procedures, and practices and made recommendations
for improvements.

The Steering Group was composed of

corporate functional heads including Legal, Human Resources,
Internal Audit, Contracts and Pricing, International Offset,
and Controller.
The Standards were revised and redistributed in October
1987 (General Dynamics Corporation, 1988).

All corporation

employees received a one hour training session at that time
conducted by a new set of in house trainers to familiarize
them with the changes in the second edition of the
Standards.

At both the initial training session in 1986 and

the update session in 1987, employees were required to sign
a card stating that they had received and read a copy of the
Standards and understood that the Standards represent the
policies of General Dynamics Corporation.

The second

edition of the Standards included two new standards:

one on
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safety, and one on the proper use of the Ethics Program.

In

addition to changing the Standards to strengthen and clarify
the meaning of the rules, the second edition of the
Standards was published to emphasize the importance of the
program (General Dynamics Corporation, 1988).

The process

of distribution was designed to increase awareness of the
Standards and to stimulate commitment to the program.
On April 30, 1986, the Chairman, Stanley Pace, signed
Corporate Policy and Procedure (CPP) 23-103, "Investigations
and Sanctions - Business Ethics and Conduct," that specified
the policy and procedures for investigating alleged
violations of the Standards and the appropriate sanctions to
be applied to violators.

Electronics Division created two

Standard Policies to further clarify CPP 23-103.

The first,

SP.02.04.01, "Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct," was
authorized on July 14, 1986 by the Division General Manager
to establish division policies on business ethics and
conduct.

This policy specified who had what

responsibilities to investigate and resolve ethical issues,
and that the identity of whistleblowers will be protected.
The second, SP.02.04.02, "Conflicts of Interest - Giving and
Receiving Items of Value," established division policy
regarding the exchanges of items of value between employees
and current or potential customers and suppliers.

This

policy covered giving and accepting items of value including
meals, entertainment, and promotional gifts, misrepresenting
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the value of items on official documents, and special cases
or exceptions.
In addition to the training, the scope and gravity of
the Ethics Program was communicated to employees in various
articles in company newspapers.

The first of these were

announcements in division newsletters about the initial
Corporate Ethics Awareness Training Program ("Ethics
Training," 1986), and reminders about the local channels for
communication (Reynante, 1988).

The corporate monthly

newspaper featured articles announcing the development of
the Ethics Program ("Five Ethics," 1986), on the
disciplinary measures taken (Andrews, 1988), on lines of
communication ("Ethics Program," 1989), and on how to use
the lines of communication ("Tips Given," 1989).

The latter

article indicated that there was some confusion among
employees as to the purpose of the Ethics Program.

This

article specified that the ethics hotline should be used for
questions and concerns regarding the standards, and the
ombudsman hotline should be used for questions and concerns
regarding compensation, discrimination, discipline,
harassment, and so forth.
In 1986, various Ethics Program representatives
throughout the corporation received a total of 3,646
communications.
rose to 5,482.

In 1987, the total number of communications
However, in 1988 the total number of

communications fell slightly to 5,379.

Table 2 illustrates

a breakdown of contacts by the specific categories specified

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164
Table 2
Ethics Program Contacts by Standard Category
Year
1987

1988

1989

677

450

392

15

14

19

128

145

156

Former Government Employees

43

52

66

Selling/Marketing

20

26

16

1

0

0

59

71

38

Time Card Reporting

533

668

610

Suppliers & Consultants

257

416

540

96

133

145

Expense Reports

128

144

107

Company & Customer Resources

202

508

784

Security

0

70

87

Political Contributions

0

12

10

Environmental Actions

0

30

37

Safety & Health

-

5

113

International Business

0

10

12

Proper Use of the Ethics Pgm.

-

3

58

Employee Relationships & Other

1,487

2,725

2,189

Total

3,646

5,428

5,379

Standard
Gifts, Gratuities, & Entertainment
Inside Information
Outside Interests

Antitrust
Pricing, Billing, & Contracting

Quality & Testing
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in the Standards.

It is interesting to note that nearly

half the contacts were related to human resources issues,
labeled as "employee relationships and other."
The data in Table 2 represent first time contacts for
each case.

Followup contacts in any particular case were

not counted.

Demographic data and other identifying

information was not compiled (General Dynamics Corporation,
1988).

Approximately half of the communications were

received on hotlines.

Approximately one third of the

contacts raised concerns or allegations; the remaining two
thirds were inquiries.
Investigations of allegations were specified by CPP
23-103 and followed three phases:

(1) initial screening,

(2) preliminary review, and (3) formal investigation.
Allegations received through the Ethics Program in 1987
resulted in an imposition of 205 sanctions, including 29
suspensions and 27 discharges.
After two years of experience with the Ethics Program,
General Dynamics Corporation (1988) specified the following
"lessons learned:"
1.

The average person has a strong personal sense of

integrity and guards his or her reputation jealously.

This

sense is the strength of an ethics program.
2.

People often respond emotionally to the word

"ethics." Reactions are often negative, defensive, or
cynical.

The word must be used carefully in building an

ethics program.
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3.

The commitment of all persons in positions of

leadership is an absolute condition for establishing an
ethics program.

But the commitment of all employees at all

levels is absolutely necessary to fully implement and
maintain the program.
4.

An ethics program is best integrated into the

existing structure of the organization. It should not stand
alone or exist as a mere appendage.

A large independent

staff and budget are unnecessary and undesirable.
5.

The aim of the program must be positive.

program must give help.

The

Its primary purpose is to teach and

guide— not catch and judge.
6.

The program should focus on questions of right and

wrong but not ignore appearances of right and wrong.
Appearance may be as damaging to the reputation of the
company as fact.
7.

Issues that may involve possible questions of

ethics arise unexpectedly and often unpredictably.

Because

there is sometimes little time to decide, a means or method
of obtaining emergency assistance is necessary.
8.

Most issues of an ethical nature are practical

matters of fact.

When the relevant facts are gathered, the

question is answered and the concern is resolved.

Few of

the issues faced by employees are real moral dilemmas
although they appear to be very perplexing at the moment.
Employees do not need to be moral philosophers to solve most
ethics-related questions they may face.
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9.

Many questions of an ethical nature would never

arise if communications were stronger in the basic
relationships between employer and employee, employee and
customer, employee and supplier, employee and shareholder,
and employee and community.

Likewise, many questions that

escalate into issues of ethics would arise less often if
common civil virtues like trustworthiness, loyalty,
helpfulness, friendliness, courtesy, kindness, cheerfulness,
and respect were practiced regularly.
10.

An ethics program has certain inherent limitations

based on the fact that it depends on people for
implementation.

There can be written standards and

carefully defined policies, but the program can do little to
change individuals who intentionally engage in misconduct,
(pp. 23-24)
Item nine of the lessons learned specifically addresses
the need for stronger humanistic values as a key element of
the Ethics Program.

It is clear that most communications

about and impressions of the Ethics Program’s objectives
included a conceptualization of the relationship between
ethics and other human resources issues such as
communication, civility, kindness, trustworthiness, and
respect.
General Dynamics Corporation also noted that some
negative reactions to the Ethics Program still persisted two
years after its implementation.

Some employees felt that

ethics is a personal matter and the program is an affront to
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their personal sense of integrity by implying that something
is wrong with their ethics.

Others thought that the program

was a good idea, but it really did not apply to them
personally because they do not make important decisions.
Some employees felt that the program was a means to "snitch"
on other employees, while some feel that reporting offenses
is reprehensible no matter what the circumstance.

Ethics Program Planning Evaluation
There were two interview groups that provided personal
assessments and observations on the Ethics Program.

The

first group, which I labeled the planning group (five
individuals), was asked questions about the planning process
that resulted in the Ethics Program.

The second group,

which I labeled the cultural group (fifteen individuals),
was asked questions of a general nature about the Ethics
Program and its effect on the organization.

Following is a

summary of the planning group respondents’ assessments of
the planning process.
The unanimous opinion of the planning group was that
the Ethics Program of General Dynamics was created and
implemented because of economic pressures from the
environment, specifically an agreement with the Navy to
implement the program or lose business.

The program was

specifically designed to avoid losing legitimacy.

This

notion was supported by media sources (Larsen, 1987;
Packard, Laird, Moot, Bowsher, & Conahan, 1988).
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Two of the five respondents in the planning group
specifically stated that the decision to implement the
Ethics Program was not the result of a sense of moral
obligation, but rather it was a decision based on business
needs.

One respondent added that if the end results were

moral it would not be because moral ends were intended, but
because they just happened.
The official objectives of the Ethics Program were to
support individual employees in their daily business
conduct, to enhance the administrative performance of the
company in basic business relationships, and to help build
trust between the company and its customers, suppliers,
employees, shareholders, and the communities in which the
company functions (General Dynamics Corporation, 1988).

The

planning group unanimously suggested that one program
objective was to provide a mechanism for employees to voice
complaints and receive guidance on questionable behavior.
Other objectives cited by the planning group were that the
program was designed to make sure that employees understood
the rules of the game regarding proper personal and business
conduct, to promote a professional image of the company, to
gain public trust, and to keep lines of communication open.
The planning group unanimously agreed that the Ethics
Program can be considered effective and successful.

As

evidence, the respondents cited high usage of the various
channels for complaints and inquiries, high levels of
employee trust in the program, fair and timely
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investigations and appropriate corrective actions, and new
employee attitudes toward customer and public relations.
Three respondents pointed out that the company had not been
involved in the latest sweeping scandals involving
government contractors.

Government officials tend to

support the claim that the Ethics Program at General
Dynamics was successful ("General Dynamics," 1989; Packard,
et a l ., 1988) .
The planning group unanimously stated that the Ethics
Program had become permanent and could not be discarded
without serious repercussions.

Two respondents remarked

that it was institutionalized, but one respondent stated
that he felt it had not yet become institutionalized because
there was still some resistance to the program.

All five

respondents felt that the program was properly planned, that
commitment from top managers was strong, that the
organization for administration of the program was
appropriate, and that communication of the program
objectives was adequate.

One respondent felt that

implementation could be considered ineffective because
supervisors had been allowed to retaliate against employees
who were known to have used the hotline.

Blatant

retaliation had been controlled effectively, but there were
no controls on the subtle forms of retaliation that can make
a subordinate’s life miserable.

Other suggestions for

improvement from the planning group included (a) providing a
mechanism for interdivision and corporatewide referrals,
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making the issues more visible (they are currently
considered company private information),
disciplinary actions by category,

(c) publicizing the

(d) investigating what

possible issues are not raised and why, (e) structuring the
investigation process so that it is less intimidating, and
(f) providing more program representatives for outlying
facilities.
All respondents in the planning group felt that
potential resistance to the program by employees was
properly planned for and counteracted by building trust
through education, communication, and individual counseling.
The planning group perceived that union officials,
suspicious employees, chronic complainers, lov* performers,
and some supervisors were sources of the resistance.

They

perceived the primary source of resistance to be union
officials and strong union supporters because the Ethics
Program somewhat undermined their grievance procedure.
All respondents felt the company had been successful in
maintaining the changes intended by the Ethics Program.
Changes had been both beneficial and consistent.

Examples

of actualized intended changes cited were (a) widespread
consideration of the spirit of the rules as well as the
language,

(b) detection and resolution of issues while they

were still small and relatively harmless,
customers were becoming commonplace,

(c) disclosures to

(d) complaints were

receiving immediate attention, and (e) general changes in
employee attitudes and conduct concerning record keeping and
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record accuracy, particularly those related to financial
issues, expense reporting, and time cards.

Surveys and Interviews
The 1986 Survey of Employees
The comprehensive survey conducted by General Dynamics
Corporation in 1986 was intended to "provide an ongoing
assessment of employee attitudes toward company policies and
procedures, management practices, and job satisfaction"
(General Dynamics Corporation, 1986, p. 1-4).

The results

of the survey were intended to be used to "respond to
employee needs, customer expectations, and the changing
business environment" (p. 1-4).

The objectives of the

survey were listed as the following:
1.

Assess employees’ perceptions of present and new

company policies and procedures.
2.

Provide employees the opportunity to contribute

directly to the changing environment of our company.
3.

Establish an ongoing action process aimed at

improving the company’s organizational effectiveness.
4.

Determine the current level of employees’ job

satisfaction.
5.

Enhance two-way communications between employees

and management.
6.

Demonstrate concern for employees through

communication and collaboration.
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7.

Define key strengths and key opportunities to

improve the company.
8.

Ensure the results are not used to the disadvantage

of unions.
9.

Accurately report results, both favorable and

unfavorable.
10.

Develop managerial skills in communication, group

feedback, and collaborative action planning.
11.

Maintain confidentiality of individuals,

(p. 1-4)

The first five objectives were called initial
objectives and the last six objectives were called feedback
objectives.
The relationship between the survey and the Ethics
Program is specified in objectives one and two.

The new

policies and procedures referenced in those objectives are
specifically those implemented for the Ethics Program.
Survey items 27-30, 78-93, and 114-122 were specifically
designed to explore the effectiveness of the Ethics Program
to that point in the process (Appendix A).

Table 3

indicates total corporate and Electronics Division responses
to items 27-30.
Item 78 asked respondents to evaluate the need for
change before the Ethics Program was implemented.
Fifty-nine percent of the total corporation respondents felt
change was needed, and 11% felt none was needed.

Of the

Electronics Division Employees, 53% felt change was needed
and 12% felt none was needed.

Item 79 requested that
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respondents evaluate the amount of change that was
instituted by the Ethics Program.

Of the total corporation

Table 3
Ratings of Perceived Interests of General Dynamics
Ratings *
Item

Good

Poor

GD

57%

11%

ED

47%

13%

GD

38%

26%

ED

34%

28%

GD

62%

9%

ED

64%

6%

GD

38%

26%

ED

35%

28%

Sample

27. Welfare of community

28. Welfare of employees

29. Customer relations

30. Public relations

* medium and no opinion ratings were omitted
respondents, 42% felt that more change was needed, and 11%
felt that there was too much change.

In Electronics

Division, 43% felt there could be more, and 23% felt there
was too much.

Item 80 asked if respondents agreed that the

right kinds of changes were implemented.

Total corporate

response to item 80 was not reported, but 36% of Electronics
Division respondents agreed and 41% disagreed.
Items 81-89 asked respondents to evaluate the impact
that the changes would have in various areas.

Table 4
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illustrates the responses to items 81-89 for both the total
corporation and for Electronics Division.
Table 4
Responses Evaluating The Impact of The Ethics Program
Impact
Item
81. Accurate expense reporting

82. Accurate time card reporting

83. Fair competition

84. Cooperation with customer

85. Efficiency of division

86. Division ethical behavior

87. Trust of public

88. Trust of customers

89. Ability to compete

Sample

Increase

Decrease

GD

68%

4%

ED

72%

5%

GD

68%

7%

ED

73%

8%

GD

not reported

ED

42%

GD

not reported

ED

43%

7%

GD

31%

27%

ED

26%

32%

GD

not reported

ED

57%

5%

GD

57%

6%

ED

57%

4%

GD

63%

4%

ED

66%

3%

GD

not reported

ED

47%

8%

12%
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Items 90-93 asked respondents to assess their own level
of involvement in the Ethics Program.

Responses to items

90-93 are represented for the total corporation and for
Electronics Division in Table 5.
Table 5
Personal Involvement In The Ethics Program
Rating
Item

Sample

90. I understand reasons

GD

71%

8%

ED

80%

7%

GD

83%

5%

ED

88%

5%

GD

not reported

ED

65%

GD

not reported

ED

61%

91. Clear about my responsibility

92. Change well implemented

93. Division mgmt. committed

Agree

Disagree

10%

14%

Items 114-118 asked respondents to assess the extent to
which the company is ethical and perceived as ethical.
Responses to items 114-118 are represented for both the
total corporation and for Electronics Division in Table 6.
Items 119-122 asked respondents to rate the
effectiveness of the ethics hotlines and workshops, and
responses for both total corporate and Electronics Division
samples are represented in Table 7.
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Table 6
Ratings of the Business Ethics of General Dynamics
Rating
Item

Sample

114. General Dynamics’ ethics now

115. Own division’s ethics now

116. G D ’s ethics one year ago

117. D iv.’s ethics one year ago

Good

Poor

GD

56%

12%

ED

65%

7%

GD

63%

11%

ED

67%

7%

GD

25%

43%

ED

36%

30%

GD
ED

118. Customer’s rating of division

GD
ED

not reported
49%

18%

not reported
43%

24%

In addition to exploring the effects of the Ethics
Program, the survey was intended to provide managers with
information about employee attitudes and with a tool that
could be used to correct any problems (General Dynamics
Corporation,

1986).

Fifty-seven percent of the total

corporate sample and 55% of the Electronics Division sample
reported that they were satisfied with the company (Item
123), and 62% and 65% respectively reported that they were
proud to work for General Dynamics (Item 75).

Seventy-two

percent of the Electronics Division sample were satisfied
with their jobs (Item 2).
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Table 7
Ratings of Ethics Hotlines and Workshops
Rating
Item

Sample

119. Hotline is a good idea

120. Hotline gets action

121. I ’ll be hurt if I use it

122. EP workshops are effective

Agree

Disagree

GD

71%

7%

ED

74%

6%

GD

not reported

ED

46%

12%

GD

32%

26%

ED

31%

28%

GD

46%

20%

ED

52%

17%

For the Electronics Division, 45% rated the division
performance good (Item 141), but 70% rated the division high
on technological development (Item 12), and 74% rated the
division high on product quality (Item 13).

Only 20% felt

the division was efficient (Item 17), and only 22% felt the
division was effectively managed (Item 72).

In addition,

only 33% felt the division was innovative (Item 16), and
only 28% felt Electronics Division had a clear sense of
direction (Item 18).

A lower percentage, 24%, felt the

division planned effectively.
In the Electronics Division sample, there was a clear
critique of top division managers.

Sixty-four percent rated

their supervisor as good (Item 153) and 59% rated top
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corporate management as good (Item 155), while only 26%
rated division top management as good (Item 154).

A good

deal of this criticism can be accounted for by considering
interdepartment cooperation and decision making.

Only 26%

of the sample felt the division had a cooperative atmosphere
(Item 20), and only 20% agreed that decisions were made
without undue delay (Item 61) even though 52% agreed that
the lines of authority were clear (Item 47).

Sixty-four

percent felt the level of cooperation within their own
department was good (Item 144), but only 41% rated
cooperation with other departments as good (Item 145).

Only

27% of the sample felt the division was interested in the
welfare of its employees (Item 21), while 54% felt they were
treated with respect and dignity (Item 7).
Following the development and administration of the
survey, managers were supposed to analyze the results for
their own departments, meet with employees and discuss
problem areas, and develop and implement action plans to
resolve the problems identified.

Instructions for

developing the action plans and specially designed
worksheets were distributed to all upper level and middle
level managers.

All supervisors had access to the

instructions as well.
Electronics Division created an action plan with the
following three requirements for all supervisors and
managers:
meetings,

(1) all levels must conduct periodic staff
(2) all levels must be committed to an open door
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policy, and (3) all levels must provide employees with more
frequent feedback on expectations, recognition, and
corrective actions for poor performance.

Action plans were

supposed to be incorporated into departmental objectives,
then into division objectives, and finally into corporate
objectives for an integrated corporate plan (General
Dynamics Corporation, 1986).

Progress on the implementation

of the plans was reported at monthly business reviews.
addition, the monthly corporate newspaper,
World.

In

General Dynamics

carried articles in nearly every edition about

progress on the various action plans.
the July, 1987

General Dynamics World

The entire issue of
was devoted to the

corporate action plan as veil as the general division action
plans for each division.

Nearly every issue of the

Electronics Division newspaper,

The Current.

from early

1987 to 1989, featured the action plan and progress in
implementing the plan of one of the major departments.

I

wrote the article featuring the implementation of the
Material Department action plan in

The Current

("Employee

Survey," 1989).
Internal Surveys
The Division Vice President of Material met with his
staff in late 1987 to formulate an action plan for the
Material Department.

After reviewing the results of the

survey items for the department,
indicating problem areas.

12 items were selected as

Criteria for selection included a

high percentage of unfavorable responses by Material
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employees responding to the survey, a critical area of
employee relations, and a reasonably workable problem within
the control of the Vice President and his staff.

An

unfavorable response was a combination of disagree and
strongly disagree, poor and very poor responses, or an
agreement with a negative statement depending on the nature
of the item.

The degree of criticality and workability was

judged by a consensus of the staff members.

The items

selected and the percentage of unfavorable responses are
given in Table 8.
Table 8
Items Selected For Action By The Material Staff
Item No.
154

Issue

% Unfavorable

Performance of top management

46%

72

Division effectively managed

52%

61

Delays in decision making

54%

62

Frequent changes in decisions

50%

18

Clear sense of direction

57%

106

Organization well suited to work

48%

59

Understanding promotion policies

64%

53

Feedback from supervisor

54%

Improved working conditions

64%

33

Equitable distribution of work load

48%

20

Cooperative working atmosphere

79%

39

Correcting poor performance

69%

107
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Along with the three elements of the division action
plan, the Material staff adopted the following corrective
actions:

to define and communicate the goals and reasoning

for decisions, to improve communication on objectives,
performance, and business directions, to reorganize to
integrate elements of MRP II and to increase cooperation, to
train supervisors in interpersonal relations and basic
communications skills and in disciplinary action, to
investigate options for improving facilities, to communicate
promotion and advancement policies, and to be more sensitive
to an equitable distribution of work loads.
In March, 1988, I conducted a brief survey at the
request of the Vice President of Material to assess progress
on the action plans.

The survey asked respondents to list

the top ten problems in the Material Department.

A total of

50 surveys were returned out of 314 employees (16%).

The

low rate of return suggests that the results should be
considered biased.
Of the respondents to the March 1988 Survey, 36%
indicated there was not enough communication about division
activities; 24% felt their supervisor was incompetent; 10%
complained of sexism; 16% complained of disrespectful
treatment from their supervisor; 34% indicated that
operations were inefficient or wasteful; 32% felt procedures
were not followed adequately;

24% felt there was inadequate

planning; 34% felt their managers were inconsistent; 34%
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were concerned about future business; 24% were concerned
about their career mobility; 40% indicated a communication
problem between supervisors and subordinates; 54% mentioned
at least one problem with facilities; 42% indicated
communication problems with other departments; 22% felt low
morale was a problem; 28% felt unprofessionalism was a
problem; and 28% felt training opportunities were inadequate
for employees.
In June, 1989, I conducted another internal survey of
the Material Department.

This survey used the exact wording

of the original 12 items of the 1986 Survey of Employees
selected by the Material Staff (Table 8) and two more were
added which specifically asked for evaluations of the
performance of the Division General Manager and the Vice
President of Material (Appendix C).

This time the sample

was 205 out of a population of 269 employees.

Table 9

represents a comparison of responses to the June 1989 Survey
with those corresponding items of the 1986 Survey of
Employees.
There was surprisingly little difference between the
results of the two surveys.

The only issue where there was

any apparent gain was in a clear sense of direction (Item
18).

There was almost an equivalent loss in the area of

managers changing their minds (Item 62).

There were no

significant differences between the two samples.

It was

clear that employees rated the management performance of the
Vice President much higher than those of the General
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Table 9
Comparison of Unfavorable Responses of the Two Surveys
Survey
Item No.

Issue

1986

1989

154

Performance of the General Manager

38%

32%

N/A

Performance of the Vice President

—

12%

72

Division effectively managed

52%

52%

61

Delays in decision making

54%

57%

62

Frequent changes in decisions

50%

59%

18

Clear sense of direction

42%

31%

106

Organization well suited to work

37%

44%

5S

Understanding promotion policies

57%

54%

53

Feedback from supervisor

37%

39%

Improved working conditions

64%

71%

33

Equitable distribution of work load

52%

48%

20

Cooperative working atmosphere

44%

46%

39

Correcting poor performance

74%

72%

107

Manager.

There was also some improvement in organizational

structure and working conditions.
In addition to 1986 Survey of Employees which was a
comprehensive survey of all General Dynamics employees, the
March 1988 Survey which was conducted to identify general
problem areas in the Material Department, and the June 1989
Survey which was conducted to be compared with responses on
the 1986 Survey of Employees, I used data from two other
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surveys:

the April 1983 Survey and the February 1989

Engineering Survey.
The April 1983 Survey (Appendix B) was conducted to
explore functional organizational difficulties as well as to
assess organizational effectiveness.

The survey asked the

respondent to list common organizational problems (Item 3).
No records of percentages of responses were kept, but the
common problems identified by respondents were listed in the
final report.
The common problems attributed to managers,
supervisors, and fellow employees by Manufacturing and
Material Control Department respondents were the inability
of lower level employees to arouse interest in potential
problems, failure of managers to provide support in
resolving problems, failure of managers to specify clear
priorities, slow status reporting mechanisms, insufficient
self-discipline, insufficient communication between
departments, failure of employees to understand the
responsibilities of other departments, duplication of
effort, insufficient checks and balances, failure to
schedule and plan workloads, and allowance of too much work
backlog.
The survey conducted by the Engineering Department in
1989 was designed to examine the communication changes
within the department since the 1986 corporatewide survey.
The questionnaire was created by a review team to evaluate
the impact of the Engineering Department action plan.

A
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nonrandom sample of only 8% of employees from the department
of over 900 responded to the survey so the results cannot be
considered reliable.

The survey report concluded that after

the implementation of the action plan in 1987 the levels of
upward, downward, and bidirectional communications
increased, but by 1989 they had dropped to preplan levels.
Even though data from the some of the internal surveys
are limited in scope and reliability, they indicate an
underlying attitude that seems to have remained constant at
least since the April 1983 Survey.

This organizational

noise can be understood as characteristic of the
organization’s culture in the sense that it represents
prevailing beliefs about the relationship of the
organization and its employees.

The prevailing beliefs are

that there is little effective communication within formal
networks, that there is little respect between managers and
employees, that morale is consistently low even in
relatively prosperous times, and that opportunities for
employees are low even though most openings are filled from
within.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted with two groups of employees.
The planning group respondents (five individuals) were
interviewed primarily for their impressions and insight into
the organization’s planning process in relation to the
Ethics Program.

The cultural group respondents (fifteen

individuals) were interviewed to determine their
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understanding of the organization and their experience of
being members.
Both the planning group and the cultural group were
asked to give some assessment of certain cultural aspects of
Electronics Division.

Subjects in the planning group were

asked to evaluate the level of innovation in the company.
All respondents agreed that General Dynamics is innovative
in the technical areas, and that the Ethics Program was
innovative.

Two respondents felt the company had not been

innovative in human resources areas; two cited programs such
as the Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II), Total
Quality Management (TQM), and Focused Business Units (FBU)
as evidence of innovation, but none of them are human
resources programs; and one respondent suggested that some
divisions (not Electronics) had been innovative in human
resources areas besides the Ethics Program.

There was tacit

agreement that Electronics Division cannot be considered
innovative in human resources areas.

Critical comments

suggested that the company was low on concern for employees,
too bureaucratic, reactive and not proactive, dictatorial,
low on risk taking, and slow to change.

Positive comments

suggested that the company can execute programs well once
the commitment has been made.

However, three respondents

commented that programs are often implemented on paper and
put into the objectives without appropriate funding and
support.
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The planning group was also asked to assess the changes
in the company over the previous three years.

Four of the

five respondents framed the changes at General Dynamics in a
positive perspective, and all four attributed the positive
changes to Stanley Pace, the Chairman of the Board and CEO.
The one respondent who was critical of the changes focused
on Electronics Division.
The negative assessment of the changes in Electronics
Division made by the one respondent revolved around the
influence of the General Manager as the primary factor in
the negative outcome.

Specifically, the criticism focused

on poor planning, poor organization, top-down and one-way
communication, excessive internal conflict, an atmosphere of
competitive noncooperation, excessive senior management
attention to detail and neglect of widespread problems, and
limited decisive action on and support of employee oriented
programs.

The negative respondent cited the Ethics Program

as the only notable exception in a generally
nonemployee-oriented atmosphere.
The four positive respondents all assessed the changes
from the perspective of the whole organization.

Positive

assessments focused on the Ethics Program as a vehicle for
employees to express concerns without having to use a formal
grievance process, corporate level financial strategies,
corporate level proactive marketing, new cost competitive
strategies, the perceived concern of Pace for the employees
of the company and his accessibility, improved community
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relations, improved customer relations, and increased
communications of both good and bad news.
One of the participants in the cultural group had
complained that employees in the past had actively
participated in setting departmental objectives which they
were no longer able to do.

I asked one planning group

respondent who was intimately involved in business planning
processes to comment on that specific change.

The

respondent, who had provided a positive assessment of the
changes, suggested that senior managers purposely limited
employee input into the planning process because too many
inputs from the bottom confused the issue.

Senior division

managers had apparently decided that the directive approach
was more efficient.
All 15 members of the cultural group were consistently
critical of senior division managers.

When responding to

the question of how the organization has changed, the entire
cultural group was consistently negative in their
assessment.

Even the most positive of the respondents were

concerned about unannounced management decisions that would
eventually affect them.

Of the sample, hourly employees and

middle managers were the most critical.

The least critical

responses were offered by salaried professionals.
A new organizational structure recently installed in
the division drew negative criticism from 11 of the 15
respondents.

Criticism was directed toward the dual lines

of authority (one person reports to two bosses), the
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atmosphere of competition and noncooperation created by the
new structure, and the confusion generated by diffused
responsibility and unclear authority.

Respondents were also

critical of the cost reduction strategies imposed by the new
organizational structure that deemphasized the importance of
people in the production process, and decreased support
costs to a level where adequate support was impossible.
Nine of the 15 respondents criticized the Ethics
Program.

The most common observation was that the most

unethical activities had been unreported.

The most common

suggestion for improving the program was to implement some
protective measures for whistleblowers.

As one respondent

put it: "Everyone knows that whistleblowers are penalized.
Nobody is going to report something that will limit his
career.

Look what happened to the people at Northrup."

Three other respondents suggested that anyone who points out
problems or proposes an alternate point of view is labeled
"uncooperative."
Seven respondents cited other employee-centered
programs as negative changes.

Three were critical of the

new flexible benefits program for various reasons, four were
critical of the recently signed contract with the union, one
was concerned that employees were no longer asked by their
supervisors to list their personal objectives which might be
incorporated into the organizational objectives.

This

activity was previously an annual activity that coincided
with merit reviews.

Fourteen respondents suggested that the
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division had become less employee oriented in the previous
three years, and that the atmosphere had become more
repressive.
Positive changes were listed by ten respondents.

These

changes included the transition of the material systems to
MRP II, the emphasis on communication, the improved public
image of the company, the emphasis on cost competitiveness
and streamlining, the modernization of methods and
equipment, less conflict between certain departments, and
the Ethics Program.
Some assessments of the changes were suggested by
cultural group respondents that implied contradiction.

For

example, two respondents believed the Ethics Program was
good and was working but that no real changes had taken
place.

Two other respondents felt the corporation had

adopted programs that benefited the employees but that
managers felt no concern for their employees.
Most cultural group respondents attributed changes
experienced within the organization not to the Ethics
Program, but to outside influences or top manager behavior.
Only two respondents suggested that the changes were the
result of new attitudes and work behavior of the employees
that might have been inspired by the Ethics Program.
Changes were variously attributed to turnover and shifts in
management personnel, MRP II, management philosophy and
style, economic factors, government pressure and budget
cuts, competition in the marketplace, environmental factors,
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and top management desire for improved image.

The most

commonly cited factor for influencing change was the
economy.
Five respondents suggested that the first line
supervisors were the primary catalysts for making things
happen.

Of these five, three were middle managers, one was

a salaried professional, and one was an hourly employee.
The other four hourly employees suggested that the workers,
themselves, make things happen.

Four salaried professionals

suggested that middle managers make things happen, while the
remaining two suggested that whoever has the most pressing
crisis makes things happen.
The respondents were fairly consistent in their
assessment of how the various movers actually make things
happen.

The strategies used were politics, yelling the

loudest, power plays, intimidation, controlling the budget,
negative reinforcement, big egos, directing, and acting on
priorities.
The responses given identifying who solves the problems
were similar to those identifying who makes things happen
with some minor exceptions.

Three respondents suggested

that special teams assigned to resolve major problems (red
teams) were the primary problem solvers, and one salaried
professional suggested that senior managers solve the
problems.

Most respondents cited first line supervisors and

workers as the primary problem solvers.
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When asked for speculation on what changes were needed
in the organization, there was a wide variance of opinion
among the cultural group respondents.

The most commonly

mentioned needs were focused on the actions of senior
managers:

more communication of long-range plans, less

whitewashing of problems, less power politics, more people
orientation, more managing by walking around, more mutual
respect and kindness, more courtesy and recognition, less
fear tactics, more tolerance for difficult people who are
r

competent in their job, more straightforwardness and
honesty, less micromanaging, less requirement for needless
statusing, more interpersonal skills, more consistency of
actions and words, fewer levels of management, more
attention to employees’ needs, better planning and
organizing of work, more positive reinforcement, more
consistency in giving awards and merit increases, and more
caring about the organization.

Other suggestions were that

employees should be involved to a greater extent in the
organization’s planning activities, and that there should be
more cooperation between employees in different departments.
Senior managers were criticized heavily for being cold,
uninvolved, and uncaring.

Those critical of senior managers

suggested that their behavior created low morale,
frustration, discouragement, and the resulting low levels of
productivity in employees.
The cultural group was fairly consistent when assessing
the characteristics of a good employee.

All of the
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respondents cited attitude as a major factor, but few of
them were able to define this attitude.

A good work

attitude was characterized as focused on the employee’s
behavior toward others:

cooperative, positive,

enthusiastic, not defensive, responsive, supportive, and
ready to help.

Other suggested characteristics focused on

the employee’s productivity:

willing to contribute, looks

for things to do, wanting to get the job done, quick turn
around, thoroughness, and follow-through.
When asked to identify a person who embodied the ideal,
four respondents indicated that there were none in the
division.

Three females picked female supervisors, one male

manager picked a female subordinate, and the remainder of
the sample picked male supervisors or managers.

When

justifying their selections, respondents again focused on
relationships with others and productivity factors:

knows

her job, attention to detail, confident, poised, well liked,
knowledgeable, respected by peers, hard worker, always
helps, does job even if she disagrees with procedures, takes
interest in her employees, personal integrity, never gives
up, works well with employees, good planner, high
performance,

independent, a happy employee,

intelligent,

creative, good life priorities, good job priorities, and
creates positive atmosphere.
All of the respondents except two stated that feedback
from their supervisor was key to whether or not they knew
they are doing a good job.

One of the respondents felt that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

195
she had to know on her own because she could not trust her
supervisor, and one felt that verification had to come from
someone she respected.

Other suggestions were that one knew

one was doing a good job when the work got done, when
schedules were met, and when problems were solved.
The factors other than money that respondents reported
as the reasons for their remaining in the company were pride
in o ne ’s job, security, job satisfaction, benefits,
familiarity with the job, relationships with coworkers,
company prestige, sense of accomplishment, and challenge.
Most respondents indicated that money was the major factor.
Three respondents were actively (and secretly) looking for
another job.

When asked about their favorite stories about

the company, three respondents cited stories about things
that happened at work, one cited extra curricular activities
in the management club, and the remainder cited personal
stories about coworkers.
When asked if they felt that top managers were trying
to do the right thing for employees and the public, the
cultural group unanimously responded no.

The reasoning for

this judgement was that whatever managers do is either for
the sake of the company’s public image or for personal gain.
Respondents proposed the following comments as
characterizing company managers:

political games, power

plays, no loyalty to subordinates, would sell people down
the river to get ahead, too wrapped up in their own problems
to be concerned about employees, employees are nonessential,
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worried only about profits and image, do not know enough
about the employees to be able to do anything, no regard for
humans,

interested only in producing the product at the

lowest cost, would eliminate employees altogether if
possible and replace them with robots, lay off people with
no concern for their welfare, profit orientation to the
exclusion of everything else, no respect for the human
condition, uncaring, too self-centered and self-serving, and
concerned only for their image.
The above information reinforces the pervasiveness of
the organizational noise indicated by the various survey
results.

The interview respondents were selected because of

their generally positive (or at least neutral) attitude
toward their work and toward the organization.

All of the

respondents can be characterized as reasonably successful in
their work.

Yet, their feelings are consistently

pessimistic about the relationship between the organization
and its members.

Cultural Assessment
As Schein (1986) suggested, the culture of an
organization is a collection of basic assumptions about the
nature of reality, the nature of the world, and the nature
of people.

Cultural influences in an old, bureaucratic

organization such as Electronics Division are deeply held
and pervasive values.

Newcomers into the organization tend

to be selected on their perceived tendency to embrace those
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values.

There is no scientific way for a researcher to

formulate an understanding of an organization’s culture by
simply compiling answers to questions.
I studied the data from the organization’s history and
from the various surveys and interviews and considered their
relationship with my own experience of the organization.
paid particular attention to the massive inconsistencies
that seemed to present themselves at every turn.

I

concluded that the culture was based on a contradictory
foundation, and that it contained fundamentally opposing
assumptions.

The following cultural assessment based on

data gathered was presented to the cultural group members
and was given blanket approval by respondents.
General Dynamics is a large, complex, bureaucratic
organization.

General Dynamics Corporation in general and

Electronics Division specifically show two distinct and
interwoven lines of cultural influence:
engineering.

military and

The military influence is derived from the

customers who are usually military organizations and from
the many employees at all levels of the organization who
have had military service.
military personnel.

Many employees are retired

The engineering influence is derived

from the collective influence of the middle and senior
managers who have engineering backgrounds.
The military aspects of the organization are apparent
in the following organizational assumptions.
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1.

Order is more efficient and productive than

ambiguity.

Orderly appearance will necessarily result in

positive outcomes.

Rules are necessary to impose order on

natural chaos.
2.

Time is linear.

Schedules are critical no matter

how arbitrarily they were derived.

Meeting schedules is

absolutely required under all possible circumstances.
3.

Physical space utilized for equipment and activity

is limitless.
status.
sense.

For personnel, space allocated is a symbol of

Distances are relevant only in a limited logistical
Separation by distance is unimportant to activities

or communication.
4.

Problems are defined by their necessity for action.

Problems are solvable by committing sufficient resources to
solve them.
5.

Organizational hierarchies are necessary to define

the chain of command.

The chain of command is important to

establish class and status distinctions as well as to
clearly identify who has the right to give orders to whom.
6.

Idleness is unproductive.

Unless people are

physically moving, they accomplish nothing.

Discipline is

critical.
7.

People are basically lazy and unproductive, they

need constant supervision to keep them disciplined.

People

are fundamentally inert and must be strictly directed in
order to keep them active.
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8.

Human beings can be trained and disciplined.

But

the training wears off quickly and must be renewed
constantly.
9.

Communication of information must be controlled and

released only to those whose need to know can be verified.
All persons can be divided into one of two groups:
or foe.

friend

Any individual is assumed to be a foe unless proven

to be a friend; the process of proving friendship is ongoing
and ceaseless.

Information can only be released to friends,

and even then with caution.
10.

Heroes are those who take bold and decisive action

in a time of crisis.

Nothing is impossible: the failure to

accomplish is a personal failure and the result of
incompetence.
11.

Human relationships are based on comradery, which

in turn is based on loyalty.

Tradition and group

identification (membership) are the most important elements
of comradery.
12.

Rituals are critical in maintaining tradition.

Rituals should symbolize and reinforce the hierarchy of
authority, the importance of loyalty, the importance of
order, and the importance of action.
The engineering aspects of the organization are
apparent in the following assumptions.
1.
truth.

Rationality is the only means by which one may find
The rational method is the only correct method, and

will necessarily result in efficiency and effectiveness.
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Rules are basic laws of the universe and result from natural
order.
2.

Time is cyclical.

All events are manifestations of

previous events and predictors of future events.
3.

Physical space is limited.

Both space and the

things that occupy space can be altered to achieve maximum
utilization.
4.

The universe is mechanistic in nature.

The

organization is a machine, the outputs of the organization
are machines, and the people in the organization are
machines which are components of the larger organizational
machine.

The mechanisms must be constantly monitored for

efficient operation.

Organizational hierarchies represent

the natural mechanical order in the universe.
5.

Problems are mechanical in nature and are defined

by their effects on the efficient operation of the machine.
Problems are solved by adjustment of the mechanisms or
replacement of the components.
6.

People are fundamentally neutral.

Their value must

be determined in relation to their function and efficiency.
7.

Humans are neither lazy nor hard working, they

simply respond to their environment.

Behavior is important

only to the extent that it is consistent with the efficient
functioning of the organization.
8.

People can be trained for any task within their

capability.

Capabilities are fixed at birth and are

absolute limitations on abilities.

People have an operating
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lifespan and will function effectively as long as they are
well maintained.

As people get older, they wear out and

become obsolete.

Newer models are better because they are

less worn and incorporate all the latest technology.
9.

Heroes solve problems.

Really big heroes are those

who solve really big problems.
10.

Human relationships are based on hierarchies of

functioning within the organizational mechanism.
Relationships based on other grounds tend to interfere with
operations.
11.

Communication should be rational and efficient.

Rituals are important if they follow operating

procedures.

Rituals that interfere with operations are

needless and possibly dangerous.

Rituals should symbolize

effective functioning, and efficient operating procedures.
The above cultural assessment indicates some severe
conflicts that may have a debilitating effect on the
organization.

Organizational functioning cannot possibly

continue smoothly when individuals operate on different
basic assumptions at different times.

In addition, two

individuals within the organization who are operating on
different sets of basic assumptions would have a difficult
time communicating because they would not understand each
other’s values.

It is entirely possible that most of the

communication problems that make up the consistent
complaints uncovered in the data were the result of the
conflicting sets of cultural assumptions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202
Within Electronics Division, the engineering cultural
framework was generally more predominant than the military
culture.

But certain elements of the military culture are

persistent in guiding managerial behavior.

These elements

tend to manifest themselves in strong tendencies to create
procedures, strong adherence to schedules, strong needs for
hierarchies and for symbols of status such as executive
dining rooms and private parking spaces, strong discipline,
strong control of information, and bold actions, even if
they are unrelated to the issue at hand.
The engineering cultural framework also reinforces the
tendency to create procedures to some extent.

But the

engineering framework also tends to define procedures as
obstacles to problem solving.

The tendency of the

engineering orientation is to use procedures only when they
are seen as critical to technical outcomes.

Also within the

engineering framework, there is much less emphasis on
meeting schedules and much more emphasis on control of the
organization and solving problems.

The engineering

framework encourages excessive attention to detail by senior
managers and incessant adjustment of organizational
mechanisms.

Many of the complaints registered by the

respondents were the result of unnecessary and inappropriate
tinkering with organizational processes by senior managers
who were reluctant to release control to lower levels of the
organization.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

203
One of the problems in implementing change within the
engineering framework is overcoming the strong need for
control that senior and middle level managers seem to feel.
Management controls, usually in the form of charts that show
progress toward specific goals, tend to take on a
ritualistic character within the engineering framework.
Once people within the organization have created these
controls and the mechanisms for updating them, they are
reluctant to change or release the controls and formulate
new ones.

One of the difficulties of implementing a program

such as the Ethics Program is that the nature of the changes
involved does not lend itself to the style of management
control typically seen at Electronics Division.

Conclusion
Planning procedures and contextual framework were in
place in the organization.

The strategic planning process

included an adequate assessment of the environment and the
context of the organization within the environment.

Plans

and performance to objectives were essentially communicated
to employees.

General Dynamics had what appeared to be an

adequate strategic and operational planning process.
The Ethics Program was created because of a business
need, but employees understood the program as a vehicle for
voicing complaints and raising concerns about human
resources issues as well as legal behavior.

Even though the

program should have been directed exclusively toward rules
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and rule following behavior, which is the definition of
morality within the organization, it became a process of
examination of morality within a broader, social context:
treating people with dignity and respect.

Internal surveys

and interviews indicated a consistently critical assessment
of the managers’ concern for employee welfare,

internal

communication, and the maintaining of a fair workplace.
The Ethics Program was initiated because of economic
pressures, but there is little doubt that its creators
intended to use it to make the organization into a better
organization.

In order to make General Dynamics a better

or, at least, a more ethical company, senior managers set
out to change the culture of the organization.

The

management controls used to monitor the Ethics Program
indicated that the program met its specific objectives.

But

the management controls used to monitor the organization
have shown little change in employee attitudes.

The most

viable explanation seems to be that the senior managers had
no operational understanding of the culture they were trying
to change.

If they had, it is reasonable to assume that

they would have set up some sort of system to bring about a
culture that reinforces ethical and humanistic values and
minimizes conflicting values.
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CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Results
The analysis of the documentation, surveys, and
interviews indicates that the planning process at General
Dynamics Corporation was generally a linear, rational, and
step-wise process.

The strategic plan addressed the four

issues of planning suggested by Byars (1984):

(1)

organizational identity,

(3) future

(2) business posture,

direction, and (4) strategy.

One pluralistic feature of the

planning process was the participation of the division
general managers in the development of business plans.
Plans were not directed from the top, but negotiated.
However, this feature was overridden at times by occasional
"nonnegotiable" planning elements, the Ethics Program for
example.

Although corporate level plans generally addressed

the three cultural uncertainties suggested by Tichy (1983),
technical, political, and cultural, there was little
evidence that political and cultural uncertainties were
addressed in any systematic way within Electronics Division.
The division was oriented toward technical uncertainties.
205
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Corporate mission statements placed the needs of
customers and shareholders before any other claims.
Corporate business strategies stressed both quality and cost
efficiency equally, a condition which both Schuler (1989)
and Emerson (1985) have suggested may be incompatible with
consistent human performance.

Corporate strategy seemed to

change somewhat from the strategy of innovative
differentiation as outlined by Porter (1980), wherein the
company captures the market through product innovation to a
strategy of cost leadership that requires maximum cost
efficiency.

The results suggest that parochial priorities

had not been controlled sufficiently to implement an
effective cost reduction strategy in Electronics Division.
The Ethics Program was clearly implemented as a result
of pressure from the environment, and may never have been
created otherwise.

The program was planned and executed

according to corporate policies and procedures.
Communication of the objectives of the Ethics Program was
extensive and well understood by the employees.

It is

entirely possible that employees expected the Ethics Program
to be something more than it was.

An equal possibility was

that Stan Pace envisioned the program as a broad, sweeping
reform of the cultural flaws that can result in both
purposeful and unintentional illegal behavior.

The broader

goal of the Ethics Program as stated in the introduction to
the handbook (Appendix H) was to involve every employee in
bringing a sense of honesty, fairness, and integrity to the
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job.

The introduction, written by Pace, also warns that the

future of the company depends on employees’ goodwill,
judgement, self-discipline, common sense, and integrity.

In

either case, the Ethics Program at General Dynamics became
symbolic of the efforts to eliminate legal and humanistic
wrongdoing.
The lessons that General Dynamics specified as having
learned from the development and implementation of the
Ethics Program, as noted in Chapter Four, generally
indicated that people are the major resource for the
successful implementation of such a program.

The program,

in turn, gave employees a mechanism for voicing their
complaints, although some indicated their reluctance to use
the communication channels for fear of reprisals.
Employees using the communication channels established
for the program were primarily concerned with unclassified
employee and personal relationship questions not
specifically covered by the program.

Some communications

were concerned with program parameters like time card
reporting, suppliers and consultants, the use of company and
customer resources, and gifts, gratuities, and
entertainment.
Results from the surveys and interviews indicated that
the Ethics Program was successful in meeting its objectives
of communicating the rules and standards of conduct and
improving the company’s image.

But the broader goal of

creating a working environment that is founded on humanistic
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treatment, personal dignity, and mutual respect was not
realized within Electronics Division in the period of the
study.
"Despite the apparent success in attaining the specific
objectives of the Ethics Program, there seemed to be little
change in employee attitudes in Electronics Division.
Employees indicated that they felt their senior managers had
no concern for the welfare of themselves or the community.
In addition, they indicated that, although they liked their
jobs and liked working for General Dynamics, they were
basically unhappy.

Sources of unhappiness seemed to be

widespread internal conflict, management ineffectiveness,
organizational inefficiency, and insufficient communication
of a direction for the division.

Regardless of the

progressive status reports, there has been little, if any,
change in the areas that concerned employees the most.

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine how persons
in leading positions can realistically expect to plan and
implement a significant, planned organizational change.

I

undertook the investigation of three questions to fulfill
this purpose using organizational change at General Dynamics
from the period of 1985 to 1988.

The Ethics Program was

used as a case example of significant, planned
organizational change and was investigated within the
context of ether organizational changes and processes.
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three questions were the following:

(1) What changes took

place at General Dynamics between 1985 and 1988?
the changes the result of the strategic plan?

(2) Were

(3) Was the

Ethics Program successful in meeting its specific objectives
and its broader goals?
Changes Between 1985 and 1988
Considering the first question, the changes at General
Dynamics can be identified fairly easily.

During the period

between 1985 and 1988, the company enhanced its reputation
both with its employees and with its customers.

Although

most of the changes observed were brought about by business
plans and economic directions, many actions within the
company were undertaken to improve problematic conditions
that surfaced as a result of the corporatewide survey.
Although the changes may have been ineffective or
insufficient from the employees’ perspective, findings
indicate that significant and meaningful changes have been
incorporated into management practices within senior and
middle levels.

Some managers have used the program as

leverage to enforce their sense of morality and fairness,
and the managers who would knowingly violate the rules are
at least forced to maintain an appearance of conformity.
There have been changes in the company’s ways of doing
business.

As mentioned by several of the planning group

respondents, the company has made it a common practice to
disclose accounting and procedural mistakes to the
government when these are discovered.

The previous attitude
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in the company was "if General Dynamics employees made a
mistake, it was up to the government to uncover the error."
Various product line and business related strategies have
been strongly influenced by the Ethics Program.

For

example, many small spares and repairs contracts that were
readily accepted before have been refused by the company
because the nature of the cost reimbursement methods can
easily result in actual item costs that exceed the
reasonable market value of the item.

Many other requests

for proposals on new programs have been declined by the
company because the program specifications would have
required excessively expensive engineering or product
testing.

In both cases, the contracts were declined because

the company has been sensitive to the appearance of
overcharging the government.

The environmental pressure

that fostered the creation of the Ethics Program because of
excessive overcharging has awakened the company to cost
efficiency issues.
More specifically related to the Ethics Program,
methods of charging work or expenses to the government that
were commonly accepted ways of doing business by both the
company and the Defense Department that were not necessarily
in the best interest of the taxpayer have been eliminated
altogether.

Many of these methods were considered expedient

ways of operating, and were not conscious cheating.
those methods were deliberate cheating.

Some of

The awareness of

both the inappropriate practices and the appearance of
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wrongdoing had been heightened in the customers as well as
within the company.
Many changes have occurred that were unrelated, or
marginally related, to the Ethics Program.

An internal

audit program called the Management Effectiveness Program
was implemented in 1985 to review the adequacy and
effectiveness of policies and procedures in the divisions.
In 1985, this program was directed by Corporate Headquarters
which specified certain questions to be answered by each
division about its operations, and specified certain actions
to be taken.

The Management Effectiveness Program underwent

changes in focus each successive year as it identified and
solved various organizational problems.

By 1989,

Electronics Division had developed to the point where it
created its own effectiveness goals and reported its
progress to Corporate Headquarters.
A flexible benefits program was implemented in 1988
reportedly because employees requested such a program
through the 1986 survey.
planning group respondent,

A more likely reason, shared by a
for implementing the flexible

benefits program was to provide the company with a mechanism
to have employees share in health insurance costs.

Without

this mechanism, the company would have been forced to cancel
benefits to control costs.

At least the program allowed

employees to choose which benefits they would be willing to
pay for.
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A major organizational restructuring of Electronics
Division was created by two separate events:

the

implementation of MRP II and focused business units.

MRP II

affected Material and Operations departments primarily and
was designed to increase material procurement and shop floor
control efficiency.

MRP II required some major changes in

the way business was conducted within the division.
Primarily, the required changes centered on following
procedures more strictly.

The engineering propensity for

tinkering with the organization had, over time, established
a pattern of working around existing control systems to
resolve problems.

Senior and middle level managers

frequently ordered employees to use shortcuts to existing
procedures to resolve a production crisis.

The employees

who actually did the work generally resisted the shortcuts,
but were overruled by senior managers.

The shortcuts

normally precluded updating of records because record
keeping is the greatest time consumer and least contributor
toward meeting production schedules.

As a result, records

were generally inaccurate.
MRP II cannot function properly with inaccurate
records.

Therefore, record accuracy had become a focus of

awareness at Electronics Division because of the MRP II
system implementation.

The awareness of the importance of

accuracy and record keeping probably enhanced or was
enhanced by the main thrust of the Ethics Program which
emphasized the accurate keeping of financial records.

These
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two forces working in tandem seemed to enhance their
effectiveness.
In addition to supporting the objectives of the Ethics
Program, MRP II forced some simplification of organizational
structures to accommodate its relatively inflexible input
and maintenance requirements.

MRP II requires considerable

communication and coordination between departmental
functions that have major responsibilities for updating the
system.

The system organizations in the Operations

Department and in the Material Department were streamlined
and consolidated to accommodate the system.

In tandem with

this reorganization was another reorganization (focused
business units) that was unrelated to MRP II system
requirements.

The reorganization of Electronics Division

into focused business units was completed in May, 1989 after
a year of planning and preparation.

The focused business

unit concept was thought by senior managers to increase
division cost competitiveness, but was criticised by
respondents in the cultural group and the planning group as
a source of internal conflict and an "us-them" attitude of
separation and internal competition.
The focused business unit organization essentially
created three organizations out of one organization.

Each

organization was supposed to be largely independent of the
others except for certain centralized administrative
functions.

The full impact of this change could not be

evaluated properly within the time frame of the study.
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However, initial reactions by interview respondents were
decidedly negative.

This may be partly the result of the

strict secrecy of the planning process and the minimal and
cryptic communication of the organizational changes and
their meanings.
Another change that began late in 1988, again as a
result of pressure from the Department of Defense, was the
implementation of a program called Total Quality Management
(TQM) which is based on the theories and practice of
Japanese-style management and emphasizes quality
enhancement.

The TQM program had not progressed to the

stage where it could have been evaluated within the scope of
the study.

However,

although guarded.

initial reactions to TQM were positive,

Respondents felt that TQM would

ultimately bring about the sort of humanistic changes that
many had hoped for as a result of the Ethics Program.

Some

of the respondents were sceptical that any humanistic
changes could be implemented in the division regardless of
the nature of the program.
The Strategic Plan
Were the changes the result of the strategic plan?

In

answer to the second question, the changes listed previously
originated in corporate strategic objectives.

The company’s

approach to strategic planning was well ordered and
environmentally based.

Senior managers were consistent in

their adoption of corporate strategic objectives.

Division

level objectives were printed on flyers and widely
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distributed throughout the division.

Employees who

responded to interview questions were familiar with the
objectives, but they did not seem to believe that the
objectives pertaining to employee development were anything
more than empty words.
General Dynamics had gained some competitive advantage
over other aerospace companies during the time under study.
But there seemed to be some confusion, especially within
Electronics Division, over the conflicting objectives of a
quality enhancement strategy and a cost competitive
strategy.

According to Schuler (1989), cost reduction

strategies require repetitive and predictable behavior from
employees, little or no expensive employee training, short
term and results oriented focus, a high concern for quantity
and a modest concern for quality, a good deal of employee
autonomy and independence, and an atmosphere of stability
and low risk taking.

On the other hand, quality enhancement

strategies require cooperative behavior, continuous employee
training, long term and process orientation rather than
short term results orientation, a high concern for quality
and a modest concern for quantity, high levels of employee
participation, and job security.

The type of organizational

environment required for successful implementation of a cost
competitive strategy in many ways is diametrically opposed
to the type of organizational environment required for a
quality enhancement strategy.

There is no reasonable way to
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expect that both strategies could be implemented in the same
organization at the same time.
The confusion caused by alternate emphases of quality
and cost reduction is evident in the respondents’
assessments of the organization.

Employees surveyed and

interviewed consistently criticized the division for
inefficiency,

ineffective planning, and conflict between

departments.

The most likely explanation for this response

is that of conflicting strategies.

As Emerson (1985)

warned, inappropriate matches of strategies can result in
partial and ineffective change plans which frustrate both
the managers and the people who work for them.
The only element that the two strategies have in common
is that employees should feel some level of job security to
allow them to work effectively without feeling preoccupied
with uncertainties.

But the area about which the cultural

group was most critical was that of job security.

Division

activities in 1988 included the transfer of work to low cost
manufacturing facilities out of the geographic area and
subsequent reductions in force.

Employees losing their jobs

were reassured in the formal announcement of the reductions
that the division financial position would be greatly
improved by the move.

Since the knowledge of division

financial strength had little meaning to employees about to
lose their source of livelihood, it was no wonder that
individuals interviewed felt that senior managers had little
concern for employees’ welfare.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217
Part of the problem may have been in the presentation
of the various programs.

Although corporate level

communication of change plans was regular and consistent,
division level communication was left to peripheral
individuals who were delegated that task.

Senior management

participation in the communications was minimal.

Often the

communication of strategic plans by division employees was
misleading and confusing for two possible reasons:

the

communicators did not thoroughly understand the programs and
the proposed functioning, and the communicators may have
embellished the objectives of the plans with their own
personal values and objectives.

It was clear that there

were differences in expectations of the outcomes of the
Ethics Program between respondents in the planning group who
were close to the development of the program and the
respondents of the cultural group who received information
about the program third or fourth hand.

The differences in

expectations is probably the result of incomplete and
inconsistent communication of the details of the programs.
Many of the programs implemented by Electronics
Division,

in the opinion of the cultural group, were

implemented because they were ordered by corporate
executives and not because they were priorities with senior
division managers.

Planning and goal setting at the

division level was more a ritual game of satisficing than an
exercise in directing the organization.

Therefore, there

was little consideration given to the fit between the plans
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of the organization and the beliefs, values, and practices
of the members of the organization.

While Electronics

Division should have been an integrated culture, defined by
Earnest (1985) as oriented toward problem solving, or an
entrepreneurial culture, defined by Earnest as oriented
toward product development, to handle the implementation of
its plans, the division was actually more of a systematized
culture which is characterized by a reactive management
style and nonparticipative employees.

Electronics Division

was focused on routine work, operating procedures, and
external regulations also characteristic of a systematized
culture.

The introduction of the MRP II system, for

example, although implemented according to recommendations
specified by Melnyk and Gonzales (1987) regarding record
accuracy and technical support, was not supported by other
appropriate cultural conditions:

cooperation among

Engineering, Production, Material, and Marketing
departments, standardized information, and limitations on
status reporting such as shortage reporting.
While Electronics Division had some elements of the
appropriate cultural conditions, there was no consistent
cultural orientation to support the various programs.

In

fact, some of the programs seemed to require cultural
conditions that conflicted with those required by other
programs.

The majority of program development was normally

conducted at Corporate Headquarters by specific individuals
assigned to that task.

If major programs were in
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development at the same time, different individuals worked
on the different programs and did not coordinate with each
other to determine whether or not the cultural conditions
necessary for implementation were conflicting.

Further, the

program developers rarely, if ever, determined what sort of
cultural conditions were necessary and if they were
different from existing conditions.
Presumably, the program crusaders who were assigned to
implement the program within the divisions had some
understanding of the cultural conditions within the
division.

But the organizational noise apparent in the

results of this study indicated that the crusaders assigned
to carry out the program within the division may have been
more strongly influenced by parochial priorities of senior
managers than by cultural conditions.
Managers at Electronics Division tended to choose a
view of the future and then go look for supporting data.
Perceptions of the organization and its direction were
generally not influenced by what employees wanted or felt
about the organization.

The supporting data were usually

presented in status reports that were created to support the
intention of the objective and not to represent the actual
state of the organization.

In other words, the charts

usually indicated progress toward objectives that was not
actually present in the organization.

Planning at

Electronics Division was used primarily to reduce anxiety
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about the future and to give senior managers the illusion of
control.
A meaningful assessment of the relationship of the
changes in the company and the strategic objectives must
include an assessment of what has not changed.

The elements

of the strategic plan that allude to company managers’
responsibility to provide an environment that respects the
rights and dignity of the workforce, to provide human
resource programs that emphasize training, and to be
sensitive and responsive to the diverse needs of the
workforce have not apparently resulted in any identifiable
changes at Electronics Division.

Although the Ethics

Program was intended and expected to bring about such
changes, it has proven to be an inadequate vehicle.
That is not to say that senior managers at Electronics
Division have not taken action to implement the objectives
of the Ethics Program, but the action has generally been
ineffective or inappropriate.

A common organizational

analysis approach to the situation would be to condemn
senior division managers as incompetent.

But senior

managers at Electronics Division, as well as in other areas
of the corporation, are not necessarily to blame for the
lack of humanistic change.

The reward systems to which they

operate would, by themselves, eliminate the possibility of
the sort of humanistic changes that employees seemed to
expect.

Managers were rewarded for their achievement of

specific financial and performance goals, and not for their
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congeniality.

When production goals have to be met,

sometimes managers order employees to work harder or longer
even if the employees think that is unfair.

Planning

systems in place at General Dynamics tended to support some
planning objectives with appropriate reward incentives, but
they also tended to leave other objectives with little or no
appropriate support system.
For example, the training program at Electronics
Division required 20 hours per year of training for all
hourly employees, 30 hours per year for all salaried
professionals, and 40 hours per year for all supervisors and
managers.

This program, which required a considerable

commitment of division resources (perhaps as much as $1.5
million per year), was an obvious implementation of a
corporate strategic objective to develop and train
employees.

The program did not specify what the training

should be for; the individual departments and supervisors
were left with that decision.

The senior managers only

reviewed charts that indicated how many hours each
department had spent in training.

Managers were evaluated

on whether or not they met their targets of the number of
hours of training, but were not evaluated on whether or not
that training did them any good.
A

manager operating within engineering cultural

framework relies on the assumption that a machine that has
been properly designed will function properly.

There is

little or no thought given by the engineer to the practical
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or social implications of that machine’s operation.

The

problem for the manager from an engineering cultural
perspective is to design an organization to meet the
specifications of operation.

The training program mentioned

above was designed to solve the problem of meeting the
strategic training objective by providing time commitment
specifications and resources, but it was not designed to
make the training meaningful to the people involved or,
ultimately, to meet the needs of the organization.
Meaningful understanding of the diverse needs of the
workforce would require face-to-face interaction among the
people in the organization.

A good engineer knows that

maintenance of a machine is both expensive and inefficient
if the technician has to constantly check each component of
the machine.

Therefore, the good engineer will construct

remote monitors so efficient operation of the machine can be
checked without direct contact with all the components.
Most of the senior managers in Electronics Division, as well
as throughout the corporation, have been promoted because of
their engineering skills.

Therefore, the most prevalent

rituals among managers are status reporting rituals which
are designed to monitor the detailed operation and
performance of the organization without requiring contact
with any but a few of the people in the organization.
Not surprisingly, the senior managers in the division
who do not have engineering backgrounds have tended to
criticize the common methods of status reporting as too
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expensive and inefficient, and not conducive to human
relations or direct communication.

The engineering cultural

orientation tends to exclude contact between senior managers
and employees to the extent that most senior managers have
little or no idea what the diverse fieeds of the employees
are, and much less how to address them.
Close analysis of the change process at Electronics
Division supports the conclusion that the engineering
culture has not been modified sufficiently to accommodate
the strategic objectives involving human resources goals.
This analysis also suggests that until there is a decisive
and direct effort to change the conflicting basic
assumptions of the two cultural orientations in the
organization, there will probably be no change in the work
environment in the directions implied by the strategic
objectives, and the planning process will be only partially
effective.
The Effectiveness of the Ethics Program
The third research question must be answered in two
parts:

the first part addressing the specific objectives of

the Ethics Program, and the second part addressing the
broader goals of the Ethics Program.

The question must be

answered in two parts because there appears to be two
separate answers:

General Dynamics was successful in

achieving the specific objectives of the Ethics Program, but
unsuccessful in accomplishing its broader goals.
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The specific objectives of the Ethics Program can be
characterized by the actual standards listed in the
handbook.

The Ethics Program was designed to address an

immediate problem of behavioral improprieties that resulted
in both deliberate and unintentional misuse of public funds
and violation of public trust.

Because investigations

uncovered the fact that most reported violations were either
unintentional or previously acceptable ways of doing
business that were no longer acceptable, the program’s
specific objectives were to make the rules clear to
employees and to emphasize the importance of following the
rules.

Ethics Program developers did not appear to have

assumed that deliberate wrongdoing was prevalent in the
organization.
Even though interview respondents suggested a
reluctance to blow the whistle if they encountered some
wrongdoing because it might come back to hurt them in some
way, evidence suggests that the amount of wrongdoing, both
intentional and unintentional, has diminished substantially.
Numerous check and balance systems have been established to
flag violations of the standards.

The wrongdoing discussed

during the interviews tended to focus on unfair treatment
and not on law breaking.

Employees are certainly aware of

the standards and the consequences of not meeting the
standards.

From a standpoint of following the rules,

General Dynamics has become an ethical organization.
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The second part of the question of success of the
Ethics Program has to do with the broader goals implied by
the presentation of the program to employees.

The broader

goals of the program implied by the introductory sections of
the handbook were to make the work environment more
conducive to individual dignity and mutual respect, and to
promote fair treatment of employees by their managers and
supervisors.

The evidence suggests that these broader goals

were not met, and some of the interview respondents were
willing to characterize the organization as unethical
because it had not met these broader goals.
The first issue of discussion is whether the Ethics
Program was intended by its creators to actually meet these
broader goals, or if the concept of mutual respect and fair
treatment wa^ used as a tool to promote the program.
Because humanistic treatment is consistent with most
people’s idea of ethical behavior, the elements of humanism
may have been included more as supportive framework for the
program rather than as its actual goals.

It is entirely

possible that the humanistic language of the handbook was a
sales ploy to encourage people to follow the rules.
All programs examined during the course of this study
have been accompanied by some sort of sales package.

The

Ethics Program was sold to employees using two arguments:
being ethical is good business, and being ethical will
enhance the quality of work life.

Both arguments have

substantial emotional and intellectual appeal to the target
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audience.

All employees interviewed recognized that the

Ethics Program was necessary to ensure the financial
well-being of the company.

Since most employees at

Electronics Division were concerned about their job
security, the appeal of this concept is obvious.

Survey

data revealed that most Electronics Division employees felt
that the quality of work life within the organization was
generally less that satisfactory, therefore the appeal of
this argument is also easy to understand.
The second issue of discussion is whether or not the
use of this selling technique for the Ethics Program was
appropriate.

There is no obvious criticism of the technique

used to sell the Ethics Program except that it seemed to
have raised employees’ expectations unrealistically.

A

program such as the Ethics Program cannot realistically be
expected to make quality of work life improvements that are
not specifically related to the standards.

And none of the

standards specifically require the fair and humanistic
treatment of employees by supervisors.

Not only would fair

and humanistic treatment be impossible to define, but any
definition would be undesirable in situations where
supervisors are pressured to ask employees to do some "dirty
work."

For example, one employee might consider a request

to work overtime to meet a schedule a fair and reasonable
request while another employee might not.
Most important issues of fairness and treatment of
employees are covered by local, state, and federal laws and
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the programs that General Dynamics has implemented to abide
by the laws, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Program.

When Ethics Program creators compiled the

handbook, they most likely assumed that employees would use
existing grievance procedures and programs and that the
globular statements of humanistic treatment would simply
communicate the senior executives commitment to supporting
those programs.

The broader goals of the Ethics Program as

understood by respondents were probably not intended by
program creators as measurable objectives, but rather as
general attitudes.
The arguments used to sell the Ethics Program probably
should have been qualified by statements of limitations.
Even though senior executives may not have actually expected
humanistic treatment to supersede organizational tasks and
priorities that enhanced the company’s ability to conduct
business, employees at lower levels of the organization
clearly expected fair treatment to become their supervisors’
number one priority as a result of the Ethics Program.
Aside from answering the specific research questions,
the Ethics Program can be evaluated by using the models
explored in Chapter Two.

The implementation of the Ethics

Program can be evaluated using the factors developed by
Franklin (1976) which are characteristic of successful
changes.

Innovation is an important identity factor at

General Dynamics, but the innovation that General Dynamics
usually undertook was primarily in technological areas, not
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in human resource areas.

The company executives did contact

external agents prior to implementing the changes envisioned
by the Ethics Program.

The program focused on specific

rather than general problems, and used survey feedback as
one method of self-evaluation.

Top corporate managers were

very visible in their support of the program and their
commitment to its success.

The changes were part of a total

development effort and were scheduled for completion in less
than four years from development.
agents were carefully selected.

And, the internal change
Based on these criteria,

the Ethics Program essentially followed the pattern of
successful change efforts.
However, both Dunn and Swierezek (1977) and Friedlander
and Brown (1974) might have predicted that the Ethics
Program would not be successful because it was a directed
change rather than a participative change.

In addition,

General Dynamics tended to follow a pattern for unsuccessful
change articulated by Phillips (1986):

The CEO decided to

commit to a new strategy, proceeded to change the
organization in a manner consistent with the new strategy,
announced and publicly supported the proposed changes, but
then withdrew to let the division managers take over.
Normally, according to Phillips, this pattern results in the
change rapidly disintegrating because there is no mechanism
for coping with parochial priorities, habitual behavior, and
current distributions of power and influence.

However, at

General Dynamics, it is likely that the potentially
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detrimental effects of this pattern were offset by the
recognition on the part of the general managers that the
change was necessary to the survival of the organization
and, therefore, they subsequently committed their full
support.
The organization did meet most of the six criteria of
successful change suggested by Phillips:

(1) communication

of what needed to be changed at all levels of the
organization,
operation,
procedures,

(2) early demonstration of new methods of

(3) appropriate changes in standard operating
(4) the highly visible role of the CEO for

extended periods of time,

(5) the continuous emphasis placed

on the positive aspects of the program through rewards and
incentives, and (6) the change becoming the agenda of senior
managers.

The only two

according to survey and
and sixth criteria.

criteria that may not

interview results would bethe fifth

The underlying assumption that appeared

to have accompanied the

implementation of the

that if employees knew the right thing to
it.

havebeen met,

do,

program was
theywould do

Senior managers in the company depended on the personal

pride and sense of morality of the employees to motivate
them to change, and backed the intended changes by the real
threat of discipline if they did not.

Interview results

indicated that some respondents doubted whether senior
division managers had actually made ethical behavior a part
of their agenda.

In defense of the senior managers, there

is little doubt that they made, at least, the appearance of
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ethical behavior a part of their agenda.

However, although

the CEO was perceived by respondents to personify the norms
and values targeted by the Ethics Program, the division
senior managers were not.
General Dynamics Corporation in general and Electronics
Division in particular have done a good job of structuring
the goals and objectives of the organization to reinforce
the rules and standards of the Ethics Program.

It was clear

to all employees questioned during the course of the study
and many more encountered during my normal work day that
when an employee of General Dynamics acts on behalf of the
company, he or she must follow the standards specified in
the ethics handbook.

The broader goals of the Ethics

Program to foster human decency and mutual respect have not
been so clearly supported by the results.

Recommendations For Further Research
The present study was severely limited by time,
resources, and access.

It would certainly have been more

meaningful if more divisions were included.

Comparison of

the cultural assumptions in different divisions which were
more oriented toward human relations than Electronics
Division would have been most instructive.
Logistics and cost limitations prevented me from
exploring the actual motivations of the senior executives in
General Dynamics who were responsible for the actual
development of the Ethics Program.

Future research should
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be designed to include an assessment of the thought
processes that result in the packaging of such a program for
consumption by employees.

It would be instructive to know

if Stan Pace actually intended the broader goals that were
implied by the communications from him.
More research is needed in the assessment of how large
structural changes are affected by their trip down the chain
of command.

Regardless of what Stan Pace intended, the

program was presented to employees by corporate and division
communicators with their own agendas, values, and
priorities.

And more research is needed into the

translation of symbolic action into collective action by
members of large, complex groups.

I would suggest that

future research focus on comparisons of large and small
organizations.

Based on my findings, I would expect

employees in smaller organizations to exhibit more realistic
expectations of an ethics program’s objectives.
Larger organizations may be too complex to be easily
characterized by consistent trends of thought and behavior.
It is entirely possible that what appears to be a single
large organization is really a multitude of small
organizations.

The focus of the present research was on a

relatively large and diverse organization.

Future research

might be more informative if it examined the longitudinal
change within a smaller, more stable group (less than 100
employees).
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Future research should also be directed at the
seemingly prevailing conflict between the need for profits
and human resources needs.

This particular issue has not

been adequately defined or explored.

My impression has been

that nearly all research in human resources areas has been
befuddled to some extent by this conflict.

Conclusion
General Dynamics managers embody at least two
conflicting sets of cultural assumptions and values:
military and engineering.

Both of these cultural

orientations characterize people as usable and disposable
objects and are inconsistent with the social values
associated with assumptions of the sanctity of life and the
infinite worth of human beings which are the end values one
can suppose from the objectives of the strategic plan and
its implementation vehicle.
The most significant source of negative feelings in the
respondents discussed through the course of this study seems
to have been the intrinsic conflict encountered by any
business that attempts to adopt a higher level of social
consciousness while still trying to make a profit.

In

addition to the natural conflict of trying to compete while
following rules that competitors do not necessarily follow,
there was a serious and potentially dysfunctional conflict
between different and distinct sets of organizational values
and basic assumptions.

These conflicting cultural values
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can point the organization in conflicting directions and
exert pressure on organizational members to conform to
conflicting behavioral standards.
Because the level of employee participation in planning
and decision making was very low within the division, senior
division managers rarely had the opportunity to get a feel
of the actual workings of the organization.

In addition,

employees were left on their own to guess what values and
assumptions had been applied to what decisions.

Because the

process of decision making was kept strictly secret from the
rank and file and because the decisions themselves were
rarely announced until the last possible moment, employees
felt little or no loyalty to division managers and no
particular obligation to follow their decisions.
Employees understand clearly that their business role
is separate from their social responsibility and that
socially responsible action is not cost effective (Ackerman,
1973).

But employees also understand that breaking the

rules can lead to a withdrawal of the legitimacy of the
organization by the nesting society.

Although the standards

imposed by the Ethics Program were certainly incorporated
into organizational goals, high level decision making, and
long range planning, for many employees in the division they
were not as pervasive in operating plans, day-to-day
decision making, and coordination of activities.

General

Dynamics tended to treat social responsibility as an
environmental factor and was concerned primarily with
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adaptation— change for business reasons and not because it
is the socially correct thing to do.
Despite the clear communication of the standards,

it

was commonly recognized among study participants that
whistleblowing was still considered undesirable social
behavior by those who had the power and influence to create
negative outcomes for the whistleblower.

Rather than report

many potentially unethical behaviors, employees would
probably force themselves to be apathetic, a condition which
could seriously affect the performance of the organization.
The Ethics Program was incomplete in that it did not include
a supportive system for encouraging whistleblowing and
protecting the whistleblowers.
The dilemma is not an easy one to resolve.

The company

must do the right thing by society or face losing its
existence.

On the other hand, the company must compete

successfully for business or face the same end.

General

Dynamics undertook a bold, albeit forced, measure to adopt
the Ethics Program.

The program consumed a considerable

portion of the company’s resources.

In addition to taking

the time and energy of many of the company’s key employees,
the cost easily topped five million dollars during the three
year period of the study for development, communication, and
training.

In return, the company had won back a good deal

of lost public and customer confidence.
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics appeared to have
incorporated two separate and mutually exclusive ethical
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philosophies.

The first philosophy was used to develop the

standards, and was based on the assumption that there is an
ultimate, absolute, and categorical truth to which rules can
be applied.

The result of the application of this

philosophy was an expectation of absolute conformance to the
rules, and the assumption that all moral problems can be
resolved with a correct answer.

The answer to any moral

dilemma should be able to be presented to any reasonable
forum and receive a consensus.

The limitation of this

philosophy is the limitless exceptions that the rules must
accommodate.

Company executives planned for implementation

of this philosophy by holding training sessions for all
employees.

The training sessions were supposed to provide

employees with tools and techniques for grappling with the
exceptions.
The second philosophy was used to present the merits of
the program and sell it to employees, and was based on the
assumption that right behavior benefits the greatest number
of people.

The result of the application of this philosophy

was an expectation that the program would ultimately benefit
all concerned.

The company presented the program as the

right thing to do because all employees would profit from
the long term effects of the program by keeping their jobs,
and the communit 3r of taxpayers would benefit by the receipt
of quality products at fair prices.

It is this philosophy

that most likely led to employees’ expectations that their
quality of life should improve as a result of the program.
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The inherent conflict between a categorical imperative
and a utilitarian ideal has led to confusion among employees
and executives over what the program can ultimately be
expected to do.

Presenting a program that promotes moral

behavior because it is a good business practice implies *h?t
rules should be followed because the rule follower can
achieve a

ersonal gain.

Tf right behavior has reward as

its ultimate goal, then one may be justified in
discontinuing the behavior if the reward is not forthcoming.
The conflict between philosophies manifests itself in a
choice between behavior that will increase profits and
behavior which is altruistic.
Ultimately, the organizational noise is created by
those who have adopted the reward incentives, but do not
feel they have received the reward.

Simply being able to

keep one’s job is not, apparently, sufficient reward.
Employees tend to expect a higher quality of life on the
job.

Upon implementing an ethics program, organizations

must choose whether to promote the program as a categorical
imperative, that the law is the law, or whether it is, or
should be, an integral part of community life and entwined
within the culture of the organization.

If the program is

presented as a categorical imperative, then the General
Dynamics Ethics Program is an appropriate model.

If the

program is desired by executives to improve community
relations within the organizational community, then the
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changes must be broader and more profound than those
accomplished by the General Dynamics program.
The process of gathering data in an organization that
has historically been extraordinarily sensitive to the
release of information to anyone who might release that
information to the outside world was fraught with
frustrations and peril.

I would not have been able to

conduct this study to the depth that I did if I were not a
long term, and reasonably trusted employee.

To some extent,

I am sure that I violated that trust in the eyes of certain
individuals who characteristically feel that nothing
negative should ever be reported about them or their
actions.
The study would have taken a different flavor entirely
if it were conducted by persons from outside the
organization for two reasons:

they would not have been

biased by a history of personal experience with the
organization and its members, and they would not have had
the insight into many small but meaningful actions and
eventa that is gained only through extensive experience with
the organization and its members.
I feel the conclusions I have reached are valid to the
extent that they support my experience as a long time
employee.

Although it would be presumptive to present these

conclusions as generalizable to other organizations because
of the limitations inherent in the data, I cannot help but
feel that my experience of certain organizational processes
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are consistent with those of other people in other
organizations.

I would imagine that conflicting cultural

values within one organization are the rule rather than the
exception.

The miscommunication of program objectives, the

misunderstandings of those communications, and the
unrealistic expectations that tend to characterize the hope
of every person for a better life are present everywhere.
The Ethics Program at General Dynamics was seen by employees
as the potential means to a better future.
to them that way.

It was presented

Is that not the hope that people have for

every community program?
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APPENDIX B

April 1983 Survey
1.

What is your idea of the function of the following
departments:
a.

Production Scheduling

b.

Program Control

c.

Production Control

2.

What are the strengths of those three departments?

3.

What are the common problems?

4.

What are the interface problems?

5.

What duplications of effort do you think exist?

6.

What needs are not satisfied?

7.

What suggestions do you have for improvement?
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A P P E N D IX C

June 1989 Survey

EMPLOYEE SURVEY
MATERIAL DEPARTMENT
PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING AN X OVER YOUR CHOICE.
DO NOT
PUT YOUR NAME OR ANY OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS ON THE PAPER. “ "F" YOU
ARE THROUGH, PLACE SHEET IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND SEAL IT.
X.

HOW GOOD A JOB IS BEING DONE BY THE GDE GENERAL MANAGER?
1-VERY GOOD
2-GOOD 3-SO-SO
4-POOR
5-VERY POOR

2.

HOW GOOD A JOB IS BEING DONE BY THE DIRECTOR/VP OF MATERIAL?
1-VERY GOOD
2-GOOD 3-SO-SO
4-POOR
5-VERY POOR

3.

HOW GOOD A JOB IS BEING DONE BY YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR?
1-VERY GOOD
2—GOOD 3-SO-SO
4-POOR
5-VERY POOR

4.

ALL IN ALL, MY DIVISION IS AN EFFECTIVELY MANAGED, WELL RUN
ORGANIZATION.
1— STRONGLY AGREE
2-AGREE 3—NEITHER
4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY

DISAGREE

DECISIONS HERE ARE USUALLY MADE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.
1-STRONGLY AGREE
2-AGREE 3-NEITHER
4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY

DISAGREE

5.
6.

MANAGEMENT WHERE I WORK CHANGES THEIR MIND SO OFTEN ABOUT WHAT IT
WANTS, THAT IT SERIOUSLY INTERFERS WITH GETTING THE JOB DONE.
1-STRONGLY AGREE
2-AGREE 3-NEITHER
4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE

7.

HOW WOULD YOU RATE GDE ON HAVING A CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION?
1 -VERY GOOD
2-GOOD 3-SO-SO
4-POOR
5-VERY POOR

8.

THE WAY WE ARE ORGANIZED AND STRUCTURED IN MY PART OF THE DIVISION
IS WELL SUITED TO THE WORK BEING DONE.
1-STRONGLY AGREE
2-AGREE 3-NEITHER
4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE

9.

I UNDERSTAND PROMOTION POLICIES FOR EMPLOYEES LIKE ME.
1-STRONGLY AGREE
2-AGREE 3-NEITHER
4-DISAGREE 5-STRONGLY

DISAGREE

10. I HAVE RECEIVED ENOUGH FEEDBACK FROM MY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR.
1-STRONGLY AGREE
2-AGREE 3-NEITHER'
4-DISAGRFE 5-STRONGLY DISAGREE
11. IF CONDITIONS WERE CHANGED WHERE YOU WORK, HOW MUCH WOULD YOU SAY
YOU COULD PERSONNALY IMPROVE YOUR PERFORMANCE?
1 —A GREAT DEAL 2-QUITE A BIT 3-SOMEWHAT 4-A LITTLE 5-NONE
12. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF WORK YOU ARE EXPECTED TO DO?
1-MUCH TOO MUCH 2-TOO MUCH 3-RIGHT 4-TOO LITTLE 5-MUCH TOO LITTLE
13. HOW WOULD YOU RATE GDE ON HAVING A COOPERATIVE ATMOSPHERE, I.E.,
VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS WORKING WELL TOGETHER?
1-VERY GOOD 2-GOOD 3-SO-SO
4-POOR
5-VERY POOR
14. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EMPHASIS ON CORRECTING POOR EMPLOYEE
PERFORMANCE WHERE YOU WORK?
1-MUCH TOO MUCH 2-TOO MUCH 3-RIGHT 4-TOO LITTLE 5-MUCH TOO LITTLE
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A P P E N D IX D

February 1989 Engineering Survey

1.

Does your s u p tv ia o r regularly report to you with information on the following:
I— I Division Staff Meetings
□ Major Policy Changes
I ~1 R4E Staff Meetings
C 3 Programmatic Developments
C D Organizational Changes
If so, is it reported in a timely manner? |— | Yes

I— I fb

2. Do you reoulariv read:
□
The Current
1— I GO IVorid

□
□

NMA MAGS
CRA Newsletter

3. Have you ever utilized these media as a (brum for personal expression, i.e. letters to the editor?
I— I Yes

I— I N j

If yes, how often?_______________________________________________

4. Do you consider communications inprovement suggestions during your daily work routine?
□

Yes

I— I No

How many o f these suggestions have you submitted to your supervisor (approved or unapproved)
within the past year? _______________________________________________________________
5. Are you cognizant o f the following important phone numbers within the division and/or Corporation:
I— I Ethics

O

S ecurity

□

Safety

□

Job Opportunities

How many times have you used them within the past year? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
6. Which of the following sources of information do you feel are routinely displayed or accessible
within your department:
□
□
□
□

GD Daily News Summary
NMA Flyers
Division “Standard
Distribution* memos
Job Postings

a
a
□
□
□

Union Announcements .
Special Activities Pasters
CRA Newsletter
Training/Course Opportunities
Labor Accounting Updates

'Employees indicate there is insufficient feedback to and from their immediate supervisor
on division and Company information, and insufficient effort by management to get
employee ideas on work matters.'
Sirota and Alper Associates Inc.; 1986 Survey o f Employees
GD World, Special Corporatewide Edition, July 1987
7. Do you believe the above paragraph to be true today? I I Yes I
I No
If yes, has the situation: I
I Improved
|— l Oeqraded
I I Remained Unchanged
H igher management in m y division doesn't want to hear about problems - they ju st w .n t 'good news.'
8. Do you believe the above paragraph to be true today?
Q Y es 0 hb
If yes, has the situation: I
I Improved
I
I Degraded
I I Remained Unchanocd
9.

Do you submit activity reports to your Supervisor, both positive and negative? I
If yes, □
written or □
verbal?

I Yes I

I No

TO. How would you rate the efmrt made by management to get the ideas and opinions of
employees like yourself? I
I Gxd I
I So-so I
I Poor
11.

Are you aware that Phase It of the General Dynamics Employees Survey will be conducted
in September 1989? Q Yes □ hb
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APPENDIX E

Planning Group Interview Guide
1.

What do you think was the main reason for implementing
the Ethics Program at General Dynamics?

2.

What are the objectives of the Ethics Program?

3.

Do you feel the Ethics Program has been effective?
Successful?

4.

How can you tell whether or not the Ethics Program is
successful?

5.

How long does General Dynamics intend to carry out the
Ethics Program?

6.

Do you think the Ethics Program was properly planned and
executed?

7-

In retrospect, how would you have changed it?

Has there been any resistence to the program?

How and

by whom?
8.

Was resistence to the program planned for?

How?

9.

How successful has GD been in maintaining the changes
intended by the Ethics Program?

10.

Would you consider GD innovative?

11.

Has the company changed in the past three years?

How?
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APPENDIX F

Cultural Group Interview Guide
1.

How is this organization different from what it was a
few years ago?

2.

If there are any differences, to what do you attribute
them?

3.

Who determines how things get done around here?

4.

How does this person (group) actually make things
happen?

5.

Who solves the problems?

How?

6.

Do you see a need for changes in this

organization?

What?
7.

How do you know when someone is really interested in
doing a good job?

8.

How do you know whether or not you are doing a good job?

9.

What reasons, other than money, keep you working here?

10.

Who do you think is a good example of the kind of
employee you would like to be?

11.

Why?

What is your favorite story about the company that you
would tell someone at a party?

12.

Do you think upper management is trying to do the right
thing for employees?
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APPENDIX G

Interview Consent Form

I- the undersigned, agree to participate in a study of
organizational change and organizational culture at General
Dynamics conducted by Rick Barker.
I understand that I may be interviewed more than once, but I
reserve the right to refuse to answer any questions I
consider inappropriate or to cease my participation at any
time.
I further understand that I will not be identified by name
in the final report, and that no direct quotations of my
comments nor any specific answers that I give will be
attributed to me.
I understand that no one but Rick Barker
will know what I have said specifically.

Signed.
Date
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Standards of Ethics and Conduct Handbook

General Dynam ics
Standards of
Business Ethics
and Conduct
——

i- -

lV

Second Edition

“We are dedicated to achieving in
our administrative performance the
same high level of excdletcs which
we have historically achieved In
engineering and manufacturing.*

GENERAL DYNAMICS
A Strong Company For A Strong Country
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DEAR FELLOW EMPLOYEES:
G E N E R A !- O V N A M IC 5
E le c tro n ic s D iv is io n

This booklet is written to help. It contains useful
guidelines for daily business conduce It also tdls how
to get assistance if you have questions or concents
about the Standards o f Business Ethics and Conduct.
This new edition o f the booklet has been updated
and improved based on what we beard from you
through Ethics Awareness Workshops, tbe Employee
Surveys, and communications with the Ethics Program

HELP
•

EM PLO YEE BENEFITS
573-7083

•

EMPLO YEE SU G G ESTIO N PROGRAM
5 73-50*5

•

EQUAL EM PLO YM ENT O P P O R T U N IT Y
573-5310

•

ETHICS HOTLINES
Available 24 Hours a Day...7 Days a Week
573-5384 - Division
1-800-433-8442 - Corporate

•

LABOR A C C O U N TIN G
573-5024

•

O M B U D SM A N HOTLINE
Emoioyee Concerns
5 -3-5800

•

SAFETY
573-5911

•

S E C U R IT Y HOTLINE
573-7815

•

W O R K ER 'S C OM PENSATION
573-7085

•

CORPORATE OFFICE E TH IC S PROGRAM
P.O. BOX 50253
CLAYTON. M O . 63105

Directors. The Standards remain unchanged in sub
stance except for some points of clarification in mean
ing, the addition of two new Standards, and the modi
fication of one other. The new Standards are 0 ) Safety
and Health and (2 ) Proper Use of the Ethics Program.
The modified Standard is Suppliers and Consultants,
which now permits tbe acceptance from suppliers of
unsolicited promotional items of trivial value providing
acceptance does not constitute a conflict of interest in
either appearance or fact. The material on Our
Responsibilities has been clarified and enlarged.
The Standards contained in this booklet are like
roadsigns. They give directions in areas o f daily busi
ness activity where possible problems of conduct could
occur. Some Standards such as Time Card Reporting.
Quality and Testing. Security, and Company and Cus
tomer Resources involve all or most employees of
General Dynamics. Other Standards such as Antitrust
or International Business likely involve only some
employees. Some Standards involve ethical issues
directly and the Standards stare what conduct is accept
able or unacceptable. Other Standards involve safe
guards put in place to avoid either the t in or the
appearance o f misconduct. All Standards, however, are
important to administrative excellence.
Every employee has a role to play in upholding the
Standards. The Standards depend on the sense of
honesty, fairness and integrity brought to the job by all
employees. O ur values as individuals, applied to every
thing we do on tbe job. help determine what the values
of General Dynamics are perceived to be. Our values
are the values o f the company.
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In the first two yens, die implementation of the
Ethics Program has made significant progress. The
program has already had an important impact on
strengthening our administrative performance and on
improving our image as a company with our customers
and the general public. But the challenge continues, and
without an ongoing effort, the progress that has been
made could be easily lost. W e are determined to main
tain the high standards o f conduct set by these Stan
dards and we believe you share that determinarion. W e
urge you to remain thoroughly familiar with the con
tents of this booklet and we encourage you to seek
assistance when a question or coocem arises to which
there appears to be no immediate answer.
The employees of General Dynamics have demon
strated repeatedly what is the right conduct We believe
the future of General Dynamics depends not only on
the skills, abilities and commitment of all employees
but also on their continued goodwill, judgment, selfdiscipline. common sense and integrity. Thank you for
your contribution to the success o f General Dynamics.
W e share your pride in our company's
accomplishments and look forward to a strong future.

Stanley C Pace, Chairman
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OUR COMMITMENTS
There are five key relationships in the business of
General Dynamics. These relationships involve cus
tomers, suppliers, fellow employees, shareholders and
the communities in which we operate. A ll employees
participate in one way or another in these key relation
ships. The following commitments serve as broad ideals
for shaping these relationships.

OUR MISSION
General Dynamics is a company of talented, dedi
cated and resourceful people who share a responsibility
to provide the highest quality products for the benefit
o f the United States and the Free World,
Genera] Dynamics develops, produces and supports
innovative, reliable and highly sophisticated systems
and diverse military and commercial products to keep
our cation technologically strong in every environment
from undersea to outer space. These progiams consis
tently evolve as the foundation for the neat generation
o f technical advancements.
As a leading engineering-based manufacturer, we
©ring together a wide variety of technical and business
concepts to provide cost-efficient production programs
which uniquely satisfy our customers’ challenging
requirements.

• To our customers we will be attentive and strive to
maximize the value, quality and operability of
General Dynamics products and services within the
requirements of our contracts.
• To our suppliers we will be the best customer we
can be and will emphasize both lair competition and
long-lasting relationships.
• To each other, as employees, we will treat one
another fairly and with the dignity and respect due
ail human beings.
• To our shareholders we wul pursue our growth and
earnings objectives while always keeping ethical
standards at the forefront of our activities.
• To the many communities of which we are a
member, and to society as a whole, we will act as
responsible and responsive corporate citizens and in
a moral, ethical and beneficial manner.

OURVALUES
In order to fulfill these commitments, it is important
for all employees to be:
•

Dedicated and loyal to our company and to our
country,

•

Law-abiding,

•

Honest and trustworthy,

•

Responsible and reliable,

•

Truthful and accurate.

•

Fair and cooperative,

« Economical in urilizing company and customer
resources.
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OUR RESPONSIBILITIES

•

demonstrating their own commitment by conducting
themselves and managing their departments and the
activities o f all employees under their supervision in
accordance with the Standards,

•

maintaining a workplace environment that
encourages frank and open communication, free of
the fear of reprisal, concerning the upholding o f the
Standards.

The Company
Under these Standards, the company is responsible
Car
•

implementing the Ethics Program,

•

distributing the General Dynamics Standards of
Business Ethics and Conduct contained in this
booklet to all employees.

•

providing all employees with dear guidelines on
matters o f everyday business conduct,

•

making sure through established educational and
training programs that all employees are aware of
and understand the Standards,

•

providing continuing counsel on company rules and
regulations to any employee who seeks it.

•

maintaining working conditions at all locations
supportive of employee responsibilities under these
Standards.

•

enforcing compliance with the Standards,

•

recognizing employees who make an exemplary
effort to implement and uphold the Standards

Supervisors
Under these Standards all levels o f supervision have
a special responsibility for the implementation of the
Standards o f Business Ethics and Conduct and will be
measured in their performance for

All Employees
Under these Standards, all employees, regardless of
rank or station; are responsible for
• reviewing regularly their knowledge and
understanding of the Standards,
•

upholding the Standards and the policies,
procedures, and practices that support them as
demonstrated by their daily business conduct.

• contributing to a workplace environment that is
conducive to the maintenance of the Standards in
daily business activities.
• seeking help when the proper course o'f action is
unclear or unknown,
• remaining alert and sensitive to situations which
could result in actions by any employee that are
illegal, unethical, in violation of the Standards or the
policies and procedures that support the Standards,
or otherwise improper,

assuring that all current and new employees under
their supervision receive a copy o f the Standards of

• counseling fellow employees when it appears they
may be in danger of violaung the Standards or
company policies and procedures,

Business Ethics and Conduct and are trained in its
meaning and application,

• reporting violations of the Standards to those to
whom responsibility for discipline has been assigned.

•

reviewing the knowledge and understanding of this
booklet by employees under their supervision and
ensuring that “ refresher” programs are provided as
necessary,

•

stressing to all employees in word and deed the need
for a continuing commitment to the Standards.

Specific ethical responsibilities of employees should
be clearly defined by the company in education and
training programs. Any employee still in doubt about
his or her responsibilities should feel free to seek
additional counsel from his or her supervisor or any
Ethics Program Director.

•

6

7
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ETHICS PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
The Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct are
the centerpiece of the General Dynamics Ethics Pro
gram. The aim o f the Eihics Program is to integrate
these Standards into the daily business activities of the
company.
To help fulfill this aim. the Board of Directors has
established the Committee on Corporate Responsibility
to review and approve Ethics Program policy and the
effectiveness of the Ethics Program. The Committee
establishes the requirements for management to report
on the implementation of the program. The Committee
consists entirely of outside Directors of the Board.
The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer has
created the Corporate Ethics Steering Group to assist
management in the implementation of tbe Ethics Pro
gram. The Steering Group is available to review
recommendations on policies, procedures and practices
pertaining to the Ethics Program. The Steering Group
consists of corporate leaders o f various functional
departments including Legal Human Resources. Inter
nal Audit. Contracts and Pricing, International Offset
and Controller. It is led by the Corporate Ethics
Program Director and assisted by the C orpor te Vice
President for Human Resources who is responsible for
implementing training and education pertaining to the
Standards and the Corporate Vice President-General
Counsel who is responsible for appropriate legal gui
dance under the Standards and for interpreting
applicable taws, regulations and government orders.
Ethics Program Directors are installed at corporate
headquanets and at each division or subsidiary to assist
management in the implementation of the Ethics Pro
gram. A n important pan of every Ethics Program
Director’s job is to establish and maintain open chan
nels o f communication for all employees at each loca
tion. Ethics Program Directors provide information and
advice to employees who have questions or concerns
about the meaning or application of the Standards. The
individuals serving as Ethics Program Directors report
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directly to the head of their local organization and ha
a functional responsibility to the Cor,orate Eihics Pro
gram Director.
Attorneys at tbe Corporate Office and at each divi
sion support the Ethics Program by providing guidance,
support and counsel pertaining to the Standards and by
reviewing and interpreting, any applicable taws,
regulations and government ordere.

OUR STANDARDS
Conflicts of Interest
“A conflict between the private interests and the
official responsibilities o f a person in a position of
truss."
As employees we should all consider ourselves as
persons in positions of trust and conduct ourselves
accordingly. We must be particularly sensitive to the
many situations, on and off the job. where a conflict of
interest or even a perception of such a conflict could
originate. Such conflicts could involve customers, sup
pliers. present or prospective employees, shareholders,
or members of the communities in which we operate.

Gifts, Gratuities and Entertainment to
Customers
As a company, our continuing objective is to provide
our customers with the highest quality product at the
best possible price.
It is a serious violation of our Standards for any
employee to seek a competitive advantage through the
use of gifts, gratuities, entertainment or other favors.
Under no circumstance may we offer or give any item
of value to a customer or a customer's representative in
an effort to influence a contract award or other favor
able customer action. St is General Dynamics policy to
compete solely on the merits of its products and
services.
In some foreign countries, customs require the
exchange of gifts. In cases where it is desirable to meet
such a requirement, the company will provide the gift;
any gifts received will become company property.
9
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Inside Information
In no instance may we as employees ever use or
share inside information, which is not otherwise avail
able to the genera! public, for any manner of personal
gain as might be realized, for example, through trading
in the stock of our company or any other company.

Outside Interests
A conflict with the interests o f General Dynamics
can arise when an employee holds a material invest
ment interest in or is an official, director or employee
of another enterprise, particularly if that enterprise is a
supplier of products or services to the company. While
such circumstances are not automatically prohibited,
they are not desirable, and must not be entered into or
exist without prior written disclosure to and approval
by the company.

Former Government Employees
The company has clear written policies and pro
cedures which govern the conditions of employment of
former U.S. Government employees and which will
affect the duties they perform as employees of General
Dynamics.
It is absolutely essential that the company and any
such employee abide strictly by the letter and spirit of
these policies and proosdures to preclude the la a or
perception of illegality or impropriety.

We must make certain that the company's contrac
tual obligations are clearly defined.
All information we provide relative to General
Dynamics produns or services should be clear and
accurate.

Antitrust
The antitrust laws o f the United States and other
countries are extremely important.
A wide .range of transactions or practices arc prohi
bited under those laws. No agreement or understanding
may be made with competitors to fix or control prices,
to allocate products, markets or temtories, to boycott
certain customers or suppliers, or to refrain from or
limit the manufacture, sale or production of any
product.
The provisions of the antitrust statutes apply to both
formal and informal communications. Employees
involved in trade association activities or in other situa
tions allowing for less formal communication among
competitors, customers or suppliers must be especially
alert to the requirements of the law.
Anyone in doubt as to the application of the anti
trust laws in the United States or overseas should
immediately consult a company attorney.

Pricing, Billing and Contracting
Employees who are involved in any way in the
pricing, billing or contracting functions have a
special responsibility to:

Selling and Marketing
As employees, we should remember these key points
in connection with sales or marketing of our products
and services:
If at any time, it becomes clear that the company
must engage in unethical or illegal activity to win a
contrao, that business will not be pursued further.
It is our responsibility as employees to understand
the requirements o f the customer and do rite very best
we can to satisfy those requirements by submitting real
istic proposals on performance, cost and schedule.

•

understand and 3dhere to all applicable procurement
regulations and relevant company policies and
procedures with regatd to all aspects of the sale of
General Dynamics products or services.

• ensure that cost accounting standards and principles
of cost allowability as well as relevant company poli
cies and procedures are properly and consstently
followed

10
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establish prices for company products and services
that are fair and reflect their cost, the technology
involved, the difficulty of overall performance. the
market conditions, and all other relevant factors. In
out pricing negotiations with the U.S. Government,
we must at all times adhere to the provisions of the
Truth in Negotiations Act and relevant company
policies and procedures. Our prices should be clear,
accurate and presented so as to be fully understood
by the customer.
accurately reflect, in all invoices to customers and
others, the product sold or services rendered, the
true sales price and terms o f sale. Payments received
in excess of amounts billed mu<t be promptly
refunded or customer accounts credited, as
appropriate.

Time Card Reporting
Timely and accurate completion of time cards as
described in company policies and procedures is essen
tial. We must ensure that no cost is allocated to a
government contract which is unallowable, contrary to
the contract or related regulations, or otherwise
improper. AU employees shall report only the true and
actual number of hours worked by them. Shifting of
costs to inappropriate contracts is strictly prohibited.
Reporting of hours not worked, but for which pay is
received, must also be true and accurate.

Suppliers and Consultants
Whenever possible, materials, supplies, equipment,
consulting and other services should be procured from
qualified suppliers at the lowest cost, keeping in mind
the requirements for quality, performance and the
vendor's ability to meet delivery schedules.
As a company and as individual employees, we will
always employ the highest ethical business practices in
source selection, negotiation, determination of awards
and the administration of all purchasing activities.
Whenever feasible, we will encourage, establish and
maintain compcution and will at all times comply with
applicable government regulations and contractual

12

requirements as well as company policies and
procedures.
Except for items that are dearly promotional in
nature, mass produced, trivial in value, and not
intended to evoke any form of reciprocation,
employees of General Dynamics may not accept gifts,
entertainment or anything else of value from current or
potential suppliers of goods or services from consultants
to the company. Solicitation of any item, regardless of
value, is expressly prohibited.

Quality and Testing
It is our responsibility a company to ensure that
our products are designed and manufactured to meet
the appropriate inspection, test and quality criteria of
our customers, to perform the testing oecessarv to meet
these criteria, and to provide the necessary documenta
tion m support of this testing. The inspection and test
ing documentation must be complete, accurate and
truthful. As empioye-s we are all expected to be aware
of and exercise this responsibility, as our jobs require.

Expense Reports
Business expenses properly incurred in performing
company business must be documented promptly with
accuracy and completeness on expense reports.
In the filing o f expense reports, employees must dis
tinguish between personal expenses and business travel
expenses, business conference expenses and business
entertainment expenses.
Employees using company funds for such expenses
should indicate w here, in their judgment, certain costs
are or might be unallowable or inappropriate charges
against government contracts.

Company and Customer Resources
The ability o f General Dynamics to meet the broad
commitments to customers, suppliers, employees,
shareholders and communities, depends on effidentlv
utilizing company and customer resources. These
resources include technology, data, buildings, land,
equipment, cash and the time and talent of employees.

13
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As employees we may not make improper use of
company or customer resources nor permit others to do
so.

bank account No funds shall be maintained in the
form of cash, except to the limited extent reasonably
required for normal business operations.

This particularly prohibits the payment of bribes,
kickbacks or illegal payments of cash or other gifts in
any form and in any amounts.

Security

Other examples of improper use include
unauthorized appropriation, possession or personal use
o f company or customer assets, technology and patents,
software, computer, communication and copying
equipment or office supplies. Also foroidden is the
unauthorized possession, use. alteration, destruction or
disclosure of company sensitive data.

Department of Defense. We. as employees, have a spe
cial obligation to comply with those government regu
lations and laws, as w d! as with relevant company
polities and procedures, which protea our nation's
security and safeguard our nation's defense secrets.

Technology and Information
The backbone of General Dynamics as a competitive
business is our ability to develop and use high technol
ogy m day-to-day operations. Failure to maintain
control of our technological edge could cause us irrepa
rable harm As employees, we are all responsible for
guarding our technology against unauthorized disclo
sure. This applies not only to government classified
information, but also to proprietary and private data
developed or purchased by us or entrusted to us by cus
tomers or suppliers. These restrictions apply whether
the information is in written or electronic form or is
simply known by us as employees.

Cash and Bank Accounts
A ll cash and bank account transactions must be
handled so as to avoid any question of bribery, kick
backs. other illegal or improper payments or any sus
picion o f impropriety whatsoever. All cash transactions
must be recorded in the company's books of account.
A ll accounts of company funds shall be established
and maintained in the name of General Dynamics or
one of its subsidiaries, with the exception of petty cash
accounts. All transactions and accounts involving com
pany funds shall be dearly and accurately identified in
General Dynamics’ books and records. All cash
received by the company shall be promptly r e c o r d e d
on its books and deposited in a General Dynamics
14

General Dynamics is a major contractor with the

The effectiveness o f national and industrial security is
heaviiy dependent on those individuals who have
access to classified information. As employees, security
is an integral pan o f our jobs, whether or not we work
directly with such information.
Employees possessing a valid security clearance and
requiring access to specific classified informauor. will
ensure that such information, in whatever form it exists,
is handled strictly in accordance with the procedures set
h n h by the Department of Defense for safeguarding
classified information.
W e should not seek access to, accept or retain any
classified materials for which we have no need or to
which we are not entitled.
The unauthorized possession of classified documents
or classified information in any form, or failure to
properly safeguard such information, violates these
Standards, car. endanger the security of the United
States, and is punishable under the Espionage Laws
and Federal Criminal Statutes.

Political Contributions
Federal law and many state laws prohibit contribu
tions by the corporation to political parties or candi
dates. Where prohibited by law, therefore, no company
funds or other assets are to be contributed or loaned,
directly or indirealy. to any political party or for the
campaign of any person for political office, or
expended in support o f or in opposition to such party
or person.

IS
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Where corporate political contributions are legal in
connection with state, local or foreign elections, such
contributions shall be made only from funds allocated
for such a purpose by authorization of the Board of
Directors.
The company encourages ail of us as employees to
participate on an individual basis in political activities
on our own time and in our own way.

Environmental Actions
As a company and as employees, we must exercise
good judgment with regard to the environmental
aspects o f our use o f buildings and real estate, our
manufacturing processes and our products themselves.
All necessary action must be taken to eliminate the
generation, discharge and disposal of hazardous mate
rials. W e must comply fully with all federal state and
local environmental protection laws.

Safety and Health
As a company and as individual employees we are
responsible for maintaining a safe and heaithful work
environment. We must comply fully with ail federal
state and local health and safety laws and regulations.

International Business
Special care m u z he taken to identify and accom
modate the differences between international markets
and those in the United States.
As a company operating internationally, we encoun
ter laws which may vary widely from those in the
United States. These laws may on occasion conflict
with one another. Local customs and practices with
regard to business and social dealings may also vary
from country to country. Our policy is to comply with
all laws which apply in the countries where we do busi
ness. The laws of the United States and the countries in
which General Dynamics docs business must be
obeyed. Furthermore, in countries where common busi
ness practices might be less restrictive than those out
lined in the Standards, we will follow the Standards
outlined in this booklet.

16

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other U.S.
laws prohibit the payment ofanv money or anything of
value to a foreign official foreign political pany (or
official thereof) or any candidate for foreign political
office for purposes of obtaining, retaining or directing
of business. .As a company and as employees, we must
strictly abide by these laws. Any violations or any solici
tations to violate must be reported immediately.
The Foreign Comipt Practices Act. although silent
on the subject, is said not to prohibit so called
-facilitating payments." such as payments for
expediting shipments through customs or placing a
transoceanic telephone call, securing required permits,
or obtaining adequate police protection — transactions
which simply facilitate the proper performance of
duties. While company policy does not prohibit such
payments, employees are to seek advice in advance
from company legal counsel in cases where facilitating
payments may be involved. Any such facilitating
payments must be properly accounted for in the
company's records.

Proper Use of the Ethics Program
An important aim of the Ethics Program is to pro
vide guidance to all employees on matters of ethics and
business conduct. The Ethics Program is available to
answer questions, give advice, address concerns and
investigate allegations related to the meaning and appli
cation of the Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct.
Unfortunately such a program is subject to abuse.
From tune to time, in the name o f “Ethics.’* an
employee may attempt to harm or slander another
employee through false accusations, malicious rumors
or other irresponsible actions. Such attempts, if proven,
will be subject to discipline.
Again, from time to time, an employee who exer
cises roponsibility for upholding the Standards may be
threatened with reprisal by other employees including
management. Such reprisal is not only against company
policy but. in some instances, is also a violation of the
law. Reprisal if proven, will be subject to commen
surate discipline.
17
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ACXNOWLESGEMENT

Eihics Program Directors

As a condition of employment, ail new employees
are asked to sign an Acknowledgement Card which
states:

Ethics Program Directors have been designated for
each of the various company locations and are
available for employee counseling and assistance with
regard to these Standards. The Ethics Program Direc
tors may be reached by wav of regular telephone,
hotline, letter or personal visit. Inquiries will be treated
with courtesy and discretion.

' I have received and read the Second Edition
o f the General Dynamics Standards of Business
Ethics and Conduct. I understand that these
Standards represent the policies of General
Dynamics."
A ll current'employees are also asked to sign an
Acknowledgement Card each ome the Standards are
revised and redistributed.
One copy o f the card is to be retained by the
employee. The other copy is placed in the employee's
permanent personnel file.
All standard consultant agreements include a clause
requiring adherence to the Standards as a condition of
the agreement.
A ll active suppliers receive an annual solicitation to
help support the Standards in business relationships
between them and General Dynamics.

HELP AND INFORMATION
The company has designated personnel to asist
employees in resolving questions involving ethics and
conduct. As employees, we should not hesitate to avail
ourselves of the help.

Company Attorneys
Company attorneys o f General Dynamics are avail
able to employees and management for assistance and
information with regard to these Standards and for the
issuance of interpretative opinions.

DISCIPLINE AND MANDATORY
SANCTIONS
The Standards in this booklet are important to the
company and must be taken seriourlv by all of us as
employees. Accordingly, vioiauons of these Standards
will not be tolerated and. in accordance with company
reguiauons and applicable collective oargainmg
agreements, will result in one or more of the following
sancuons. as appropriate:
• A warning.
• A reprimand (will be noted in individual's perma
nent personnel record),
• Probation,
• Demotion.

Supervisors

• Temporary suspension.
An employee with a need for help or information
regarding these Standards is encouraged to take up that
need with his or her immediate supervisor. If there is
reason why asking the immediate supervisor is inappro
priate. the employee should seek the help of the Ethics
Program Director or a company attorney.

18

• Discharge.
• Required reimbursement of losses or damages,
• Referral for criminal prosecution or civil action.

19
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SUMMARY
It is the objective of the company and each of us us
employees, to operate according to the highest possible
standards. We have a scnous responsibility to ensure
that our personal conduct is above reproach and. diffi
cult as it may be at times, we also have obligations
regarding the conduct of those who work around us. In
cases where we are aware of violations of the Stan
dards in this booklet, we should make th3t situation
known to our supervisor or to an Ethics Program
Director.
The Standards wiil be enforced at all levels fairly
and without prejudice. Consistent with our obligations
under the law. and within the enforcement processes
established herein, the company will keep confidential
the identity of employees about or against whom allega
tions of violations are brought, uniess or until it has
been determined that a violation has occurred. Simi
larly, the company will take all reasonable steps to
keep confidential the identity of anyone reporting a
possible violauon.

Corporate Policies and Procedures and
Division or Subsidiary Standard Practices
The Standards of Business Ethics and Conduct
found in this booklet are supported by more
deuiled Corporate Policies and Procedures
(C?Ps) and Divisioa or Subsidiary btandard
Practices (SPs). These policies, procedures and
standard practices provide dear and specific
directions concerning everyday business practices
and behavior. Employees wishing to consult a
Corporate Policy or Procedure and Division or
Subsidiary Standard Practice should ask their
supervisor or an Ethics Program Director.

20
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APPENDIX I

Timeline of Surveys and Interviews
April, 1983

April 1983 Survey of Production

March, 1988

March 1988 Survey of Material

February, 1989

February 1989 Engineering Survey

June, 1989

June 1989 Survey of Material (resurvey)

June/July, 1989

Interviews with Planning Group

July/August, 1989

Interviews with Cultural Group
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